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Foreword
“Self-control, openness, the ability to engage with others, to plan and to
persist - these are the attributes that get people in the door and on the job,
and lead to productive lives.”
—JAMES HECKMAN1
This quotation from a New York Times article by James Heckman summarises broadly
but very illustratively important determinants of a life most people would define as “suc-
cessful” or expressed in a more economic manner, as “productive”. For such a productive
life, a comprehensive and enriching education seems to be valued as similar important as
commitment and dedication in a future working life since many of the characteristics Heck-
man highlights are learnt and shaped during formal education but also when interacting
with others at work.
This dissertation is intended to investigate some aspects of these two fields, education
and the labour market which basically every person will be in touch with sooner or later.
The first two chapters deal with determinants and possible outcomes of mobility decisions
whilst a person pursues her education. The final chapter 3 strives to answer questions,
related to the search process at the labour market.
Chapter 1 and 2 do not only investigate a different “stage” of the career than chapter 3,
the point of view is also slightly different. Whilst chapter 1 and 2 puts the individual, here
the student, in focus, investigations chapter 3 focus on the behaviour of the employers side
on the labour market.
Although seemingly intuitive, questions related to a well-founded education as cen-
tral cornerstone for a successful career have not always attracted these levels of public inter-
est as we observe nowadays. Scholars like Eric Hanushek or James Heckman dealt with this
field of so called Education Economics already since the 1970s. However, the importance
1US-American Economist and laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2000 (Heckman, 2013).
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of education gained firstly massive public attention when the results of the first OECD-
comparison of student assessments were published, better known as PISA (Programme for
International Student Assessment). Especially in Germany, the bad performance of local
pupils in comparison to other OECD countries lead to a great discussions about the success
and capability of the domestic educational system.
Whereas PISA lead to a remarkable increase in research related to the schooling suc-
cess of pupils and possible determinants, up to now the tertiary educational system in Ger-
many has not received this high level of attention, especially during the last few years. Al-
though the introduction of tuition fees in Germany lead to an unique cut in a, up to this date,
fee free university policy, research on universities in Germany seems to attract relatively less
attention. Especially in comparison to a established body of research on the effects of tuition
or personal determinants on study outcomes for Anglo American countries, results for Ger-
many are relatively scarce.
My dissertation is intended to close this gap partially by focussing on two aspects of
mobility for university enrolment in a German context. Chapter 1 puts the focus on the
period of tuition fees in Germany and how these fees shaped mobility patterns of first year
students. Chapter 2 deals with a more general question, namely whether mobility during
the period of (academic) education explains subsequent mobility and monetary success.
Changing from this educational context to the labour market, I shed light on the search
process when looking for new workers from an employer’s perspective in chapter 3. This
process is investigated by well-founded theoretical literature, whereas empirical results to
verify theoretical outcomes are relatively rare in comparison.
The introduction of tuition fees in Germany, which is investigated in chapter 1 lead to
a comprehensive debate, especially amongst students and policy-makers. Previous to the
introduction of the fees, numerous comments on the pros and cons of such financial duties
were published, like the following one in the newspaper Die ZEIT in July 2009:
“If there had been tuition fees, I would not have been able to study.”
—FRANK-WALTER STEINMEIER2
This introduction of tuition fees in Germany in the aftermath of a decision of the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court in January 2005, declaring a ban of fees unconstitutional might
2Federal President of Germany and former Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs (Steinmeier, 2009).
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mark the most significant change in financing of tertiary education in Germany within re-
cent decades. Previously, studying in Germany was free of any fees in general. This might
explain the massive public debates preceding the introduction of those fees. Whereas some
opponents of those fees like Frank-Walter Steinmeier argued that tuition fees might hinder
prospective students from lower income groups from pursuing an university degree, others
argued that the barriers for children from low wage earners to go to university are deeply
rooted in a relatively impermeable educational system (e.g. Spiewak (2009)). Advocates of
a differentiated fee scheme which should charge only higher income groups argue in the
sense of Karl Marx, who asserted already in 1875 in his critique of the “Gothaer Programm":
“If in some states [...] higher education institutions are also ‘free’, that only
means in fact defraying the cost of education of the upper classes from the
general tax receipts.”
—KARL MARX3
These two quotes from a broad spectrum of arguments with respect to the pros and
cons of tuition fees in Germany should give a small insight into the discussion which arose
when some states decided to introduce tuition fees. However, not even 10 years after the
first state had fees introduced, all states were fee free again (and are still fee free until now).
In general, research has shown that there are significant negative effects of an increase in
tuition fees on the enrolment behaviour of prospective students (see e.g. Neill (2009) or
Wilkins et al. (2013)), especially for lower income groups (Coelli, 2009). Whereas these re-
sults stem from investigations of Anglo-American countries (USA, Canada or UK), who ex-
hibit a significantly different fee scheme in terms of magnitude and heterogeneity between
universities and states, the German case is different due to a very homogeneous level of fees
(roughly e500 per term) and a state-wide introduction with no exemptions among public
universities.
Therefore, the question of distributive effects in terms of access to university can
hardly be answered by taking results from an international context. Although first empirical
analyses (e.g. Baier and Helbig (2011)) do not find significant drops in enrolment rates of
prospective students and explain these findings with fee-induced higher outcomes of a uni-
versity degree, the discussion about the fairness of those fees went on until the abolishment
in all related states.
3German economist and philosopher (Marx and Engels, 1970, p.2).
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In chapter 1, I investigate a question, closely related to the findings of authors like
Bruckmeier and Wigger (2014), Baier and Helbig (2011) or Mitze et al. (2015) finding small
or negligible effects of the enrolment rates in reaction to an introduction of tuition fees. My
focus lies on the question how tuition fees shaped migration behaviour of first year students
in some states if they e.g. stem from a fee free state with a neighbouring fee charging state
or vice versa. Since tuition fees were abolished relatively shortly after their introduction, I
examine whether this short period of tuition fees (with introduction and abolishment shortly
afterwards) has lead to a general effect in enrolment rates or migration patterns.
The question, whether the introduction of fees lead to changes in migration patterns
is important in many respects. Firstly, Germans (and also German students) display a rel-
atively low level of mobility: Whereas relocations in Germany happen in more than 80%
within the same state, similar behaviour can be found regarding the willingness of prospec-
tive students to leave the home state in order to enrol in university. Taking into account
that German students are less mobile in general, it is important to note that financial barri-
ers to start to study increase if the home state charges fees. Since moving to another state
and therefore having to rent an own flat/room etc. is the only possibility to avoid fees, the
question whether students react spatially to an introduction of fees becomes a question of
equal access to higher education. Only families of higher income groups might be capable
to finance a university degree away from home.
Secondly, students in Germany are generally free to decide where to enrol. The level
of tuition fees in Germany did not depend on the origin of the person enrolling, i.e. people
coming from the same state did not receive fee discounts as some American universities of-
fer for students from the same state. Therefore, the effects of fees on enrolment behaviour
can help to answer the question whether fees have negative effects on enrolment rates (sim-
ply because they increase the costs to study) or whether they have positive effects by sig-
nalling a higher quality of eduction.
My results suggest that the generally low level of mobility of prospective students in
Germany is not altered by the introduction of tuition fees in general: total flows to a state do
not change significantly if this state introduces fees or abolishes them. However, the aspect
of adjacency between two states when investigating these flows seems to be important. I
find that the ratio of first year students (normalised by the respective age specific cohort)
starting to study in a neighbouring state decreases significantly if this state introduces tu-
ition fees whilst the home state does not.
Furthermore, I do not find any anticipatory effects in reaction to the abolishment of
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tuition fees: students do not seem to delay their enrolment decision to the date the fees are
abolished in their home state again, if they have notice of this point in time.
Interestingly, aggregated results suggest a positive all over effect of the introduction
and abolishment of tuition fees for the enrolment rates of those states. A state which ex-
perienced a period of tuition fees receives higher flows of incoming students than previous
to the introduction of fees. This, in the first moment puzzling result, may be explained by
the financing of universities in states with tuition fees. For example, universities in Bavaria
generated e219 million of additional budget by tuition fees. To avoid an underfinancing of
these universities after the abolishment of tuition fees, Bavarian government guaranteed a
compensation of exactly this amount (Scherf, 2013). According to personal contact to the
German Hochschulrektorenkonferenz (Conference of University Presidents), most universities
in the other, fee abolishing states, complained successfully to ensure a public compensation
as well.
Therefore, it could be argued that the period of tuition fees lead to a better financial
endowment of universities in the respective states without a higher level of financial inclu-
sion of students in comparison to states which never charged fees. By saying so, tuition fees
lead to a better university financing without higher fees for students in the long run, which
might be an explanation for the increased popularity of those states in recent years (after the
abolishment of the fees).
Chapter 2 investigates a more general question related to the professional career, namely
how mobility in the working life is shaped by mobility in younger years. This question is
important from a policy perspective: If people who are mobile earn a higher lifetime income,
the state should implement policies and programmes to foster mobility e.g. of high school
or university students to increase the welfare of these persons but also the state itself due to
higher tax earnings in the future (assuming the person stays in the country she grew up).
The so called ERASMUS-programme is an illustrative example of how a public policy
can foster even transnational mobility. The ERASMUS-programme was founded in 1987
to simplify studying abroad (within the European Union) by increasing the collaboration
between European universities and supporting the students with scholarships to overcome
the extra costs of a stay abroad. The success of the programme is tremendous, and represents
today the biggest scholarship-scheme worldwide for exchange terms with more than 4.4
million scholarships until 20174 (Schulze-von Laszewski, 2017).
4The year of the 30th anniversary of the founding of ERASMUS.
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Researchers like Parey and Waldinger (2011) showed that the likelihood to work abroad
is significantly higher for people who stayed abroad during university times (in this specific
setting, by spending a term abroad with the ERASMUS-programme). Following these re-
sults, it can be argued that these people, exhibiting a higher level of mobility, are also more
likely to enter higher levels of income as a well established literature on the so called “mo-
bility premium” shows. Some people argue that the upsides of (international) mobility are
even more diverse:
“The benefits of studying abroad are almost endless.”
—MICHELLE OBAMA5
From a researcher’s perspective, questions regarding the benefits and effects of migra-
tion are always connected to the issue of endogeneity: most people move for reasons and
due to personal characteristics which can hardly be observed. Therefore, identifying really
exogenous drivers for mobility is often problematic. We take a relatively small sample of
graduates from Bavarian universities and track these people within Bavaria from school to
their first professional position in the labour market.
We therefore narrow the broad focus from international mobility and its possible gains
to one federal state of Germany and migration patterns of university graduates within. We
do so because this allows us to use a dataset which tracks students down to the postal code
of their high school, their university and their first job. Because of this, we are able to control
for the state of Bavaria on a very fine level in comparison to related literature. However, we
are restricted to the state of Bavaria only due to the dataset used.
We ensure that the sample of interest consists of graduates who are as similar as pos-
sible: in direct observable factors like family background and education but also in a more
indirect, hardly observable dimension like influence of the neighbourhood and therefore
environmental conditioning.
Our results indeed suggest that mobility at a relatively early stage in life (at enrolment
to university) fosters later mobility, in our case when a person decides on whether to move
when entering the labour market. We find significant higher movement rates for those peo-
ple who did not chose the university closest located to their home but moved somewhere
else.
5Former First Lady of the USA (Obama, 2014).
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What we cannot find are higher earnings for those deciding to move more often. If
we take all characteristics into consideration which are relevant for the decision to move (in
our view), those who move do not have superior earnings when entering the labour market.
However, the payouts of these mobility investments might occur at a later point in time (e.g.
when the person has already spent a few years in her occupation), where relevant data is
not available for our case.
Chapter 3 finally takes the opposite view at the labour market by investigating how
an employer deals with problems during the recruitment process. The availability of data is
a problem which occurs when identifying patterns during the recruitment process: in every
dataset, to the best of our knowledge, firms are interviewed once during the recruitment
process about its characteristics, e.g. which and how many channels used, how many people
applied etc.. However, a panel structure is not delivered by the available data in order to
track down which events occurred at what point in time to see e.g. if an additional search
channel has lead to a significant increase in applications.
We overcome this issue by matching firms with different outcomes of the application
process (firms which hired before the intended hiring date, around this date or afterwards)
on observable characteristics. An unique feature of our investigation is the incorporation
of the planned search duration (we know how long a firm planned to search) to control
and match these firms also on unobservable dimensions which are relevant for the search
process.
We are able to show manifold reactions of employers to problems during the recruit-
ment process by employing this approach. Firstly, firms seem to need a sufficiently great
pool of applicants considered to be suitable for a posted position in order to fill this posi-
tion. We can show that, although all firms find suitable applicants, at least 4-5 should be
found to fill a vacancy. If a firm has a smaller pool of suitable candidates, the likelihood that
the filling date is delayed increases significantly.
Secondly, firms react towards this small pool size by increasing the number of search
channels used and by being more willing to make concessions related to qualification and
experience of the candidates.
Thirdly, we show that most of the applicants apply at an early point of the hiring
process, meaning that a prolonged search duration does not necessarily increase the number
of applications proportionally. Especially this point seems to be important from a policy
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perspective. In line with research on so called “phantom-vacancies” 6 our results suggest
that firms should ensure that their vacancy posts are updated from time to time.
Otherwise, possible applicants seem to assume that a vacancy post, although still
available (e.g. in an online platform like linkedin), might be filled if the date of publishing
dates back a decent time.
To put chapter 3 in a global context, results suggest the importance of attracting suit-
able applicants at an early stage of application process. This issue seems to be prevalent
especially in the context of the so called “Fachkräftemangel” (skilled labour shortage), subject
to a massive public debate in Germany in recent years. If this trend of increasing shortage of
suitable workers for certain jobs, although theoretically hard to explain, persists, more and
more firms will face the problem of unfilled vacancies in the future.
By connecting this phenomenon to our results, firms could increase their likelihood
of success by entering the search for a suitable worker with an increased number of search
channels. Instead of activating further channels, once the previous ones did not deliver a
suitable candidate, firms should consider that especially a “freshly” posted vacancy seems to
attract applicants. Therefore, a higher number of search channels from the very beginning
on might also lead to a higher number of suitable candidates (which also apply earlier).
Although using more channels obviously increases the search costs, firms lacking suitable
workers should incorporate the costs of an unfilled position, maybe even for a longer period,
when deciding about the budget for the search for applicants.
Nowadays, firms which are not able to fill a vacancy seem to use incumbent employ-
ees and spread the extra work amongst them. Although a great part of those firms seem to
increase payments to compensate for this additional work, it is questionable whether this
strategy is sustainable in the long run. Again, arguing with the skilled labour shortage and
an increase in the importance of a fair balance between work and leisure, especially pro-
nounced amongst younger generations (known as “Generation Y”), it remains questionable
whether workers might be willing to increase their workloads above the current level agreed
on when entering the firm.
6See e.g. Albrecht et al. (2017)
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Chapter 1
The effect of tuition fees on freshmen flows in Germany
Abstract
The introduction of tuition fees in Germany can be used as a quasi-experimental setting to study
the manifold effects of such fees. I investigate migration patterns of students in reaction to the
introduction and abolishment of those fees. By employing a Difference-in-Differences approach, I
find small but significant effects of tuition fees on migration patterns if countries are neighbouring.
Interestingly, an introduction and following abolishment of fees seem to have negative effects
on the external enrolment of first year students. Posing the question whether students avoid
paying fees by delaying enrolment decisions until tuition fees are abolished again does not lead to
significant effects which could be clarified by a dataset with a higher sampling frequency, however.
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1.1. Introduction
Studying at a German university or applied university (“Fachhochschule”) has been with-
out any tuition fees since the 1970s. This tuition-free regime in tertiary education stands
in stark contrast to countries like the USA or UK, charging fees of several 1,000 dollars per
term, at least partially. In Germany, some states (“Bundesländer”) allowed their universi-
ties to charge tuition fees up to e500 per term in the short period between 2006 and 2014.
This investigation is focussing on the effects these fees might have on migration patterns of
prospective students.
Therefore, I do not solely investigate effects the introduction of tuition fees have on
migration patterns of students but also the change in student flows in reaction to the abol-
ishment of those fees. Since the period of tuition fees in Germany lasted, depending on the
state, between 1 year (Hesse) and 8 years (Lower-Saxony), it is important to account for
possible differences between the states to ensure that effects found are due to the tuition fee
reform and not particular characteristics of the states.
My analysis enriches the existing literature in two different ways. Due to the fact that
since 2014 all German states are fee free again, I am in the lucky position to investigate
migration patterns in reaction to the introduction and the abolishment of tuition fees. This
event of abolishment allows me to investigate effects of tuition fees in a second type of
“reaction dimension”: If a student has to decide on where to study in the period of existing
tuition fees, she can avoid paying those fees only by migrating to a fee-free state. In contrast,
students who receive their university entrance diploma in the transition period before the
abolishment of fees, i.e. in the period after the notification about a fee abolishment but before
the realisation of this abolishment, are offered a second way of studying without tuition
fees, simply by delaying the enrolment to the date when studying is without fees again.
The question whether students make use of this alternative avoidance behaviour will be
investigated here as well.
My findings are, similar to previous investigations, relatively diverse: Whereas I can-
not find strong evidence that students react to tuition fees by a stronger migration to other
states, the abolishment of those fees in the home state seems to trigger students to opt more
often for a (cost free) study course at home. However, the aspect of neighbourhood seems to
be central for the question which state to choose to study. Whereas there are no effects of the
flows from one to the other state if they are not neighbouring, flows from a tuition free state
to a fee introducing state seem to be negatively influenced if these states share a common
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border. However, I cannot find evidence for an enrolment delaying decision in reaction to
an approaching abolishment of tuition fees.
The structure of this investigation is as follows: section 1.2 gives a brief overview over
related literature while section 1.3 explains the institutional setting, the introduction and
abolishment is embedded in. The following section 1.4 describes the dataset employed for
this analysis and presents the empirical approach. Additionally, section 1.5 is fully dedicated
to the identification strategy and validation of important assumptions. Section 1.6 presents
the results according to the set up of the used dataset (aggregated dataset in subsection 1.6.1
and a dyadic approach in subsection 1.6.2). Finally, section 1.7 summarises the main results.
1.2. Related literature
The versatile effects of tuition fees have been studied by a broad strand of literature. Espe-
cially for the United States of America and Canada, researchers have investigated the effects
of the level of tuition fees on migration behaviour. The United States are especially interest-
ing due to the facts that a) tuition fees vary highly between states and especially b) public
universities charge higher fees from students from other states compared to “incumbent”
students. As one of the first authors, Tuckman (1970) shows that there is a positive correla-
tion between the outflow of students and the level of tuition fees charged in their home state.
More recently, Baryla and Dotterweich (2001) find that the sensitivity of students towards
tuition fees highly depends on the quality and recognition of the local student programs and
economic conditions of the universities’ location. In general, evidence regarding the elastic-
ity of enrolment behaviour to the level of tuition fees is mixed. Whereas authors like Leslie
and Brinkmann (1987) find significant negative effects of increased tuition fees on enrolment
rates for Canada,1 the research of e.g. Johnson and Rahman (2005) show only minor if not
negligible effects of the tuition fees on enrolment behaviour. Coelli (2009) shows that a sharp
increase in tuition fees in some Canadian provinces lead to lower enrolment rates especially
amongst low-income groups. In their meta-analysis of 43 related studies, Havranek et al.
(2017) show that enrolment rates seem to be negatively influenced by increasing tuition fees
whereas male students and students at private universities seem to react more sensitive to
such increases.
Literature on tuition fees in Europe mostly identifies small but insignificant effects of
the level of tuition fees on enrolment behaviours. Canton and de Jong (2005) or Huijsman
1The authors find a drop of 3-6 percentage points per $1000 increase in tuition fees.
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et al. (1986) focus on the relatively long post WWII period to identify determinants of en-
rolment for the case of the Netherlands finding only minor effects for the level of tuition
fees. Since Germany, in contrast, introduced tuition fees in relatively recent years, research
in this area concentrates on few empirical investigations. Most important, it should be kept
in mind that the introduction of tuition fees in Germany is hardly comparable to other coun-
tries with tuition fees. This is due to the fact that the tuition fees are roughly the same for
all public universities in all charging states in contrast to countries like the US where the
level of tuition fees exhibits a much higher level of heterogeneity. Additionally, a quasi-
experimental setting is given due to the fact that at the same time some states charge fees
whilst others do not.
As one of the first authors for Germany, Hübner (2012) relates the introduction of tu-
ition fees in some states in Germany to the transition rate from high school to university
by employing a Difference-in-Differences approach. However, this study assumes a com-
mon treatment period for all fee introducing countries (although some states introduced
fees one year ahead of the others) and controls for only very few variables which might
influence transition rates as well. The study of Bruckmeier and Wigger (2014) closes this
gap by allowing for different treatment periods and a set of new control variables leading to
insignificant effects of fee introduction on the state specific transition rates.
Both investigations take the ratio between first year students and high school gradu-
ates in the respective year and state as dependent variable. By doing so, the results already
include a) migration into/out of a state to begin studying and b) timing decisions (e.g. begin
to study one year earlier or later). This post-migration and post-timing dependent variable
does not allow to disentangle possible reactions as a) or b) of students in reaction to the intro-
duction and also the later abolishment of tuition fees. Mitze et al. (2015) investigate the flow
between states and universities depending on the tuition fee status (charging/non-charging)
finding that male students show stronger tuition fee avoiding behaviour by studying in a
tution free state against female and that this behaviour strongly depends on the distance be-
tween universities and the type of university2. They conclude that the reaction of students
to avoid tuition fees decreases the further the distance to the next tuition free university is,
which could be explained by the human capital theory of Becker (1994) arguing that the
costs of avoiding tuition fees increase with distance to the next fee-free university.
2Mitze et al. (2015) distinguish between universities, applied universities (“Fachhochschulen”) and colleges
of art and music.
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1.3. Institutional background
For a long period of time German public universities3 were legally not allowed to charge
tuition fees as regulated in the so called “Hochschulrahmengesetz”. After 35 years of tu-
ition free universities, the federal court decided in January 2005 that this ban of tuition fees
represents an intervention into the legislative independence of the states in educational is-
sues. German public universities did not charge fees for tuitions since 19704. In reaction to
this most authoritative case law, all western German states except for Bremen, Rhineland-
Palatine and Saxony-Anhalt introduced tuition fees between 2006 and 2007. Table 1.1 sum-
marises the introduction and abolishment dates of tuition fees for the states.
Table 1.1: Introduction and abolishment of tuition fees in German states
State Introduction fees Fee abolishment
Baden-Wurttemberg Spring 2007 Spring 2012
Bavaria Spring 2007 Fall 2013
Hesse Fall 2007 Fall 2008
Hamburg Spring 2007 Fall 2012
Lower-Saxony Fall 2006 Fall 2014
North Rhine-Westphalia Fall 2006 Fall 2011
Saarland Fall 2007 Spring 2010
Berlin - -
Brandenburg - -
Bremen - -
Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania - -
Rhineland-Palatinate - -
Saxony - -
Saxony-Anhalt - -
Schleswig-Holstein - -
Thuringia - -
Before the introduction in 2006 and 2007, students were obliged to pay an administra-
tive fee in order to study at a public university. This administrative fee accounted for 75 to
100 Euro and was meant to cover administrative costs of the university, at least partially.
In reaction to the supreme court’s decision in January 2005, the conservative governed
states Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg, Hamburg, Hessia, Lower-Saxony and North Rhine-
Westphalia announced that they will start raising tuition fees up to e500 per term.5 These
fees were in general charged on top of administrative fees, such that the cost of studying
3In the following I will use university synonymously to describe all public tertiary educational institutions,
including universities, applied universities, technical colleges and colleges of art and music.
4Previously, tuition fees were called “Hörgelder” and were repealed after student boycotts in 1970.
5All states except for Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia charged a fixed amount of e500 per term. In
North Rhine-Wesphalia, 2 universities charged less than this amount (one university charged e350 per term,
the other e275 per term). In Bavaria, the mean of tuition fees per term was e481 for universities and e417 for
applied universities. Due to this relatively homogeneous level of fees, I assume that this treatment is similar
between states.
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increased exactly by the amount of fees, the respective university charged. Consequently,
roughly half of all public German universities charged tuition fees at the “zenith” of the
tuition fees in Germany.
Although states like Bavaria or Baden-Wurttemberg included many exemption clauses
from paying tuition fees6, no general financing scheme for prospective students with liq-
uidity constraints was established. Therefore, the introduction of tuition fees in Germany
represents a “basic institutional change from cost-free higher education to a tuition fee
regime”(Mitze et al., 2015, p.391). In general, nearly all universities charged tuition fees
up to the maximum amount of e500 per term, the level for applied universities was with
approximately e400 only slightly lower.
Following massive protests especially from the student body, Hess abolished tuition
fees around one year after their introduction with the beginning of fall term 2008. Saar-
land and North Rhine-Westphalia followed shortly afterwards. Ultimately, Lower-Saxony
abolished tuition fees in fall 2014.
Some specialities of the German tertiary education system have to be kept in mind
when analysing the effects of tuition fees and, especially, comparing them with findings in
Anglo-American countries. Most importantly, there are no local admission restrictions for
German students. In general, every student with a university entrance diploma (“Abitur”)
from whatever German state can apply for any university in Germany. However, there
are local admission restrictions, implemented by the universities themselves (“Numerus
Clausus”). As a result, universities can filter the load of applications by allowing only high
school graduates with a diploma grade better than the Numerus Clausus for a certain field
of study. Only medical degree programs7 are managed via a nation-wide application proce-
dure, handled by the Stiftung für Hochschulzulassung (known as ZVS), placing the applicants
according to preferences and grades possibly all over Germany.
Public universities in Germany are mostly financed by the local and federal budget.
On average, 75% of the financing stems from state governments. Specific research projects,
clusters or schools (e.g.“Exzellenzinitiative”) are financed by federal budgets, adding up to
approximately 15% of universities funding. In total, roughly 90% of public universities are
financed by public funds, the remaining 10% stem from e.g. private sponsoring, contract
research and students administrative or tuition fees (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz, 2019).
6In Baden-Wurttemberg, for example a family with more than two studying children had to pay tuition fees
for a maximum of two children. In Bavaria, families with more two children had to pay no tuition fees for their
children at all.
7I.e. pharmacy, human medicine, veterinary medicine and dentistry
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1.4. Data
1.4.1 Treatment indicator, controls and variables of interest
I build a panel dataset of enrolment figures on the state level for the period between 2000
and 2015 to investigate the migration behaviour of students in reaction to the introduction
and abolishment of tuition fees at public German universities . The data stem from the Fed-
eral Statistical Office and include information on the total number of first year students in a
specific year and state8 and a disaggregation of this number according to the state, the stu-
dent received her university entrance diploma (Federal Statistical Office, 2019b). This data
is merged with data on the total number of high school graduates (Federal Statistical Office,
2019a) and economic factors on the state level (GDP per capita and unemployment rate)
(Statistical Office Baden-Wurttemberg (2018) and Federal Employment Agency (2019)). All
data is available on the state level on a year-by-year basis and split by gender and type of
tertiary education institution (universities and applied universities). I enrich this adminis-
trative data with information on the introduction and abolishment of tuition fees according
to Table 1.19, information for each state on the date the reform of a shortened high school
period (“G8”) came into effect and information on the lag between graduating from high
school and the beginning of studying on the state level (Federal Statistical Office, 2019b).
Since the main interest of this investigation are migration flows, I take the number of
out of state migrating first year students as “base variable”. Since this figure might vary
especially with the respective age specific cohort, I normalise the out of state migration by
this number. Therefore, the normalised out of state migration (NOM) for state i in year t can
be formalised as
NOMit =
TOMit
POPit
(1.1)
where TOMit represents the total number of freshmen with a university entrance diploma
from state i starting to study in year t in a state different from i and POPit the size of the
respective age specific cohort i at time t10. This flow variable can be further split into stu-
dent flows to states with tuition fees (fee out of state migration: FOMit) and states without
8I decide to take the total number of first year students both from universities and applied universities to
give a general overview over migration patterns in reaction to tuition fees in the tertiary education sector.
9I assume the date (term) when fees are introduced and abolished also as date of public disclosure. There-
fore, I assume no anticipation effects due to a lag between public information on introduction/abolishment
of tuition fees and realisation. Changing this points in time into the dates, information about fee introduc-
tion/abolishment became public do not alter my results significantly.
10The size of this age specific cohort as used by Federal Statistical Office (2019b) follows OECD (2018) stan-
dards, taking the share of people of age x enrolled in tertiary education on the total population of age x, summed
up for all ages.
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tuition fees (no fee out of state migration: NFOMit) both normalised again by the size of
the respective age cohort in year t and state i. By saying so, NOM comprises of FOM and
NFOM such that
NOMit = FOMit + NFOMit (1.2)
holds if at least one state charges tuition fees in time t. Before the introduction and after the
abolishment of tuition fees in all states Equation 1.2 simplifies to NOMit = NFOMit.
Additionally the other dimension of interest are inflows into a state to investigate
basically the reverse side. Again, I normalise all inflow values with the total number of high
school graduates in the destination state at that point in time and separate this normalised
total ratio of in-state migration (NIM) by the fee status (tuition fees introduced: yes/no) of
the origin state. Similar to Equation 1.2 following relation holds for inflows:
NIMit = FIMit + NFIMit (1.3)
In order to investigate, whether the introduction and abolishment of tuition fees changed the
rate at which young people enrol at universities I calculate the transition rate from school
to university by modifying the nominator of Equation 1.1 and substituting TOMit, the total
number of students enrolling a different state than their home state by TERit, which simply
represents the total number of students who start to begin studying at time t and received
their university entrance diploma in state i, no matter in which state they enrol.
1.4.2 Descriptives
Figure 1.1 summarises the development of first year students and high school graduates in
Germany for my period of interest. The two vertical dashed lines represent the years 2006
and 2007 when tuition fees were introduced. It is clearly visible that the number of first year
students as well as the number of high school graduates increase during the years after the
introduction of the tuition fees with no clear tendency beginning with the year 2010. The
sharp rise in high school graduates in 2011 and 2012 with a significant drop afterwards can
be explained by the introduction of a shortened high school period from 9 to 8 years (“G8”),
leading to double graduation classes in the transition period11.
It is not meaningful to form the direct ratio of the values of part a) and b) of Fig-
11The sharp drop in high school graduates in 2001 is due to the fact that Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania
and Saxony-Anhalt introduced a 13th year of schooling in that year, meaning that in that respective year nearly
nobody (<100) graduated from high school in these states.
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ure 1.1 to form transition rates from high school to university especially due to the fact that
not every person with the permission to enrol for a university degree does so directly af-
ter graduation from school. Indeed, investigations like those of Bruckmeier and Wigger
(2014) show that less than half of those students starting a university class sometime does
so directly after graduation. Therefore, we follow the approach of Federal Statistical Office
(2019b) in forming transition rates by taking the percentage of people from a certain birth
year who start to study and calculate the mean of this value for each birth cohort to account
also for differences in schooling duration.
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Figure 1.1: Total number of a) first year students and b) high school graduates in Germany
between 2000-2015.
Notes: Only German first year students and high school graduates considered. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and
Federal Statistical Office (2019a).
Figure 1.2 visualises this transition rate separated by tuition fee introducing and not
introducing states. Whereas the left graph a) takes the transition rate based on the state the
student starts to study, graph b) represents the means for the transition rate based on the
state the student receives her university entrance diploma.
Both graphs are leading in the same direction, showing an increase in enrolment rates
beginning in the period after the introduction of fees in 2006 and 2007. Whereas a) exhibits
a slightly stronger increase in enrolment rates after 2006 and 2007 for the non introducing
states against introducing states (the difference becomes smaller) there is a nearly parallel
development in enrolment rates between these two groups in b). This seems to be reason-
able since a) incorporates already possible migration patterns of students in reaction to the
introduction of tuition fees. Since a) compares the number of freshmen with the size of the
birth cohort according to the state the student starts to study, it includes already students
who decided to start to study in a different state than the one they received their university
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entrance diploma from. A small catchup in the enrolment rates for no fee introducing states
to fee introducing states might therefore be a first hint towards a student migration from fee
to no fee introducing states to start to study.
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Figure 1.2: Enrolment rates based on a) location of university and b) high school
Notes: Calculations in a) are based on the state the student starts to study. Calculations in b) are based on the state the student
receives her university entrance diploma. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a).
At the same time, graph b) of Figure 1.2 does not exhibit such a catchup after fee intro-
duction since it does not account for migration pattern due to the calculation of transition
rates based on the state the student received her university entrance diploma. However, the
kink in 2011/2012 and the resulting greater difference in enrolment rates between fee and
no fee introducing states could give a first clue about possible timing reactions of students
in fee introducing states when fees are abolished. If a prospective student knows that fees
are abolished in the foreseeable future, she might decide to wait another year to start uni-
versity to avoid these fees. This kink coincides with the abolishment of tuition fees in North
Rhine-Westphalia, the most dense state in terms of population but also first year students.
In general, it should be noted that Figure 1.2 nicely illustrates (at least partly) the
validity of the common trend assumption which is important for the identification strategy
via a Difference-in-Differences approach: no matter whether the enrolment rate is based on
the location of the university or the high school, trends seem to move nearly parallel until
the introduction of tuition fees.
1.5. Identification strategy
As argued in related literature (e.g. Dwenger et al. (2012) or Bruckmeier et al. (2013)), the
introduction of tuition fees in Germany can be seen as a natural experiment, leaving some
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states as control group without introduction of those fees and treating other states with
this shift from a basically fee-free education regime to a tuition fee based regime. In order
to measure the effects on student migration patterns when fees are introduced and abol-
ished it is important to ensure that there are no anticipatory effects before the treatment,
i.e. that students do not react to the introduction of the tuition fees before the fees are actu-
ally introduced. Table 1.2 summarises the dates and therefore the differences in time local
governments decided on the introduction of tuition fees and when they were actually im-
plemented. Since for some states there are significantly big gaps between those two dates
(e.g. for Baden-Wuerttemberg) it is important to ensure that there is no measurement error
due to this anticipatory effects by setting the treatment indicator to the right point in time to
minimise the risk of such effects. The same holds for the abolishment of tuition fees where
the dates when the information about abolishment became public and the real date of abol-
ishment are summarised in Table 1.3. I decided to take the date of “realisation” (the date
from when on students had to (no more) pay tuition fees) as date for the treatment indicator
due to two reasons:
Table 1.2: Dates of enacting and introduction of tuition fees
Federal state Date of enacting Date of introduction
Baden-Wurttemberg December 2005 April 2007
Bavaria May 2006 April 2007
Hesse October 2006 October 2007
Hamburg December 2005 April 2007
Lower-Saxony December 2005 October 2006
North Rhine-Westphalia March 2006 October 2006
Saarland July 2006 October 2007
Firstly, it seems to be reasonable that paying tuition fees has an greater impact on
prospective students than the sole information that they probably will have to pay tuition
fees in a few years if they study in the respective state. Secondly, and this holds especially for
the indicator of the tuition fee abolishment, the period between enactment and realisation
is relatively short, meaning that students could have had only few months to react to this
change before it came into force.12,13
I follow a classical Difference-in-Differences approach (DiD) as described by e.g. Don-
ald and Lang (2007) in order to estimate the effects of the tuition fee introduction and abol-
12As noted in section 1.4 the data is only available on a yearly basis. Therefore, if enactment and realisation
falls into the same year as e.g. the abolishment for Hesse or Bavaria, I am not able to disentangle these two
dates.
13I also did the calculations with the different definition of the treatment indicator such that it turns into 1
whenever the law for tuition fee introduction or abolishment is enacted. However, this does not change the
results significantly.
19
EDUCATION AND THE LABOUR MARKET
Table 1.3: Dates of enacting and abolishment of tuition fees
Federal state Date of enacting Date of abolishment
Baden-Wurttemberg December 2011 April 2012
Bavaria April 2013 October 2013
Hesse June 2008 October 2008
Hamburg April 2011 October 2012
Lower-Saxony December 2013 October 2014
North Rhine-Westphalia February 2011 October 2011
Saarland February 2010 April 2010
ishment. Central to the question of causal inference is the outcome of a treated unit in the
treated period if it had not been treated (counterfactual), in my case the migration pattern of
students in states after the introduction of tuition fees if such fees had not been raised. The
DiD approach argues that if these treated states exhibited similar trends in relevant variables
as the other, non treated states (the control group) in the pre-treatment period, the outcome
of the control group in the treatment period can be seen as possible counterfactual for the
treatment group.
Before justifying this central common trend assumption in the subsequent subsection,
I define the model to be estimated as follows:
Flowit = α + β1introducedit + β2abolishedit + β3Xit + Zi + Tt + εit (1.4)
Flowit represents the dependent flow variable (standardised inflow/outflow to a state). Our
parameters of interest are β1 and β2 as they measure the effect of tuition fee introduction
and abolishment on my dependent variable. introducedit is a binary treatment indicator
turning one if state i introduced tuition fees in year t. Importantly, this binary indicator
stays one even after the state abolished the tuition fees again. A similar coding holds for
abolishedit if the respective state t abolished the fees in year t. Consequently, this means that
a state i which once introduced tuition fees and abolished them in e.g. t = 2 has two “ac-
tivated” treatment indicators (introducedit and abolishedit) from period t = 2 on. Therefore,
introducedit measures the effect of an introduction of tuition fees on the dependent variable
amongst all states whilst abolishedit measures the mean effect of an introduction and suc-
ceeding abolishment of tuition fees on the dependent variable again for the entire group of
German states.
Xit represents my set of (1-period lagged) control variables (log of highschool gradu-
ates, unemployment rate, “G8-dummy” , GDP per capita - all for state i at time t) while Zi
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implements state fixed effects and Tt time fixed effects. The error term is represented by εit.
As argued above the assumption of common trends before the treatment period for
treatment and control group is central to the question whether we can interpret the coeffi-
cients β1 and β2 causally is. I rely on a graphical inspection of the variables of interest to test
this assumption.
1.5.1 Common trend assumption
For the graphical inspection of the common trend assumption it is important to notice that
there are two dates tuition fees were introduced. As depicted in Table 1.2, Lower-Saxony
and North Rhine-Westphalia introduced tuition fees in 2006 whereas all other states (Baden-
Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Hamburg, Saarland) introduced tuition fees in 200714. Since
the following graphs are illustrated in an event-study like design, meaning that they are
normalised to year 0 as the year of introduction (2006 or 2007), I always present two graphs:
on the left-hand side always for the states introducing tuition fees in t(0) = 2006 and on the
right-hand side with t(0) = 2007. In both cases the control group consists of those states
which never introduced tuition fees.15
Figure 1.3 summarises important enrolment statistics and separates them by states
which introduce and states which do not introduce tuition fees. As the graph nicely visu-
alises, states of both regimes (with/without fees) have approximately parallel trends in their
general enrolment rates a) and their external enrolment rates (number of freshmen who do
not start to study in the state they received their university entrance diploma, normalised by
the respective age cohort) for the time period before the introduction of tuition rates. Most
interesting seems to be c) of Figure 1.3, visualising the mean net-migration rates, calculated
as outflows minus inflows, normalised by the respective age cohort. A decrease in this rate
can be interpreted as a higher “attractiveness” of the respective state to study in since this
means that the number of those students flowing in becomes greater against the number
of those students leaving the state to study somewhere else. Thus, the sharp drop for the
no-fee-states (dark grey line) in both graphs of c) could hint towards a migration reaction of
students to tuition fees by deciding more often to study in a no-fee-state. In general, graph
c) of Figure 1.3 delivers further support for the common trend assumption previously to the
introduction of tuition fees although there seems to be a relatively high level of heterogene-
14Since the data is on yearly basis, it is not possible to distinguish between different dates of introduction
within one year.
15Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony, Saxony-
Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia.
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ity for states introducing tuition fees in 2007 after the year of introduction. The assumption
of common trends as verified above is especially central for the investigation of the effects
of the introduction of tuition fees since it validates that states seem to behave similar in the
period previous to this introduction.
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Figure 1.3: Mean enrolment rates normalised to states with & without the introduction of
tuition fees
Notes: The left row is normalised to states, introducing tuition fees in 2006, the right row to states introducing tuition fees in
2007. Only German first year students and high school graduates considered. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and
Federal Statistical Office (2019a).
In contrast, the validity of the causal effect for the abolishment of these tuition fees
highly depends on the question whether the pattern of migration flows depend on the du-
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ration of tuition fees, e.g. whether a state has a period of 1 or 5 years with tuition fees. I
argue that the states seem to behave similar in this period, meaning that the coefficient on
the variable abolishedit in Equation 1.4 can be interpreted causally.
Figure A.1 - Figure A.3 in the Appendix are a graphical reproduction of a fully flexible
time dummy regression for each fee introducing state separately. They show that the states
seem to behave similar in all relevant flow variables within the period of tuition fees. How-
ever, two states seem to differ slightly, namely the “small states” Hamburg and Saarland.
Therefore, results in section 1.6 are always further validated by a regression with a subset of
states, leaving these two states out. The results of these analyses are available in Appendix
A.2
1.6. Results
This section is split according to the set-up of the dataset used for the calculation of the
empirical results. Whereas the results in subsection 1.6.1 are based on a “simple” panel
dataset including T = 16 years (from 2000-2015) and i = 16 states16, the underlying dataset
for subsection 1.6.2 is build up in a dyadic manner, meaning that the unit of observation is
not one state at one point in time but the combination of two states and the flows between
these states at one point in time. More details of this setup are given at the beginning of
subsection 1.6.2.
1.6.1 Results for a n = 16 approach
Starting with general enrolment rates as depicted in Table 1.4, we see that the introduction
of tuition fees might even have positive effects for female students. These results somewhat
contradict the findings of e.g. Hübner (2012) or Bruckmeier and Wigger (2014) finding neg-
ative or no results of an introduction of tuition fees on the transition rate from high school
to university. However, it should be kept in mind that the dependent variable of Table 1.4 is
the transition rate based on the state the student received her university entrance diploma.
Therefore, my results take one step back in contrast to e.g. Hübner (2012) or Bruckmeier
and Wigger (2014) who measure transition rates post migration while I measure transition
16The reason for the fact that the dataset of this part does not consist of 17 ∗ 16 = 272 observations but 236
observations is due to two facts: Firstly, the states of Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania and Saxony-Anhalt
had to be taken out of the sample for t = 2001 due to a schooling reform (introduction of the 13st high school
grade), leading to no representative results when calculating ratios. Secondly, to control for time specific effects
one year had to be taken out of the sample to function as baseline year. This leads to the sample size N = 236
for the following results.
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Table 1.4: Enrolment rates based on state of university entrance diploma
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced 0.0102∗ 0.0137∗∗ 0.0060
(0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0064)
Tuition fees abolished 0.0091 0.0099 0.0081
(0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0060)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 0.0677∗∗∗ 0.0722∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0065) (0.0061)
L.Local unemployment rate −0.0039∗∗ −0.0021 −0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0019)
L.Ln of high school graduates 0.0529∗∗∗ 0.0526∗∗∗ 0.0499∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0086) (0.0076)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 236 236 236
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Years:
2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. An identical analysis for a subset of “big states” is conducted in Table A.1.
rates pre migration. Therefore, my results indicate that the introduction itself does not neces-
sarily have negative effects of enrolment rates for prospective students receiving their high
school diplomas in an introducing state. In fact, the enrolment rate in those states seem to
have increased even after the introduction, especially for female prospective students. Their
enrolment rate increases in fee introducing states after the introduction by on average 1.4
percent against no fee introducing states. The results stay robust against re-specifications of
the sample as Table A.1 in the Appendix shows.
Coming to the more central question of this investigation, namely the movement pat-
terns of prospective students in reaction to introduction and abolishment of tuition fees,
Table 1.5 represents the results of regressing the external enrolment rate on the parameters
as defined in Equation 1.4. Recalling that the external enrolment rate is measured as stu-
dents with an university entrance diploma from state i starting to study in every other state
but i, normalised by the age specific cohort of i, shows that the external enrolment rate stays
unchanged by the introduction of tuition fees. However, the following abolishment shows
a significantly negative effect on the external enrolment, pronounced especially for male
students. If a state abolishes tuition fees after the introduction, the rate of those students
starting to study not in the “home” state decreases by 2 percent. This novel finding hints
towards an asymmetric behaviour of students in reaction to tuition fees: whereas the ratio
of those leaving their home state to study does not increase after the introduction of tuition
fees, this figure decreases after the respective state decides to abolish tuition fees again.
These findings are further validated by the results of the net migration rate as de-
picted in Table 1.6. An increase in net migration means that the number of students leaving
the state increases against the number of those entering the state, all normalised by the age
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Table 1.5: Regression of external enrolment rate of freshmen
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced 0.0034 0.0002 0.0058
(0.0071) (0.0078) (0.0068)
Tuition fees abolished −0.0166∗∗ −0.0146∗∗ −0.0181∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0073) (0.0064)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0284∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0075) (0.0065)
L.Local unemployment rate −0.0048∗∗ −0.0020 −0.0073∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0021)
L.Ln of high school graduates 0.0198∗∗ 0.0129 0.0226∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0100) (0.0081)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 236 236 236
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Years:
2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. An identical analysis for a subset of “big states” is conducted in Table A.2.
specific cohort of the respective state. Therefore, the negative coefficient on the tuition fee
abolishment dummy in Table 1.6 is in line with the findings of Table 1.5 indicating that the
abolishment of tuition fees negatively influences the net migration rate which can either be
due to a higher inflow of students or a lower outflow of students as argued in Table 1.5.
This abolishment lowers the net migration rate for male prospective students by roughly 2
percent which is in line with the findings of previous calculations and has a similar order
of magnitude17. Analysing the mean outflow of prospective students to states which intro-
duce tuition fees, the variable FOMit from subsection 1.4.1 is estimated in the upper part
of Table 1.7 whilst the outflows to states which never introduced tuition fees (NFOMit) are
investigated in the lower part of Table 1.7.
The results of Table 1.7 further verify my previous findings, namely that although
the introduction of tuition fees does not seem to have significant effects on the movement
pattern as found as well by e.g. Bruckmeier and Wigger (2014), its abolishment in contrast
seems to be relatively important for the migration patterns of students stemming from these
states. Table 1.7 shows that for all three subgroups (all, female, male) the ratio of those
students starting to study in a state with tuition fee decreases if the own home state abolishes
tuition fees. This effect is relatively large for male prospective students where the ratio of
those starting to study in another fee charging state decreases by roughly 2 percent against
all other fee states if studying in the home state becomes costless again. At the same time, I
cannot observe any effect of tuition fees on the outflow ratio to no fee introducing states as
17However, these results should be treated with caution as they stay not robust against regressing on only a
sub sample of states as shown in Table A.4 in the Appendix. Therefore it might be the case that these results are
mainly driven by the two small states Saarland and Hamburg, exhibiting slightly different migration patterns
than the remaining 5 fee introducing states.
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Table 1.6: Net migration rate (standardised out-inflows)
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced −0.0032 −0.0010 −0.0004
(0.0108) (0.0127) (0.0102)
Tuition fees abolished −0.0145 −0.0046 −0.0224∗∗
(0.0100) (0.0118) (0.0094)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 0.0307∗∗∗ 0.0373∗∗∗ 0.0244∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0122) (0.0096)
L.Local unemployment rate 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0031)
L.Ln of high school graduates 0.0755∗∗∗ 0.0838∗∗∗ 0.0807∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0162) (0.0120)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000∗ −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 236 236 236
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Years:
2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. An identical analysis for a subset of “big states” is conducted in Table A.4.
Table 1.7: Outflow to states, separated by regime (fee/no fee)
All Female Male
to fee introducing states
Tuition fees introduced −0.0021 −0.0024 −0.0011
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Tuition fees abolished −0.0156∗∗∗ −0.0134∗∗∗ −0.0171∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0031)
to no fee introducing states
Tuition fees introduced 0.0055 0.0026 0.0068
(0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0051)
Tuition fees abolished −0.0010 −0.0013 −0.0010
(0.0052) (0.0059) (0.0048)
Observations 236 236 236
Notes: Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Controls for “G8”, unemployment rates and gdp
per capita for both states not reported. Years: 2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and
Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. An identical analysis for a subset of
“big states” is conducted in Table A.5 and Table A.6.
the lower part of Table 1.7 shows.
This finding of a negative effect of the outflow to other states after the abolishment
(and introduction) of fees could be explained by the financial endowment of universities af-
ter the period of tuition fees. Whilst the universities within the fee charging states generated
significant levels of income through this fees (e.g. in entire Bavaria e219 Million per year
(Scherf, 2013)), most universities complained successfully against a cut of this income due to
the abolishment of tuition fees. Therefore, the public hand stepped in to compensate for this
loss according to private contact to the Hochschulrektorenkonferenz (Conference of University
Presidents). Therefore, students could enjoy universities with better financial endowments
without having to finance this endowment, at least partially via fees. This might explain the
lower level of outflow to other states (and therefore higher attractiveness of home universi-
ties) after the period of tuition fees.
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1.6.2 Results for a dyadic approach
In contrast to the previous section, the underlying dataset for analyses in this part is built
in a dyadic manner, meaning that for each year I form every possible pairwise combination
of states, leading to 16 ∗ 16 = 256 observations for each year. The advantage of this set-up
is the possibility to measure flows between two states directly and not a sum of states (e.g.
flows from all fee introducing states to all no fee introducing states). As Mitze et al. (2015,
p.401) argue, the pairwise-approach is useful since “analysing the tuition fee effect for the
overall regional migration balance, may lead to an underestimation of the true impact”. The
reason for this possible underestimation is due to the summation of flows as the numerical
example in Figure 1.4 visualises.
T=1 T=0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
10 
10 
5 
10 
 20  15 
Regions i Region j Regions i Region j 
0= no fees, 1= fees 
Figure 1.4: Numeric example for flows in dyadic approach following Mitze et al. (2015)
In a simple three country example, all drawn as boxes, the switch from region j from
a no fee charging to a fee charging regime (from 0 to 1) would imply a reduction in flows
from regions, subsumed as regions i of about (20 − 15)/20 = 25%. However, since we
cannot disentangle in the n = 16 approach from which states (with/without tuition fees) this
reductions stem from, this approach might lose some precision. As the numerical example
shows, the reduction stems entirely from the region in i which is still without tuition fees,
the flow between the region in i introducing tuition fees and region j stays unchanged.
In addition to this advantage in being able to disentangle the flows by regimes (no-fee
to fee; no-fee to no-fee, fee to fee and the other way round) I am now able to control for adja-
cencies of each state pair. Since investigations like those of Bruckmeier et al. (2013) or Mitze
et al. (2015) argue that the mobility of students in Germany seems to be rather low, incor-
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Table 1.8: Standardised flows from 2 to 1 if state 1 introduces fees and state 2 does not -
neighbouring states
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced in state 1 −0.0106∗∗∗ −0.0161∗∗∗ −0.0049∗
(0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0028)
Tuition fees abolished in state 1 −0.0013 −0.0029 0.0012
(0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0024)
Observations 450 450 450
Notes: Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Controls for “G8”, unemployment rates and gdp per capita
for both states not reported. Years: 2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office
(2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. An identical analysis for a subset of “big states” is conducted in
Table A.7.
porating the adjacency of two states should be plausible since moving into a neighbouring
state to avoid tuition fees might be less costless than moving to another, not neighbouring
state far away.
A pairwise investigation of each possible combination of states lead to an increase
in the number of observations. Instead of having 16 observations per year, this number is
increased to 16 ∗ 15 = 240 state pairs (observations) for each year of interest. The different
number of observations for the following results are due to drawing different subgroups,
e.g. investigating only the flows from pairs with one introducing and one not introducing
state. Additional restrictions may occur if I restrict to neighbouring states only.
The most straightforward specification is presented in Table 1.8: The effect of the in-
troduction (and abolishment) of tuition fees in state 1 on the flow from state 2, which never
introduces tuition fees if these two states share a common border. The flows are again stan-
dardised by the age specific population of the home state (state 2). Control variables are the
same as in subsection 1.6.1, now for both states of the respective state pair.
Interestingly, the coefficient on the introduction of tuition fees in Table 1.8 exhibits a
negative sign which is in contrast to the results of the previous section, where the introduc-
tion of tuition fee did not seem to have any effect on the student flows. However, this might
be especially due to the neighbourhood of the state pairs I restricted the analysis of Table 1.8
to. Additionally, this negative effect might have gone lost in the n = 16 approach because of
the lower level of precision, where the flows between neighbouring and not neighbouring
states might have washed out a clear statistical effect. This result is in line with the findings
of authors like Bruckmeier et al. (2013) or Mitze et al. (2015) arguing that students in Ger-
many seem to be willing to avoid tuition fees only if costs (and therefore distances from the
home state/town) are relatively small.
Here is a numerical example to visualise the dimension of the change in flows due
to tuition fees: Whereas in the year 2006 roughly 2 percent of the age specific cohort from
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Table 1.9: Standardised flows from 2 to 1 if state 1 introduces fees and state 2 does not - not
neighbouring states
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced in state 1 −0.0008 −0.0010 −0.0006
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Tuition fees abolished in state 1 −0.0018 −0.0019 −0.0017
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Observations 1710 1710 1710
Notes: Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Controls for “G8”, unemployment rates and
gdp per capita for both states not reported. Years: 2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b)
and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. An identical analysis for a
subset of “big states” is conducted in Table A.8.
Saxony started to study in the neighbouring state Bavaria, this number goes down to ap-
proximately 1.5 percent of the age specific cohort for 2008, the year when Bavaria introduced
tuition fees. In total numbers, the number of first year students in Bavaria from Saxony went
down from 907 in the year 2006 to 673 in 2008. The comparison between the total with the
relative numbers shows the importance of normalising the number of students by the age
specific cohort to control for trends in population growth
Interestingly, there does not seem to be an effect of the abolishment of tuition fees for
state 1 on its inflows from neighbouring and not fee introducing states. This is somewhat
puzzling since you would expect a more symmetric behaviour of prospective students on
the abolishment of tuition fees: if the inflows to an introducing state went down after the in-
troduction, a significant increase from these states after the abolishment would be intuitive.
In contrast to Table 1.8 investigating only neighbouring states, Table 1.9 is calculated
based on state pairs with no common border. The insignificant coefficients on both dum-
mies, the introduction and the abolishment of tuition fees is in line with previous research.
If it becomes costly for a student to avoid tuition fees since she would have to move rela-
tively far, the willingness to do so decreases significantly. At the same time, if e.g. the state
of Hamburg abolishes tuition fees, this should be only of minor interest for a student who
has to decide about studying in her home state relatively far away, e.g. in Saxony.
1.6.3 Geographical vs timed avoidance of tuition fees
So far, I only analysed direct flows between states in reaction to the introduction and abol-
ishment of tuition fees. However, there could be other ways how prospective students avoid
paying tuition fees. Whereas students can only avoid paying tuition fees after the introduc-
tion in 2006 and 2007 by emigrating to another, no fee charging, state, subsequent students
have different possibilities to avoid fees when it becomes clear that they will be abolished.
As Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 in section 1.5 show, there is a gap between the enacting of the
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introduction and abolishment of tuition fees and the realisation of those laws (i.e. the “true”
introduction and abolishment of those fees). Students who plan to start studying sometime
in the period between the enacting and the realisation of the abolishment of tuition fees
could therefore simply wait to avoid paying tuition fees. This could possibly have the ad-
vantage of being able to study cost free without the need to leave the home state. Therefore,
I argue that prospective students who receive their university entrance diploma relatively
late in the tuition fee regime period in Germany have two possibilities to avoid paying fees.
Either, if they wish to start studying immediately they could move to another state. Or, if
they want to stay at home they could wait a few terms since they know the point in time
when tuition fees will be abolished in the home state.
Federal Statistical Office (2019b) provides statistics for each state on transition ratios
from high school to university, depending on the lag between graduation from high school
and the enrolment at university. Therefore, I am able to check whether the rates of students
who e.g. start to study one or two years after high school graduation increase if it is clear
that tuition fees will be abolished in one or two years respectively. To give a first graphi-
cal impression, Figure 1.5 visualises the so called transition-index over time and the group
of treated (fee introducing) and not treated states. Thereby, I define this transition-index
according to the following formula:
Transition− indexit =
5
∑
p=0
quotaitp
years since highschool graduation(p) + 1
(1.5)
where quotaitp represents the following ratio:
Freshmen starting p years after graduating in i at t to study
the sum of all high school graduates in i at t .
The index in Equation 1.5 basically sums up the transition rates for a high school gradua-
tion year over the succeeding 5 years, each quota weighted by the inverse of the number of
years since high school graduation.18 Although the absolute values of the index cannot be
interpreted instantaneously, the index is helpful to analyse how “fast” a high school gradu-
ation cohort passes over to university studies. The lower the index, the bigger is the sum of
gaps between high school graduation and university enrolment.
18I add +1 to every weight to ensure that the transition rate directly after high school graduation, therefore
in year 0 is not divided by 0
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Figure 1.5: The transition rate of students over time (based on a self-calculated transition-
index)
Notes: Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b).
.5
2
.5
4
.5
6
.5
8
M
ea
n 
tra
ns
iti
on
 in
de
x
-5 0 5
event year (0= year of fee abolishment)
Figure 1.6: The transition rate of students over time - event study (based on a self-calculated
transition-index)
Notes: Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b).
The two vertical dashed lines in Figure 1.5 represent very generally the first date a state
(Hesse in 2008) abolished tuition fee up to the last date a state changed back to the tuition
fee free regime (Lower-Saxony in 2014). The graph shows no clear trend in a change in the
transition speed for treated states in the period of tuition fee abolishment or previously.
In general, it should be noted that the sharp decline of the index in the end of the
period of interest is due to the construction of the index: since for e.g. 2015, we can only
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observe 1 following year (2016), the index has to decrease against an index for an earlier
year due to the fact that for e.g. 2010 I am able to observe all relevant subsequent 5 years to
calculate the index according to Equation 1.5.
Generally, the transition index has a clear upward slope for both types of state regimes
(with/without tuition fees), indicating that the speed high school graduates enrolled at uni-
versities has increased over recent years. Interestingly, there is a sharp drop around the years
2006/2007 coinciding with the 2 years where states introduced tuition fees. Afterwards, the
transition speed in both regime states seem to increase significantly.
Figure 1.6 shows a transition index, normalised to the year, a state abolishes tuition
fees, and as mean over all abolishing states . Similar to the previous graph, I cannot detect
any significant change around the abolishment date which would hint towards a delay in
enrolment rates to avoid tuition fees.
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Figure 1.7: The transition rate of students normalised to the announcement of tuition fee
abolishment
Notes: Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b).
I use the difference between the date of enacting and the date of realisation of the law
abolishing tuition fees to generate the respective transition ratio of interest to investigate in
more detail whether students delayed their decision to start studying to avoid tuition fees.
If e.g. a state announces before October in year t that it will abolish tuition fees beginning in
year t + 1, the transition rate 1 year after graduation should be significantly higher for the
cohort graduating in t if students delay their decision to study. Figure 1.7 depicts this rele-
vant transition rate for all treated states normalised to the year when the information about
the abolishment became public. If students avoid tuition fees by delaying the enrolment,
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Table 1.10: Change in transition rate from high school to university after abolishment of
tuition fees
All Female Male
Abolishment of tuition fees −0.0167 0.0032 −0.0249
(0.0178) (0.0236) (0.0285)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 −0.0075 0.0003 −0.0152
(0.0150) (0.0197) (0.0242)
L.Local unemployment rate 0.0081 0.0508 0.0962∗∗
(0.0315) (0.0418) (0.0387)
L.Ln of high school graduates −0.0609∗∗ −0.0359 −0.0864∗
(0.0280) (0.0365) (0.0455)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 58 58 58
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported.
Years: 2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. An identical analysis for a subset of “big states” is conducted in Table A.9.
the enrolment rate should peak at the zero point since this would visualise the decision of
students to delay the decision up to the point when studying in the respective state becomes
costless.
The graph does not show any significant peak at the event date (the announcement
about the tuition fee abolishment), meaning that based on this graph students do not time
their enrolment decision to avoid tuition fees. Rather, the transition rates seem to be rela-
tively unstable without the tendency of a clear trend over time. Therefore, an econometric
specification is conducted to verify whether there are timing reactions after the information
about the abolishment of tuition fees to avoid paying exactly these fees.
Regressing the relevant transition rate on a dummy indicating the abolishment of tu-
ition fees in accordance with Equation 1.4 shows that there is no significant effect of the
abolishment of tuition fees on the transition speed from high school to university. In fact,
Table 1.10 indicates that there are no gender differences in the reaction to tuition fee abolish-
ment in terms of delaying the enrolment decision to save fees.
The results in Figure 1.7 and Table 1.10, however, should be interpreted with caution
due to two reasons. First, since data is available only on a yearly basis and as Table 1.3
shows, only one state (namely Hamburg) has a significant gap between announcement and
realisation of the abolishing law, Hamburg is the only state I could really measure whether
students delay the enrolment decision one year later to avoid fees (however, I could not find
significant results for Hamburg either). Secondly, the transition rates are based on the state
the student received her university entrance diploma. Therefore, I am not able to distinguish
between students who start to study in the home state and in other states. By saying so, the
results summarise within- and between-state transition, meaning that there could be some
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effect of the announcement of the tuition fee abolishment on the internal transition rate, I
am not able to account for.
Although I cannot find any significant evidence that students avoid tuition fees by
timing their enrolment decision, this result is important since it further supports the valid-
ity of my identification strategy for the detection of migration patterns in reaction to the
introduction and abolishment of tuition fees. Such anticipatory effects can be problematic
since it may dilute the explanatory power of the evaluation of quasi-experimental settings
as the one investigated here.19 Therefore, I take the insignificance of results regarding tim-
ing decisions as a further argument for the validity of my identification strategy as set up in
Equation 1.4.
1.7. Conclusion
The question how tuition fees influence the decision of prospective students to enrol has
been investigated comprehensively, especially for the UK, the USA or Canada with a long
history of tuition fees for tertiary education. The German case is somewhat different due
to the relatively low level of tuition fees and a short period of less than 10 years when 7
states introduced tuition fees but abolished them shortly afterwards. Furthermore, fees were
introduced relatively equal in their amount (roughly e500 per term) amongst introducing
states which makes a direct comparison to the very heterogeneous setting in the US and
Canada harder.
The results of my investigation of the effects of these tuition fees on the migration pat-
terns of German students sketch a relatively ambiguous picture in the first view: Although
the total numbers of students migrating to or from a fee introducing state does not seem to
change after the introduction of tuition fees, the effects do not seem to be symmetric for the
case of the abolishment of those fees. If the home state abolishes tuition fees, the number of
students emigrating to other states with tuition fees decreases significantly.
A more detailed picture was drawn by employing a pairwise dataset using the flows
between each two state combination to find possible migration patterns. This refined ap-
proach puts the proximity of two states into focus, showing that there is a significant de-
crease in the flows from the home to the neighbouring state if this neighbouring state intro-
duces tuition fees. This effect vanishes if the states do not share a common border. Addi-
tionally, the abolishment of tuition fees does not seem to have changed the flows between
19See e.g. Alpert (2016) for an illustrative example on the importance of considering anticipatory effects.
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two states.
As a last part, the possibility of avoiding tuition fees by delaying the enrolment deci-
sion up to the point when studying is costless again (due to the abolishment of tuition fees) is
investigated. However, I cannot find any evidence that students anticipated the abolishment
of tuition fees and therefore delayed the enrolment decision. This result, however, should be
seen carefully since a more detailed investigation by using monthly (or at least term wise)
data should be able to reconcile possible anticipation reactions more comprehensively.
My results refine the findings of e.g. Bruckmeier and Wigger (2014), arguing that there
are no changes in the transition effects from high school to university when introducing fees.
In contrast to the authors, I control for between state migration, finding even positive effects
of the introduction of tuition fees on the transition rate.
Furthermore, I validate the importance of controlling for proximity between two states
when investigating the change in flows in reaction to tuition fees as Mitze et al. (2015) ar-
gues: Whereas the flows into a fee charging state from a fee free state decrease when the
states share a common border, there are no significant effects if these states are no direct
neighbours. A reverse effect, however, cannot be found after the abolishment of tuition fees.
Additionally, I cannot find any evidence for the argument that prospective students may
delay their enrolment decision to avoid paying tuition fees in their home state.
The question, why tuition fees seem to have such a small effect on migration patterns
of German students should be answered by putting the level of fees in relation to the total
costs of studying in Germany. According to a recent survey of Middendorff et al. (2016),
students in Germany have on average a disposable monthly income of e918 (in the year
2016), adding up to e5,508 per term. The question whether to pay tuition fees of roughly
e500 per term would increase the costs of studying by less than 10 %. Therefore, tuition fees
in Germany do not seem to change costs of studying dramatically for at least a great part
of the student body. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that many states implemented
generous exemptions from paying those fees. As an example, more than 30 % of students in
Bavaria were exempt from paying tuition fees (Bruckmeier and Wigger, 2014, p.20).
Therefore, the findings of only minor effects of tuition fees on migration patterns in
Germany seem to be plausible and should be treated differently than the effects, tuition fees
in countries like the USA can trigger where those fees often account for the greatest costs of
succeeding a university degree.
35
APPENDIX
Appendix A
A.1 Further validation of common trend assumption
Figure A.1 - Figure A.3 represent linear regressions of the main outcome variables of interest
mean external enrolment rate, general enrolment rate and net migration rate on time dum-
mies for each year and treated state. Therefore, each subgraph of Figure A.1 - Figure A.3
represents a regression of the respective treated state and all control states on treated-state-
specific time dummies and a set of general time dummies, meaning that the estimates rep-
resent the most flexible estimation of the effects of tuition fee introduction and abolishment
for treated states. The first vertical line represents the introduction of tuition fees, the second
vertical line its abolishment for each state. As the graphs show, the states behave relatively
similar with the exception of Saarland and Hamburg, exhibiting somewhat different pat-
terns.
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Figure A.1: Time dummy regression - Mean enrolment rate by fee introducing states
Notes: Each subgraph represents a regression of the respective treated state and all control states on a set of time dummies for
the treated state and general time dummies. Only German first year students and high school graduates considered. Source:
Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a).
37
APPENDIX
-1
6
-1
2
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
Ba
de
n-
W
ur
tte
mb
er
g
2000 2005 2010 2015
year
-1
6
-1
2
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
Ba
va
ria
2000 2005 2010 2015
year
-1
6
-1
2
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
He
ss
e
2000 2005 2010 2015
year
-1
6
-1
2
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
Ha
mb
ur
g
2000 2005 2010 2015
year
-1
6
-1
2
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
Lo
we
r-S
ax
on
y
2000 2005 2010 2015
year
-1
6
-1
2
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
No
rth
 R
hin
e-
W
es
tph
ali
a
2000 2005 2010 2015
year
-1
6
-1
2
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
Sa
ar
lan
d
2000 2005 2010 2015
year
Figure A.2: Time dummy regression - mean external enrolment rates by fee introducing
states
Notes: Each subgraph represents a regression of the respective treated state and all control states on a set of time dummies for
the treated state and general time dummies. Only German first year students and high school graduates considered. Source:
Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a).
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Figure A.3: Time dummy regression - Mean net migration by fee introducing states
Notes: Each subgraph represents a regression of the respective treated state and all control states on a set of time dummies for
the treated state and general time dummies. Only German first year students and high school graduates considered. Source:
Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a).
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A.2 Robustness checks
The tables in this section (Table A.1 - Table A.9) basically reconcile the estimations from
section 1.6, however for a smaller sample leaving the two states Hamburg and Saarland out
since these small states seem to exhibit slightly different patterns from the other “big” states.
Table A.1: Enrolment rates based on state of university entrance diploma - no small states
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced 0.0104 0.0128∗ 0.0071
(0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0066)
Tuition fees abolished 0.0110∗ 0.0141∗∗ 0.0074
(0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0065)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0710∗∗∗ 0.0644∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0064)
L.Local unemployment rate −0.0043∗∗ −0.0032∗∗ −0.0051∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0020)
L.Ln of high school graduates 0.0573∗∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗ 0.0482∗∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0086) (0.0078)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 206 206 206
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Years:
2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Table A.2: Regression of external enrolment rate of freshmen - no small states
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced −0.0049 −0.0066 −0.0043
(0.0074) (0.0083) (0.0068)
Tuition fees abolished −0.0228∗∗∗ −0.0212∗∗ −0.0242∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0082) (0.0068)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0374∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0082) (0.0067)
L.Local unemployment rate −0.0044∗∗ −0.0027 −0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0021)
L.Ln of high school graduates 0.0154 0.0144 0.0129
(0.0093) (0.0104) (0.0081)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 206 206 206
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Years:
2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Regression of the net migration rate - no small states
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced 0.0112 0.0180 0.0070
(0.0107) (0.0119) (0.0106)
Tuition fees abolished −0.0055 0.0062 −0.0163
(0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0105)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0104)
L.Local unemployment rate 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0049∗ 0.0098∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0032)
L.Ln of high school graduates 0.0940∗∗∗ 0.1059∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0151) (0.0125)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 206 206 206
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Years:
2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Table A.4: Net migration rate (standardised out-inflows) - no small states
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced 0.0112 0.0180 0.0070
(0.0107) (0.0119) (0.0106)
Tuition fees abolished −0.0055 0.0062 −0.0163
(0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0105)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0104)
L.Local unemployment rate 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0049∗ 0.0098∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0032)
L.Ln of high school graduates 0.0940∗∗∗ 0.1059∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0151) (0.0125)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 206 206 206
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Years:
2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Table A.5: Outflow to fee introducing states - no small states
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced −0.0052∗ −0.0042 −0.0053
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Tuition fees abolished −0.0173∗∗∗ −0.0150∗∗∗ −0.0188∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0032)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0032)
L.Local unemployment rate 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0010)
L.Ln of high school graduates 0.0027 0.0031 0.0051
(0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0038)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 206 206 206
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Years:
2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
41
APPENDIX
Table A.6: Outflow to no fee introducing states - no small states
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced 0.0002 −0.0023 0.0009
(0.0060) (0.0067) (0.0055)
Tuition fees abolished −0.0056 −0.0062 −0.0054
(0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0055)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0067) (0.0054)
L.Local unemployment rate −0.0089∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0017)
L.Ln of high school graduates 0.0127∗ 0.0113 0.0078
(0.0075) (0.0084) (0.0065)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 206 206 206
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Years:
2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Table A.7: Standardised flows if state 1 introduces fees and state 2 does not - neighbouring
states - no small states
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced in state 1 −0.0116∗∗∗ −0.0175∗∗∗ −0.0053∗
(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0030)
Tuition fees abolished in state 1 −0.0009 −0.0025 0.0018
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0026)
Observations 420 420 420
Notes: Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Controls for “G8”, unemployment rates and gdp per capita
for both states not reported. Years: 2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office
(2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.8: Standardised flows if state 1 introduces fees and state 2 does not - no neighbour-
ing states - no small states
All Female Male
Tuition fees introduced in state 1 −0.0003 −0.0007 0.0001
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Tuition fees abolished in state 1 −0.0009 −0.0009 −0.0009
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Observations 1470 1470 1470
Notes: Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported. Controls for “G8”, unemployment rates and
gdp per capita for both states not reported. Years: 2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b)
and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
42
CHAPTER 1. TUITION FEES AND FRESHMEN FLOWS IN GERMANY
Table A.9: Change in transition rate from high school to university after abolishment of
tuition fees - no small states
All Female Male
Abolishment of tuition fees −0.0167 0.0032 −0.0249
(0.0178) (0.0236) (0.0285)
L.Dummy for introduction G8 −0.0075 0.0003 −0.0152
(0.0150) (0.0197) (0.0242)
L.Local unemployment rate 0.0081 0.0508 0.0962∗∗
(0.0315) (0.0418) (0.0387)
L.Ln of high school graduates −0.0609∗∗ −0.0359 −0.0864∗
(0.0280) (0.0365) (0.0455)
L.Gdp per capita in federal state −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 58 58 58
Notes: L. stands for a 1-period lag of the respective variable. Yeardummies and state fixed effects not reported.
Years: 2000-2015. Source: Federal Statistical Office (2019b) and Federal Statistical Office (2019a). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 2
New region, new chances: Insights from a spatial
analysis of a Bavarian graduate survey
∗
Abstract
The question how spatial mobility for jobs pays out monetarily is a prevalent issue in economic
research. In this paper, we take one step back and raise the question what determines the mobility
of people in their working life. Therefore, we take a representative sample of Bavarian university
graduates and track their mobility patterns back to their high school times. The distance to the
nearest university will be applied as an instrumental variable on the decision whether to move
when going to the university or enrolling at an university nearby. Taking a subset of graduates
who went to a suburban high school close to a city with university makes the distance exogenous,
given a broad set of controls. We find that people who move to study exhibit a significantly higher
likelihood to change location after graduation from university. These results stay robust against
personal and socio-economic controls from the survey and add to the literature by arguing that
job-mobility is rooted in mobility patterns when starting university education.
∗This chapter is joint work with Valentin Lindlacher.
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2.1. Introduction
The question whether spatial mobility in education pays out monetarily and determinants
of this mobility has been investigated by a vast strand of literature, mostly focusing on
the effects of being mobile internationally (e.g. (Parey and Waldinger, 2011) or Kratz and
Netz (2018)).1 The findings are manifold, a certain consensus, however, exists that mobility
seems to pay out in working life in the long run in monetary terms. A central issue in
investigating outcomes, monetary or in other dimensions, of mobility is the selection on
unobserved, often hardly to define or measure dimensions like e.g. motivation. Whether
an individual decides to move for a job, an apprenticeship or to study seems to be at least
partly predetermined by her surrounding, her family background, the area she is living in
and intrinsic motivation. Therefore, every research taking mobility as explanatory variable
into account should handle this issue of selection carefully. In this investigation we focus
exactly on this point by going one step back in contrast to the research question of most of
the related papers: instead of asking if and in which dimensions mobility may pay out, we
ask what might actually shape mobility for the job.
We analyse the effect of the distance to the nearest university when graduating from
school on the decision to enrol at the local university2 or somewhere else. In a second step,
we use this instrument of exogenously given distance to university when graduating from
school to model the likelihood that a person decides to move after university graduation. We
use a survey containing very detailed information (on postal code level) about the mobility
patterns of university graduates, beginning with the place where they got their university
entrance diploma up to the location roughly 1.5 years after graduation of this person. Ad-
ditionally, we have information on parental educational background and socio-economic
factors of the investigated individuals. By saying so, we are able to form a group of uni-
versity graduates which is similar in spatial patterns and socio-economic factors up to a
level, not being investigated by the literature in detail so far. We argue that the decision
of individuals in these “peer groups” to study at the university located the closest to the
place of receiving the university entrance diploma or to leave “home” to study somewhere
else increases the credibility of assuming this decision to be exogenous with respect to the
variables mentioned in comparison to recent literature in this field significantly.
1In this investigation, we focus on mobility, defined geographically by moving from one place to another.
Aspects of social mobility, i.e. whether and how people can reach a higher social status, job position or educa-
tional level than their parents is not part of this paper.
2“Local” is defined as university within the same labour market region. The concept of labour market
regions is defined in greater detail in section 2.5.
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We find that this instrumental variable approach delivers a significant increase in the
likelihood to change location for the first job if a person (exogenously) changed location
to study as well. This result stays robust against the inclusion of a vast set of controls.
However, we show that this initial mobility does not necessarily pay out in later live by
delivering higher wages. We check for the salary at the first job only, therefore a wage
premium at a later point in the career is possible but cannot be investigated with our dataset.
In section 2.2 we present a selection of related literature, whereas section 2.3 describes
the data we use. Section 2.4 deals with the institutional setting and how we identify the
effects of early mobility. Following section 2.5 describes the empirical approach while sec-
tion 2.6 presents the results. Finally, section 2.7 summarises the results.
2.2. Related literature
A vast part of the literature on mobility and its outcomes concentrates on the so called job-
to-job mobility and raises the question whether a higher level of mobility for jobs results in
greater earnings. Leary et al. (2014) use data from graduates in the UK and find superior
earnings for workers with a higher level of mobility. Additionally, they detect a positive
link between the decision where to study (leave the home region or not) and mobility in the
subsequent career.
Spanning a more international context, Parey and Waldinger (2011) use the introduc-
tion and expansion of the European student exchange program ERASMUS as exogenous
variable to determine whether staying abroad as a student increases the likelihood in work-
ing abroad at a later point in time. The authors find that a stay abroad increases the likeli-
hood to work abroad later on by roughly 15%. A more heterogeneous picture is found by
Di Cintio and Grassi (2013), investigating wage premiums for Italian university graduates if
they a) chose to study not in their home region or b) migrate within the country for the first
job. The authors find small losses for students who migrate for studying (a)) but significant
gains for movers for the first job (b)) by employing a matching procedure.
In general, authors like Malamud and Wozniak (2010) find a higher level of mobility
and higher willingness to move longer distances for college graduates than workers without
a college degree by employing an instrumental variable approach. Similar results are found
by Kodrzicki (2001) who evaluate the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth from 1979 to
1996. In contrast, Groen (2004) shows a positive relationship between the state a student
decides to study and the state this respective student starts to work and therefore a home
bias for the decision where to work.
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Coming to the case of Germany and the question, how effects of mobility can be iden-
tified, research available is relatively little. The investigation of Krabel and Flöther (2011)
uses a nation-wide survey amongst German graduates and finds a lower level of mobility
for graduates in metropolitan areas and promising labour markets. At the same time, a
higher level of mobility from school to university coincides with a higher mobility when
starting the first job. The investigation models the employability of graduates by using a
Heckman selection model and takes the results of this regression of employability on per-
sonal characteristics and explanatory variables for the determination of the probability of
being mobile. Maier and Sprietsma (2016) use the variation in regional availability of uni-
versity places as exogenous variation in migration decisions when students have to decide
where to study. They find a strong dependency between this first level mobility (school to
university) and the mobility when entering the labour market. Going one step further, a
higher level of mobility does also coincide with a wage premium in the later working life,
as the authors find.
In general, literature has identified a relatively clear nexus between the distance to
a tertiarty education institution and the likelihood to enrol there. As one of the first au-
thors, Kjellström and Regnér (1999) use a Swedish dataset to investigate the link between
the distance between place of residence and the closest university on the one hand and en-
rolment rates at the other hand. They find a small but significant negative effect of distance
on enrolment rates, controlling for a set of personal and parental characteristics. More re-
cently, Frenette (2004) establishes this link for the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income
Dynamics and finds a more pronounced effect for individuals from lower income families.
These results are also found by Frenette (2006) who shows that the likelihood to enrol at an
university decreases significantly if a person’s residence does not lie within an acceptable
“commuting distance” and that this effect is especially prevalent for people from the lower
end of the income distribution again. For the case of Germany, Spiess and Wrohlich (2010)
show a higher likelihood of university enrolment if the university is nearby when complet-
ing secondary education. They show that 5 years after high school graduation, 57% of those
who live relatively far away from an university have enrolled while the share of people who
enrolled at an university is 70% for those, living close to such an institution3.
When investigating the effects of mobility it is important to control for family char-
acteristics (e.g. education of the parents but also own ability) to ensure that findings are
3Far away is defined as more than 12.5 kilometres to the closest university while closely located are those,
having an university within a radius of 6 kilometres to their residence.
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causal. However, as the growing literature on urban economics has shown, the location
where a person grows up might be central to her further career and development. Mion and
Naticchioni (2009) show for the case of Italy that skills seem to be sorted spatially which is
similar to the descriptive findings of Combes et al. (2012), showing the difference in skill and
wage distributions between differently dense areas in France. Even more basically, Bosquet
and Overman (2019) show a positive raw elasticity of roughly 4% between the size of the
city, an individual is born and her later earnings.
2.3. Data
To investigate determinants of mobility we use the Bavarian Graduates Panel (Bayerisches
Absolventen Panel - BAP)4, a survey amongst graduates from Bavarian universities and
applied universities. The BAP is conducted by the Bavarian State Institute for Univer-
sity Research and Development (Bayerisches Staatsinstitut für Hochschulforschung und
Hochschulplanung - IHF). The survey focusses on the transition from university to the
labour market and aims to cover all Bavarian universities and applied universities with
possibly all fields of study, if a field had at least 10 graduates in the respective survey year.
The survey is conducted approximately every 2-3 years with the first cohort interviewed in
2003-2004.
In the survey, graduates are asked about their course of study, their first position at the
labour market, socio-economic indicators and when and where they received their univer-
sity entrance diploma. A distinct feature of the BAP with respect to other graduate surveys
is the possibility to track persons spatially very finely (up to post codes) since graduates
indicate the post code of the school, they graduated from, the university where spatial in-
formation can be generated easily and the post code of their first position at the labour mar-
ket5. Graduates are interviewed up to three times after graduation. Whereas the first wave
takes place roughly 1.5 years after graduation with a focus on the transition from university
to labour market, the second wave (approximately 5 years after graduation) and third wave
(approximately 10 years after graduation) are more interested in employment history and
on the job training.
For that reason, we only use the first wave of the BAP and concentrate on the two grad-
uation cohorts of 2005/2006 and 2009/2010. We concentrate our investigation on these two
4More information can be found at http://www.bap.ihf.bayern.de.
5Graduates do not directly indicate the post code of their employers office but the post code of their private
address after beginning to work. Although this might not perfectly correlate with the employers address this
represents the best possible proxy for first job location of graduates available.
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cohorts mainly due to the fact that the questionnaire of the BAP varies relatively strongly
between cohorts and the biggest overlap of variables which are important for our investi-
gation exists in these two cohorts. The latest cohort (2013/2014) for instance has no such
detailed information on the high school location. In total, 22,296 graduates participated in
the first interview of these two relevant cohorts.6
As the survey took place at Bavarian universities, we have no information on grad-
uates who went to high school in Bavaria but did not go to a Bavarian university or did
not study at all. Hence, we can only analyse the mobility pattern of graduates who limited
their mobility to the state they went to high school and conditioned on graduating. The
fact that we only have university graduates might be less critical as university graduates are
more mobile compared to people without a university degree. We therefore argue that the
results for university graduates can be seen as upper bound results with respect to the entire
population.
The fact that we only investigate movement within Bavaria does not seem to be prob-
lematic for our identification neither. Firstly, German students do not seem to be very mobile
between states. Statistics from the Federal Statistical Office (2019b) show that roughly 60%
of all freshmen in Bavaria also stem from Bavaria7 and that only 20% of all Bavarian high
school graduates who decide to study leave Bavaria for enrolment. Secondly, this seems to
hold true for the general population: According to Deutsche Post Adress (2018), more than
85% of all relocations in Germany happen within the same state (Bundesland).
The survey does not include questions about moving out. Therefore, we have to define
movements based on the location of high school, chosen university and first job. Also, we
do not know the location of the home (town) but only the high school the graduates went
to. However, this should not differ a lot regarding the distance to the home, and therefore,
the distance to the nearest university.
2.4. Institutional background and identification strategy
The main aspect of this investigation deals with the question which effect mobility in the
early stage of the career, i.e. from high school to university, has on later mobility and mon-
etary payouts. In order to provide the necessary background information, the following
part should briefly clarify the institutional background in Germany regarding admission to
6In 2005/2006 6,819 graduates participated which equals a respondent rate of 38.9%. For the cohort 2009/10
the respondent rate was 37.5% with 15,477 interviewed graduates.
7This percentage corresponds to the year 2014, the values for other years differ only slightly.
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universities and applied universities. In general, students in Germany are not obliged to re-
gional boundaries when applying for a degree course. Except for medical degree programs8
where application procedures are centralised, students have to apply at universities and ap-
plied universities directly for their preferred field. Since we leave out medical degrees and
focus on diploma (“Diplom”), bachelor and master degrees, every student within our sam-
ple basically had the possibility to apply to any university and applied university9 as long
as she received a university entrance diploma.
In total, Bavaria has 12 universities10 while we leave out the University of the Armed
Forces Munich and University of Neuendettelsau since our sample does not include grad-
uates from these universities. Additionally, 19 universities of applied sciences are located
in the federal state of Bavaria11 where we have to leave out the EVNH Nürnberg and the
Catholic Foundation University Of Applied Sciences Munich due to similar data restrictions
as above. Except for the University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt and the Catholic Foundation Uni-
versity Of Applied Sciences Munich, all universities and applied universities mentioned are
public universities while the two exceptions are under ecclesiastical sponsorship.12
Coming to the identification strategy, the central aspect is to ensure an exogenous
variation in the mobility of high school graduates in their decision, which university to
choose and, by saying so, whether to move or not to move for studying. Going back to
the human capital theory of Becker (1994) high school graduates should decide to go to
university if the expected payouts outrun the expected cost of studying. This, very basic,
argumentation should also hold for the decision whether to leave home to study or not as
e.g. Mitze et al. (2015) argue. We think of costs as commuting which depends on the distance
to the university and the costs of leaving a social group (family and friends) and find contact
to a new group for instance. The cost of commuting are of course affected by the decision
to move. At the same time, moving may come with benefits like making new friends or
being able to choose from a wider field of study courses. To sum up, commuting costs can
8i.e. pharmacy, human medicine, veterinary medicine and dentistry
9Due to the setup of the BAP we can only investigate students which decided to study at a tertiary education
institution within the federal state of Bavaria.
10i.e. University of Augsburg, University of Bamberg, University of Bayreuth, University of Erlangen-
Nürnberg, LMU Munich, TU Munich, University of Passau, University of Regensburg, University of Würzburg,
University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, University of the Armed Forces Munich, University of Neuendettelsau.
11These are: Amberg-Weiden, Ansbach, Aschaffenburg, Augsburg, Coburg, Deggendorf, Hof, Ingol-
stadt, Kempten, Landshut, Munich, Neu-Ulm, Nürnberg, Regensburg, Rosenheim, Weihenstephan-Triesdorf,
Würzburg-Schweinfurt, EVNH Nürnberg, Catholic Foundation University Of Applied Sciences Munich
12Although under ecclesiastical sponsorship, the University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt and the Catholic Foun-
dation University Of Applied Sciences Munich are similar to the public universities since they do not charge
tuition fees and are open to public.
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be minimised by moving whilst the social costs for setting up a new personal environment
rise. Obviously, social costs can be seen as benefits, depending on personal preferences.
In general, these two important determinants (expected costs and benefits of leaving
home to study) seem to be highly influenced by parental and general socio-economic as
well as peripheral characteristics. As one of the first authors Greenwood (1975) argues that
migration (in general, not related to students) is highly influenced by socio-economic char-
acteristics and the environment, a person is living in. Mchugh and Morgan (1984) show that
the economic conditions of the destination area, i.e. the region the university or college is
located in, seem to be important for students when deciding which educational institution
to go to. This is confirmed by the more recent work of Agasisti and Dal Bianco (2007) for
students in Italy.
As argued above, central to the decision whether to move or not seems to be the envi-
ronment of the prospective student. Whereas factors like parental background, the number
of children or gender can be controlled for, the unobserved dimension of this environment
might highly influence the decision whether to leave home to study. If we do not take care
of this unobserved dimension and use the “movement-variable” when starting to study as
explanatory variable for further calculations, results might be highly biased. This holds es-
pecially true if further investigations relate to movement patterns. Results here might be
biased since they do not necessarily reflect the interrelation of interest (e.g. how mobility for
the first job influences wages) but these results might stem from the underlying differences
in individuals due to their different environment they grew up when they were younger. A
priori it may be hard to argue whether the bias is up-, or downwards sloping.
We argue that students, stemming from the same suburban region and controlled for
observable socio-economic factors should be similar in the sense that the decision whether
to take the university which is located in the neighbourhood of the school the student gradu-
ated from or to leave this area to study somewhere else can be seen as an exogenous decision.
However, this assumption is relatively strong since it does not incorporate the argumenta-
tion that the decision whether to leave or stay for studying might be correlated with i.e.
intrinsic motivation and might be endogenous therefore.
In order to take this point into account, we employ an instrumental approach by in-
strumenting the decision whether to leave or to stay via the distance to the most proximate
university the student has after graduation. We argue that the place the prospective student
receives her university entrance diploma is exogenous to the location of the closest univer-
sity, i.e. the student does not and cannot influence the location of her high school in such
52
CHAPTER 2. NEW REGION, NEW CHANCES
way that she is closer located to her favoured university.
At the same time, characteristics of the parents might influence where they settle, ei-
ther close to a city with a university or not. If these parental characteristics are again linked
to personal characteristics of their descendants, endogeneity might still arise between per-
sonal characteristics and the place of residence when graduating from high school. How-
ever, we argue that we are able to control for this indirect link by taking care of parental
characteristics which might shape the decision, where to settle.
We do not compare the city centre with the suburbs and those in turn not with the
country side. We exclude high schools located in the countryside as these pupils have to
move anyway if they go to university. We also exclude high schools within the central
urban area, as cities are more heterogeneous than the suburbs and distance within the city,
especially for smaller cities, is less important.
In summary, our identification succeeds the following argumentation: prospective
students growing up in a common region and controlled for their family background are
similar in unobservable and observable dimensions, except for their intrinsic motivation in
leaving home to study. To overcome this endogeneity, we take the distance to the university
nearest by since a closely located university should decrease the likelihood to move. There-
fore, we argue that the (exogenously given) distance between high school and university is
a valid instrument for the decision to move to study when we e.g. want to investigate the
effect of this first movement after high school on the decision to move when entering the
labour market after university graduation.
2.5. Empirical approach
As argued in section 2.4, we take a group of students which is similar in terms of the lo-
cation they graduated from high school, control for family characteristics, and use the dis-
tance from high school to closest located university as instrumental variable for the deci-
sion to go to this university or chose another university in another labour market region
(LMR, Arbeitsmarktregion). The concept of labour market regions was developed by the
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. LMRs coincide usually with 2 or 3 dis-
tricts (Kreise) and are defined as regions where workers might commute within, but not
between.13 We use this instrument of distance between high school and closest university to
13More specific, LMRs are defined as regions where at least 65% of all wage earners with residence in this
region also work in this region and that at least 65% of all paid jobs are filled with domestic workers (stemming
from this region). Additionally, commuting times within a LMR should not exceed 45 minutes one way. For
more information see www.bbsr.bund.de.
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investigate how the movement decision between high school and university influences the
likelihood to move to another city after graduating from university.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how we decided to form our group of interest to have a set of
students, as similar as possible in unobservable and observable dimensions. We calculate
distances as road distances by using the Stata tool osrmtime by Huber and Rust (2016) to
account for the geography and streets which might reflect commuting more realistically
and draw lines around the city centre according to these distances.14
City 
Centre 
Inner border (start of suburbs) 
Outer border (start of countryside) 
Figure 2.1: Schematic selection of group of interest (in grey dotted area)
The outer border of our group of interest in defined as a maximum of 30 (for Munich)
or 15 ( for all other cities) kilometres street distance to the next bigger city centre. We argue
that roughly at this line, geographical structures change from a suburban environment to a
more countryside characterised infrastructure.
Coming back to Figure 2.1 we define the inner and the outer border separately for
Munich and all other relevant cities with a university or an applied university. Munich rep-
resents the centre of Bavaria in many dimensions (economical, cultural, educational) with
a relatively widespread network of public transportation. For Munich, the average travel
14The tool calculates distances between longitudinal and latitudinal specified places by using open source
street maps. We used a street map of Germany provided by Geofabrik (http://www.geofabrik.de/).
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distance between the city centre and a terminal stop of a suburban train (S-Bahn) is 39 kilo-
metres while this distance is 11 kilometres when taking the metro (U-Bahn) instead of the
suburban train.15
Hof
Weiden
Passau
Coburg
Amberg
Neu-Ulm
München
Bamberg
Ansbach
Würzburg
Nürnberg
Landshut
Bayreuth
Augsburg
Rosenheim
Regensburg
Ingolstadt
Deggendorf
Schweinfurt
Aschaffenburg
Kempten (Allgäu)
Figure 2.2: Distribution of schools and city centres in Bavaria
By having these street distances, we define the outer border of Figure 2.1 for Munich at
30 kilometres travel distance, the inner circle at 15 kilometres. We do so to ensure a mostly
homogeneous group of people, especially in terms of availability of public transportation
since this might be a main driver for the decision where to study. By taking the inner cir-
cle at 15 kilometres, we ensure that these people are “far enough” spatially located from
the terminal stops of the metro, which shapes to a certain degree the border of the city. At
the same time, taking 30 kilometres as outer border ensures that all people within this ring
between 15-30 kilometres away from the city centre are similarly close to a stop of the sub-
urban train and, by saying so, have equally good public transportation connections to the
centre of Munich. For the other relevant cities, we take half of the distances as for Munich,
therefore the inner circle is at 7.5 kilometres from the city centre, the outer circle is drawn
15The distances are measured as simple arithmetic mean of the sum of distances between Munich’s city
centre, defined as Marienplatz (location of the town hall) and the terminal stop, measured by using Google
Maps.
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at 15 kilometres. Both values seem to be reasonable for the expansiveness of the respective
public transportation network.
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Figure 2.3: Fraction of people with relevant distance between high school and relevant city
centre for a) full sample and b) relevant subsample.
Notes: Distances are relevant road distances. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, cohort 2005/06 and 2009/10.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the distribution of high schools (green dots) in Bavaria and circles
around the city centres of 5 kilometres (inner circle) and 25 kilometres (outer circle). We
see that there are only very few overlaps of schools, belonging basically to the catchment
areas of two or more cities. Therefore, most prospective students can decide between only
one university in the closer neighbourhood with the next closely located university being
significantly far away. Furthermore, the graph nicely illustrates that schools, except for
those in the direct city centre, are spread relatively even within Bavaria without having big
overlaps between circles around the city centre.
Figure 2.3 gives a histogram of the pecentage of graduates with respect to the distance
between the high school they received their university entrance diploma from and the city
centre of the next relevant city with a university. The distances are measured as road dis-
tances. What this graph should illustrate is the proper selection of our subsample, i.e. that
the left-hand side of the graph shows a high level of heterogeneity especially with a great
fraction of people who live relatively close to (or even within) a city with a university. If
we restrict the sample to the persons within the “doughnut” as drawn in Figure 2.1, the
distribution amongst people with respect to this relevant distance becomes higher even as
the right-hand side b) of Figure 2.3 shows. We argue that the restriction to this subsample
ensures that effects found are not driven by few observations with a relatively short distance
between high school and university as depicted in a) of Figure 2.3.
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We split up the histogram b) in Figure 2.3 between students closely located to Mu-
nich and all other relevant cities. Percentages can be found in Figure 2.4 with left-hand
side a) presenting the percentages for Munich and right-hand side presenting the results
for all other cities of our sample. The picture of those two histograms is somewhat similar,
however it should be noted that the dimension of the x-axis (the distance to the closest city
centre) is larger for histogram a) of Figure 2.4 than for b) of the same figure, accounting for
the mentioned bigger expansiveness of Munich in contrast to the other cities. Therefore,
Figure 2.4 supports our argumentation to set different distances to city centres for Munich
and all other cities when setting up our sample of interest.
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Figure 2.4: Fraction of people with relevant distance between high school and relevant city
centre for relevant subsample and a) Munich only b) all other cities.
Notes: Distances are relevant road distances. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, cohort 2005/06 and 2009/10.
2.5.1 Estimation
As explained above, we take a subset of individuals based on the distance of their high
school where they received their university entrance diploma, to the closest city centre with
an university or applied university. We want to know how the decision of those seemingly
similar individuals to go not to this closest tertiary education institution influences her fur-
ther mobility behaviour. Therefore, we implement a two-stage-least-squares instrumental
approach (2SLS) to instrument the (possibly biased) variable of moving for the university
by road distance to the closest university. We argue that for the decision to move the com-
muting distance to university is important. Therefore, we take the distance to the university
as an instrument. As mentioned before, the survey does not include questions about move-
ments. Because of this, we define moving as a change in the LMR. According to the defini-
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tion of LMRs, commuting times should be acceptable within these areas but not between.
We argue that this should hold true, no matter whether a person commutes to her job or her
university. Because of this, we define a person with a high school in a different LMR than the
university she enrolled in as “moved for university”. Analogously, if the indicated first res-
idence after graduating from university lies in another LMR than the university, we define
the graduate as having moved after graduating and therefore being mobile after graduating.
Formally, the first stage of our approach regresses the variable “move for university” (X) on
our set of explanatory variables (including the distance to the most proximate university),
summarised as Z
Xi = α0 + α1Zi + ei (2.1)
, where Z consists of variables, all exogenous with respect to X. The predicted values of
Xi, X̂i, calculated by X̂i = α̂0 + α̂1Zi are then used in the second stage to calculate the effect
of our instrumented variable (move for university) on our variable of interest (e.g. mobility
when entering the labour market), represented by Y:
Yi = β0 + β1X̂i + εi (2.2)
Equation 2.2 is the central equation we are estimating to model the link between move-
ment at an early stage of the career on later mobility pattern. Thereby, X̂i consists of the es-
timated values of following variables: distance to the next university/applied university (in
road kilometres - instrument for movement for university) and following control variables:
socio economic characteristics of the prospective student (age, marital status, children, gen-
der), characteristics of the parents (education and professional position), educational char-
acteristics (grade of university entrance diploma, grade of university degree, dummy for
internship, dummy for exchange term, dummy for working experience), controls for the
region of residence and dummies for the type of university (university/applied university).
2.5.2 Restriction of the dataset
Our dataset for the cohorts 2005/06 and 2009/10 consist in total of roughly 10,000 inter-
viewed individuals. To ensure a mostly causal identification, we have to restrict the sample
in several dimensions. 2,362 bachelor graduates have do be dropped since they are inter-
viewed whilst still succeeding another degree (mostly a masters degree) and therefore are
still students. The sample decreases further by implementing restrictions regarding the high
school location: First, 3,338 graduates are dropped as they went to a high school which is lo-
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cated in an LMR where no university (of applied sciences) is located. These students would
by definition always be accounted as movers, even for their nearest university. Therefore,
we do not incorporate them in our analysis. More observations get lost when considering
graduates which went to a high school within a city. By removing graduates with a dis-
tance to the city centre closer than the calculated radius of the city, 2,903 observations are
removed. People, moving back to their “home” LMR after finishing university somewhere
else are coded as not moved since we are interested in the effects a migration for university
has on later mobility and not the likelihood to go to the home area again.
Finally, we take an additional distance to the city border and remove graduates too far
away from the city centre (outside of the outer boarder of Figure 2.1). This removes further
2,791 graduates. Hence, the final sample of interest shrinks to roughly 500 observations.16
2.6. Results
As a first result and to get an impression of the relationship between movement for univer-
sity and the subsequent first job, Table 2.1 is a basic regression (without any controls) of the
mobility for university (as a reminder, mobility is defined as enrolling at another university
than the closest one) on the later mobility for the first job. The results are presented for the
entire sample, once with an instrumented “move for university” variable with the distance
to the closest university and once without an instrumentation.
We see that there seems to be a high level of, at least, correlation between these two
variables17. However, results of Table 2.1 should not be emphasised too much due to the
fact that we neither include any control variables here nor ensure homogeneity within the
group of investigated individuals. Table 2.1 is separated by the choice of the sample.
Whereas specification 1 and 2 take all individuals graduated for the calculation, spec-
ification 3 and 4 concentrate on a subsample consisting of only the individuals within the
inner border of Figure 2.1. The table clearly shows that there seems to be a link between
mobility on the different stages of the career (school → university and university → first
job).
However, as we argued in section 2.5, it is important to ensure that these mobility
patterns are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity, either directly through e.g. family
16Some of the graduates have several characteristics which lead to a drop, e.g. still succeeding a university
degree and stemming from a LMR without a university nearby. Therefore, adding up the mentioned values
does not lead to the sample size of 500 individuals.
17Regressing movement for university on the distance to the closest university delivers significant results.
We argue that the instrument is relevant therefore.
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Table 2.1: Likelihood to move for first job based on migration for university - full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit-IV - full sample Probit-full sample Probit-IV - within circle Probit- within circle
Moved for university 0.3085∗∗∗ 0.1866∗∗∗ 0.6148∗∗∗ 0.3118∗∗∗
(0.0699) (0.0338) (0.1221) (0.0569)
Observations 6255 6255 3352 3352
Notes: Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and 2009/10. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
background or indirectly, for example by a specific neighbourhood which stimulates mo-
bility more than another neighbourhood. Therefore, we enrich and modify the underlying
strategy of Table 2.1 in two dimensions: Firstly, we restrict our dataset to only those persons
within the two outer rings of Figure 2.1 to ensure homogeneity in the mentioned indirect di-
mension. Secondly, we control for a vast set of socioeconomic factors like the education and
professional position of the parents, the grades in school and university of the respective
individual, family status etc.18
Table 2.2 presents the results similar to the ones of Table 2.1, enriched by these two
dimensions mentioned above. As previously, measuring the effect of a change in the LMR
for enrolling at a university on later enrolment seems to be underestimated by a simple
binary indicator as the probit specifications (model (2) and (4) in Table 2.1 and model (2) in
Table 2.2) exhibit a remarkably smaller coefficient than the specification with the distance to
the closest university as instrument (model (1) and (3) in Table 2.1 and model (1) in Table 2.2).
This seems to be reasonable, due to the fact that the instrument (distance between high
school and closest university in road kilometres) measures the costs of going to the closest
university or somewhere else in a much finer way than a simple binary variable, indicating
whether the student moved for enrolling at a university or not.
The specification (1) in Table 2.2 can be seen as our baseline specification, controlling
for all measurable factors of heterogeneity and coming closest to an exogenous change in
location for university studies in our setting. The coefficient indicates that if a person moves
for her tertiary education, the likelihood to move afterwards is higher than for a student
who decides to stay in the home region to study.
Importantly, it should be noted that both specifications (1) and (2) have a binary vari-
able (Moved for job:yes/no) as outcome variable and are therefore estimated with probit
or an IV-enriched probit approach. Therefore, interpretations of the coefficient are cumber-
some if not impossible due to this non-linear specification of the model.19 A possibility to
18All controls are defined in the notes of the respective tables and in section 2.5.
19see e.g. Liao (1994) for a detailed description of issues arising from interpreting non-linear models.
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Table 2.2: Likelihood to move for first job based on migration for university - reduced sam-
ple
(1) (2) (3)
Probit-IV -reduced sample Probit - reduced sample OLS-IV - reduced sample
Moved for university 4.2769∗ -0.0460 1.0020∗
(2.2764) (0.1640) (0.5342)
Grade University 0.0860∗ 0.0891∗∗ 0.0165∗
(0.0491) (0.0364) (0.0099)
Intern Experience -0.2941 0.2164 -0.0618
(0.3864) (0.1777) (0.0888)
Grade High School 0.0474 0.1794 0.0177
(0.2268) (0.1384) (0.0526)
German -0.2742 -0.2115 -0.0524
(1.0867) (0.6698) (0.2611)
Female -0.6871 0.0316 -0.1600
(0.4439) (0.1509) (0.1020)
Experience abroad -0.1114 0.2588∗ -0.0184
(0.2997) (0.1482) (0.0669)
Job Mother 0.0203 -0.0627 0.0003
(0.1524) (0.0943) (0.0350)
Job Father 0.0637 0.1056 0.0197
(0.1305) (0.0811) (0.0307)
Education Mother 0.4929∗ 0.1795 0.1136∗
(0.2904) (0.1563) (0.0671)
Education Father -0.1451 -0.0433 -0.0396
(0.1577) (0.0938) (0.0379)
Observations 515 515 528
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort interviewed, terms studied, type of university entrance diploma, marital status,
children, age and type of university (university or applied university) not reported. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and
2009/10. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
overcome this issue is the calculation of margins and their interpretation at means. How-
ever, this might be not meaningful in this context due to the IV specification and the level of
variance (e.g. in terms of grade at high school) to interpret the effect of a person at mean,20
a change in location for university would have on her later decision whether to move for a
job.
Because of this, we interpret the results only in their significance and sign, not in their
magnitude. For that, a third column is included which estimates an IV OLS specification.
We are aware of possible problems of a linear interpretation of a binary outcome variable
and argue that this specification is meant only to get a sense of the magnitude of the arising
effect. We find from column (3) of Table 2.2 that the likelihood to move for the first job
doubles roughly if a person previously had to move for enrolling at a university.
What should be noted in the general interpretation of our results is an issue, occurring
for students who decide to study at the university in their neighbourhood. Unfortunately,
our dataset delivers only postal code information for the university, a student enrols and
20This means we would interpret the effect of a synthetic observation, having mean values for all relevant
variables.
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the high school she graduates from. We coded a movement for a student if she chooses a
university which is not the closest one to the place she graduated from school, based on this
postal code information. We can therefore not distinguish between students who study at
their home university and decide to do not leave the parental home and students who move
out, although they decided to enrol at the most proximate university. Both types of students
(home stayers and leavers, both enrolled at closest university) are dropped from our sample.
Since the costs for those students are lower since they can choose their closest univer-
sity and move out, thereby keeping the environment at least partially constant, we argue
that an inclusion of those students should lower the effects we find. Therefore, results as in
Table 2.1 or Table 2.2 should be treated as upper bound results.
2.6.1 The case of Munich
Bavaria exhibits some specialities in its structure in comparison to other states. Especially
the strong centralisation towards Munich, as “heart” of the state in many dimensions, sepa-
rates Bavaria from most other German states with a more evenly spread structure in terms
of economy, culture or population density in general. Apart from Berlin, Munich is the only
German city with more than one public university (Technical University Munich (TUM) and
Ludwig Maximilian University Munich (LMU)) and a set of applied universities. Table B.1
in the Appendix gives an overview of the universities, individuals of our relevant subsam-
ple were enrolled at.21
As the table shows, students from both universities located in Munich (TUM and
LMU) account for roughly 37% of the sample, adding the HaW Munich increases this num-
ber to nearly 50%. The table basically mirrors the distribution of students in our subsample,
based on the region where they received their university entrance diploma. Here, roughly
58% of the students graduated from a high school in the LMR Munich. Table B.2 in the Ap-
pendix shows the distribution according to LMR of high school graduation.22 For the reason
that roughly half of our sample consists of individuals who studied in Munich and therefore
presumably the highest level of heterogeneity for this city and the aspect that Munich repre-
sents the centre of Bavaria, we decide to separate our analysis to students from Munich and
21Differences in the number of observations in Table B.1 and regression results like in Table 2.2 may occur
if we have very few observations for some high school/university region combinations such that fixed effects
(control dummies) in one of this areas lead to perfect collinearity. Furthermore, not all control variables are
available for all students of the subsample presented in Table B.1.
22If we account for a graduation from a high school in the LMR of Munich and check the distribution of
those graduates among Bavaria, we see that approximately 70% of those, graduating from school in Munich
(and decide to study) go to an university in Munich. Table B.3 in the Appendix shows this distribution.
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Table 2.3: Likelihood to move for first job based on migration for university - Munich only
(1) (2) (3)
Probit-IV - reduced sample Probit-reduced sample OLS-IV - reduced sample
Moved for university 4.2988∗∗ 0.4444∗ 0.7354∗∗
(2.1537) (0.2328) (0.3431)
Grade University 0.1080 0.0889 0.0120
(0.0812) (0.0671) (0.0107)
Intern Experience -0.6644 -0.0157 -0.1123
(0.5032) (0.2502) (0.0831)
Grade High School 0.0136 0.1134 -0.0051
(0.2911) (0.2042) (0.0496)
German 0.0000 0.0000 0.1197
(.) (.) (0.2189)
Female -0.5728 -0.0216 -0.0882
(0.4314) (0.2167) (0.0685)
Experience abroad 0.0224 0.2106 0.0191
(0.3147) (0.2124) (0.0523)
Job Mother 0.2164 0.0285 0.0398
(0.2099) (0.1287) (0.0360)
Job Father 0.0939 -0.0405 0.0113
(0.1895) (0.1226) (0.0328)
Education Mother 0.3516 0.1902 0.0708
(0.2893) (0.1958) (0.0496)
Education Father -0.2446 -0.1303 -0.0446
(0.2072) (0.1408) (0.0355)
Observations 288 288 306
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort interviewed, terms studied, type of university entrance diploma, marital status,
children, age and type of university (university or applied university) not reported. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and
2009/10. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
the rest of Bavaria.
Table 2.3 regresses the likelihood to move for the first job on the movement for uni-
versity on a subsample of students who graduated from a high school within the LMR of
Munich. The remaining students who did not graduate from a Munich high school form the
subsample of the regression in Table B.11 in the Appendix. We see that the effect movement
for university studies has on later mobility for the first job is especially pronounced for high
school graduates from Munich. As previously, the true effect seems to be underestimated
by a simple probit regression, since the coefficient on the interrelation is significantly higher
for the IV-estimation in column (1) in Table 2.3. At the same time, this effect found does not
seem to be valid for high school graduates from other LMRs as Table B.11 in the Appendix
does not verify any significant interrelation between mobility from school to university and
university to job market, the simple probit regression in column (2) in Table B.11 even gives
a negative and significant coefficient.
We do not want to overemphasis the results of Table 2.3 or Table B.11 due to the fact
that the Bavarian Graduates Panel consists largely of persons stemming from Munich and
surrounding areas. Therefore, we have a higher level of heterogeneity, especially for these
regions, which we utilise in this subsection. Therefore, the findings that the positive effects
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of a movement for university has on general mobility is especially pronounced for persons
from Munich should be validated with further analyses and especially by using a dataset,
containing higher levels of heterogeneity also for other LMRs but Munich.
2.6.2 Does higher mobility pay out monetarily?
Whereas we modelled determinants of later job mobility in the previous sections, this sub-
section is meant to check whether mobility pays out monetarily, i.e. whether people who
decide to move for the first job earn more than the respective home stayers. The Bavarian
Graduate Panel includes information on the yearly wage for the first job. We use this infor-
mation to investigate whether mobile people earn more in this first position, based on the
approach we used to model mobility.
Literature in this field delivers relatively homogeneous results regarding the question,
whether spatial mobility leads to superior earnings. For a sample of German graduates,
Maier and Sprietsma (2016) find significantly higher earnings for mobile graduates, using
the number of students in the respective labour market region as instrument for mobility.
Leary et al. (2014) show a similar relationship for the case of UK graduates. Theoretically,
Raphael and Riker (1999) and more recently Lkhagvasuren (2014) show that higher levels of
mobility should induce higher wages.
We showed in section 2.6 the importance of accounting for mobility when enrolling
at university when investigating determinants of mobility for the first job. Now, we use
this approach to check whether mobility for the first job also pays out while accounting for
the relevant levels of unobserved heterogeneity: As before, we restrict our sample accord-
ing to the location of the school, the individual received her university entrance diploma.
Secondly, we control for personal and parental characterstics by including a set of control
variables as e.g. in Table 2.3.
Thirdly, we now instrument for the mobility for the first job with mobility for univer-
sity and this variable, again instrumented by distance to the closest university. The relevant
identifying assumption, next to the previous argumentation that mobility for university is
exogenous when taking the correct subsample and controlling for socioeconomic factors,
is that there is a direct, positive and linear relationship between mobility after school and
after university. We basically follow the empirical approach proposed by Maier and Spri-
etsma (2016) who regress the effects of mobility for the first job on the respective earnings.
However, mobility for the first job is modelled by accounting for mobility for university
education. We do the same, but instrument for mobility for university education with the
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Table 2.4: Determinants of log of yearly income based on previous mobility
(1) (2)
IV - reduced sample OLS-reduced sample
Moved for first job 0.1395 0.0402
(0.2169) (0.0337)
Grade University 0.0123 0.0119
(0.0132) (0.0138)
Intern Experience -0.0083 -0.0049
(0.0355) (0.0363)
Grade High School -0.0273 -0.0200
(0.0309) (0.0279)
German -0.1176 -0.1181
(0.1239) (0.1297)
Female -0.1935∗∗∗ -0.1940∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0304)
Experience abroad 0.0117 0.0188
(0.0325) (0.0301)
Job Mother -0.0125 -0.0149
(0.0196) (0.0197)
Job Father 0.0361∗∗ 0.0394∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0168)
Education Mother 0.0027 0.0074
(0.0296) (0.0291)
Education Father 0.0300 0.0280
(0.0192) (0.0196)
Observations 422 422
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort interviewed, terms studied,
type of university entrance diploma, marital status, children, age and type of university
(university or applied university) not reported. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Co-
hort 2005/06 and 2009/10. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the log of yearly income, which include the sum of
monthly payments plus possible bonuses.
established distance between high school and closest university.
The results for this approach are mapped in Table 2.4 showing that mobile people do
not earn higher (logged) wages than their not moving counterparts, if we use the subsample
as in Table 2.2 and instrument for the first job mobility as mentioned before. The dependent
variable is the log of the yearly income, including bonuses. This result stays robust against
a respecification of the estimation approach: In Table B.5 in the Appendix, we estimate the
log of the yearly wage in the first job on mobility for this first job, accounted for selection
on the mobility for university by using a Heckman selection model as proposed firstly by
Heckman (1979). The respecification does not alter results significantly, indicating that there
is no significant effect of the mobility for the first job on the respective earnings, as well.23
23Instead of using yearly wages as dependent variable like e.g. in Table 2.4 we also do this investigation
using hourly wages. The advantage of using hourly wages might be a better comparability since wages are
normalised by hours worked. We calculate hourly wages by dividing monthly salaries with the realised number
of monthly hours worked. Results for these calculations, using the IV approach and the Heckman selection
model and controling for the case of Munich can be found in the Appendix from Table B.7 to Table B.10. Results
stay basically unchanged with a small but significant effect for movement for the first job when employing the
Heckman model.
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However, as already argued in subsection 2.6.1 it should be kept in mind that the
sample size is relatively small, leading to a smaller level of heterogeneity than it could be
expected with a bigger dataset.
We conduct the analysis of the wage premium based on an IV-strategy as in Table 2.4
or a Heckman selection model as in Table B.5 also for a subsample of persons graduat-
ing from school in the LMR Munich to check, whether we observe different effects for this
region. Results are presented in Table B.4 and Table B.6 in the Appendix. The Heckman se-
lection model delivers a slightly significant effect, mobility for the first job has on the wage.
This supports the previous results, setting the effects for Munich apart from other cities in
Bavaria.
2.7. Conclusion
In this paper, we add to the existing literature on determinants of spatial mobility of uni-
versity graduates in two dimensions. Firstly, we show that the likelihood to move when
entering the labour market for the first time is highly determined by previous mobility, i.e.
the decision whether to study in the home area or somewhere else. We set up an identifi-
cation strategy which is, in our view, able to control for direct and indirect channels which
influence the decision to move for university studies and therefore models this decision as
exogenous as possible.
Secondly, we show that this positive interrelation of mobility decisions in the career
is especially pronounced for individuals, graduating from a school in the LMR of Munich.
Furthermore, we show that there does not seem to be a premium when moving for the first
job if our identification approach is employed.
Our findings are novel to existing literature in several dimensions: Firstly, the results
that a higher level of mobility in the job might be rooted in mobility for earlier university
studies points toward a nexus in a growing field of research in urban economics, showing
the importance of the place of birth for later earnings and the literature on wage premium
for higher levels of mobility.
Secondly, we find that by controlling for early mobility patterns, this premium seems
to be not existent any longer which is somewhat contradicting to the well established liter-
ature on mobility premiums. However, migration even with small distances is often driven
mainly by endogenous and hardly to measure factors like mobility. Our approach tries to
control for these factors more comprehensively than many other related studies. Therefore,
we consider the mobility premium found by other authors be driven, at least partially, by
66
CHAPTER 2. NEW REGION, NEW CHANCES
these factors.
However, two limitations arise in our analysis. Firstly, the number of relevant obser-
vations shrinks dramatically when we implement the identification strategy to account for
unobserved heterogeneity. Here, a greater sample might help to validate the results found
on a broader database. Secondly, the dataset does not allow for distinguishing between peo-
ple who move when enrolling at university within the same LMR and people who stay at
their parents’ home when starting university studies. Although our dataset allows to track
people down to the level of postal codes of their schools and universities, which is very
precise in contrast to other, related investigations, this drawback only allows to distinguish
between relocations between LMRs. Therefore, we argue that our results should be treated
as upper bound results since costs for people, moving within a LMR when enrolling as stu-
dents should be lower as for people who change the region.
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Appendix B
B.1 Composition of sample
Table B.1: Composition of sample based on university
Name of University No. obs. Freq. Cum.
HaW Kempten 1 0.18 0.18
HaW Weihenstephan 1 0.18 0.36
Uni Würzburg 1 0.18 0.53
HaW Ansbach 2 0.36 0.89
HaW Hof 3 0.53 1.43
HaW Ingolstadt 3 0.53 1.96
HaW Deggendorf 4 0.71 2.67
Uni Bamberg 4 0.71 3.39
HaW Amberg-Weiden 6 1.07 4.46
HaW Aschaffenburg 6 1.07 5.53
Uni Eichstätt-Ingolstadt 7 1.25 6.77
HaW Rosenheim 9 1.60 8.38
HaW Regensburg 11 1.96 10.34
Uni Bayreuth 11 1.96 12.30
HaW Landshut 13 2.32 14.62
Uni Augsburg 16 2.85 17.47
HaW Nürnberg 26 4.63 22.10
Uni Regensburg 26 4.63 26.74
HaW Würzburg-Schweinfurt 29 5.17 31.91
HaW Augsburg 31 5.53 37.43
Uni Passau 36 6.42 43.85
Uni Erlangen-Nürnberg 44 7.84 51.69
HaW München 64 11.41 63.10
TU München 77 13.73 76.83
LMU München 130 23.17 100.00
Total 561 100.00
Notes: HaW = Hochschule für angewandete Wissenschaften (University of Applied Sci-
ences). Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and 2009/10.
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Table B.2: Composition of sample based on LMR of university entrance diploma
Name of LMR No. obs. Freq. Cum.
Ansbach 1 0.18 0.18
Würzburg 1 0.18 0.36
Deggendorf 6 1.07 1.43
Aschaffenburg 10 1.78 3.21
Weiden 10 1.78 4.99
Landshut 11 1.96 6.95
Amberg 12 2.14 9.09
Passau 14 2.50 11.59
Rosenheim 25 4.46 16.04
Regensburg 30 5.35 21.39
Augsburg 50 8.91 30.30
Nürnberg 66 11.76 42.07
München 325 57.93 100.00
Total 561 100.00
Notes: Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and
2009/10.
Table B.3: Distribution of universities if students graduated from high school in LMR Mu-
nich
Name of LMR No. obs. Freq. Cum.
HaW Amberg-Weiden 1 0.31 0.31
HaW Deggendorf 1 0.31 0.62
HaW Kempten 1 0.31 0.92
Uni Bamberg 1 0.31 1.23
Uni Würzburg 1 0.31 1.54
HaW Ingolstadt 2 0.62 2.15
Uni Eichstätt-Ingolstadt 4 1.23 3.38
Uni Augsburg 5 1.54 4.92
Uni Bayreuth 5 1.54 6.46
HaW Rosenheim 6 1.85 8.31
Uni Regensburg 6 1.85 10.15
Uni Erlangen-Nürnberg 7 2.15 12.31
HaW Landshut 8 2.46 14.77
HaW Augsburg 9 2.77 17.54
Uni Passau 18 5.54 23.08
HaW Würzburg-Schweinfurt 23 7.08 30.15
HaW München 56 17.23 47.38
TU München 58 17.85 65.23
LMU München 113 34.77 100.00
Total 325 100.00
Notes: HaW = Hochschule für angewandete Wissenschaften (University of Applied Sci-
ences). Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and 2009/10.
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B.2 Robustness checks
Table B.4: Determinants of log of yearly income based on previous mobility - only LMR
Munich
(1) (2)
OLS-IV - reduced sample Probit-reduced sample
Moved for first job 0.1297 0.0940∗
(0.2755) (0.0552)
Grade University 0.0411 0.0424∗
(0.0254) (0.0250)
Intern Experience -0.0522 -0.0518
(0.0489) (0.0523)
Grade High School -0.0246 -0.0227
(0.0413) (0.0414)
German -0.1702 -0.1616
(0.1641) (0.1613)
Female -0.1473∗∗∗ -0.1470∗∗∗
(0.0411) (0.0439)
Experience abroad -0.0237 -0.0218
(0.0426) (0.0428)
Job Mother -0.0065 -0.0067
(0.0250) (0.0267)
Job Father 0.0336 0.0330
(0.0235) (0.0247)
Education Mother 0.0134 0.0145
(0.0365) (0.0381)
Education Father 0.0020 0.0011
(0.0271) (0.0280)
Observations 241 241
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort interviewed, terms studied, type of university
entrance diploma, marital status, children, age and type of university (university or applied university) not
reported. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and 2009/10. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the log of yearly income, which include the
sum of monthly payments plus possible bonuses.
70
CHAPTER 2. NEW REGION, NEW CHANCES
Table B.5: Determinants of log of yearly income based on previous mobility by using a
Heckman selection model
(1)
Heckman selection model
Moved for first job 0.0381
(0.0266)
Grade University 0.0175
(0.0135)
Intern Experience -0.0222
(0.0319)
Grade High School -0.0119
(0.0226)
German -0.0164
(0.1106)
Female -0.1752∗∗∗
(0.0256)
Experience abroad 0.0247
(0.0251)
Job Mother -0.0055
(0.0158)
Job Father 0.0337∗∗
(0.0138)
Education Mother -0.0065
(0.0243)
Education Father 0.0265
(0.0165)
Observations 538
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort inter-
viewed, terms studied, type of university entrance diploma, mari-
tal status, children, age and type of university (university or applied
university) not reported. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort
2005/06 and 2009/10. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the log of yearly
income, which include the sum of monthly payments plus possible
bonuses.
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Table B.6: Determinants of log of yearly income based on previous mobility by using a
Heckman selection model - only LMR Munich
(1)
Heckman selection model
Moved for first job 0.0940∗
(0.0515)
Grade University 0.0424∗
(0.0234)
Intern Experience -0.0518
(0.0488)
Grade High School -0.0227
(0.0386)
German -0.1616
(0.1505)
Female -0.1470∗∗∗
(0.0410)
Experience abroad -0.0217
(0.0399)
Job Mother -0.0067
(0.0249)
Job Father 0.0330
(0.0230)
Education Mother 0.0144
(0.0356)
Education Father 0.0011
(0.0262)
Observations 311
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort inter-
viewed, terms studied, type of university entrance diploma, mari-
tal status, children, age and type of university (university or applied
university) not reported. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort
2005/06 and 2009/10. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the log of yearly
income, which include the sum of monthly payments plus possible
bonuses.
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B.3 The monetary effects on hourly wages of mobility for university and job
Table B.7: Determinants of log of hourly wage based on previous mobility - full subsample
(1) (2)
IV - reduced sample OLS-reduced sample
Moved for first job 0.1227 0.0316
(0.2334) (0.0376)
Grade University 0.0255 0.0245
(0.0175) (0.0182)
Intern Experience -0.0178 -0.0147
(0.0392) (0.0404)
Grade High School 0.0048 0.0132
(0.0372) (0.0321)
German -0.0541 -0.0542
(0.1368) (0.1439)
Female -0.1674∗∗∗ -0.1665∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0343)
Experience abroad -0.0168 -0.0106
(0.0357) (0.0336)
Job Mother -0.0327 -0.0347
(0.0216) (0.0221)
Job Father 0.0422∗∗ 0.0455∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0187)
Education Mother 0.0231 0.0278
(0.0333) (0.0326)
Education Father 0.0341 0.0320
(0.0214) (0.0219)
Observations 415 415
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort interviewed, terms studied,
type of university entrance diploma, marital status, children, age and type of university
(university or applied university) not reported. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Co-
hort 2005/06 and 2009/10. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table B.8: Determinants of log of hourly wage based on previous mobility - only LMR
Munich
(1) (2)
2SLS - reduced sample Probit-reduced sample
Moved for first job 0.0782 0.0958
(0.2934) (0.0604)
Grade University 0.0535∗ 0.0528∗
(0.0275) (0.0274)
Intern Experience -0.0647 -0.0650
(0.0535) (0.0572)
Grade High School 0.0143 0.0132
(0.0462) (0.0458)
German -0.0803 -0.0847
(0.1797) (0.1763)
Female -0.1103∗∗ -0.1105∗∗
(0.0452) (0.0483)
Experience abroad -0.0415 -0.0425
(0.0470) (0.0472)
Job Mother -0.0389 -0.0388
(0.0276) (0.0295)
Job Father 0.0345 0.0348
(0.0257) (0.0270)
Education Mother 0.0262 0.0256
(0.0399) (0.0417)
Education Father 0.0117 0.0121
(0.0295) (0.0307)
Observations 238 238
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort interviewed, terms studied, type
of university entrance diploma, marital status, children, age and type of university (university
or applied university) not reported. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and
2009/10. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.9: Determinants of log of hourly wage based on previous mobility by using a Heck-
man selection model - full subsample
(1)
Heckman selection model
Moved for first job 0.0505∗
(0.0296)
Grade University 0.0303
(0.0191)
Intern Experience -0.0221
(0.0343)
Grade High School 0.0246
(0.0263)
German 0.0677
(0.1302)
Female -0.1574∗∗∗
(0.0287)
Experience abroad 0.0068
(0.0280)
Job Mother -0.0237
(0.0186)
Job Father 0.0414∗∗∗
(0.0151)
Education Mother 0.0199
(0.0275)
Education Father 0.0285
(0.0182)
Observations 538
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort in-
terviewed, terms studied, type of university entrance diploma,
marital status, children, age and type of university (university
or applied university) not reported. Source: Bavarian Grad-
uates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and 2009/10. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.10: Determinants of log of hourly wage based on previous mobility by using a
Heckman selection model - only LMR Munich
(1)
Heckman selection model
Moved for first job 0.0959∗
(0.0563)
Grade University 0.0528∗∗
(0.0255)
Intern Experience -0.0649
(0.0534)
Grade High School 0.0132
(0.0427)
German -0.0847
(0.1645)
Female -0.1104∗∗
(0.0451)
Experience abroad -0.0425
(0.0440)
Job Mother -0.0388
(0.0275)
Job Father 0.0348
(0.0252)
Education Mother 0.0256
(0.0389)
Education Father 0.0121
(0.0286)
Observations 311
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort in-
terviewed, terms studied, type of university entrance diploma,
marital status, children, age and type of university (university
or applied university) not reported. Source: Bavarian Grad-
uates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and 2009/10. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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B.4 Additional material
Table B.11: Likelihood to move for first job based on migration for university - without
Munich
(1) (2) (3)
Probit-IV - reduced sample Probit-reduced sample OLS-IV - reduced sample
Moved for university 0.0449 -0.7949∗∗∗ 0.2921
(4.5387) (0.2840) (1.2801)
Grade University 0.1278∗∗ 0.1312∗∗ 0.0252∗∗
(0.0572) (0.0537) (0.0127)
Intern Experience 0.5227∗ 0.5278∗ 0.1349
(0.2956) (0.2874) (0.0859)
Grade High School 0.1975 0.1649 0.0893
(0.2894) (0.2243) (0.0813)
German 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0203∗∗
(.) (.) (0.4925)
Female -0.0512 0.1201 -0.0702
(0.9581) (0.2485) (0.2561)
Experience abroad 0.1401 0.2518 -0.0023
(0.6487) (0.2359) (0.1657)
Job Mother -0.2002 -0.1887 -0.0492
(0.1759) (0.1609) (0.0527)
Job Father 0.2487 0.2960∗∗ 0.0556
(0.2874) (0.1305) (0.0832)
Education Mother 0.5546 0.4187 0.2009
(0.8010) (0.3162) (0.2201)
Education Father -0.0934 -0.1011 -0.0296
(0.1573) (0.1478) (0.0468)
Observations 214 214 222
Notes: Controls for district of high school graduation, cohort interviewed, terms studied, type of university entrance diploma, marital status,
children, age and type of university (university or applied university) not reported. Source: Bavarian Graduates Panel, Cohort 2005/06 and
2009/10. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
Dynamics and endogeneity of firms’ recruitment
behaviour
∗
Abstract
We use detailed German data to carefully document how the vacancy-filling hazard evolves from
the recruiting firms’ perspectives. We further show how firms adjust their search behaviour when
they are unable to fill their vacancy within the planned search duration. We find that the vacancy-
filling hazard is increasing during the planned search period and that it decreases thereafter. Most
applicants arrive early in the recruitment process. Firms’ willingness to pay higher wages or to
hire less qualified, inexperienced or unemployed applicants increases when they are unable to
hire before the intended starting date. Models of random search, directed search, and stock-flow
matching differ substantially in the way they assume that job seekers and firms behave during
the recruitment process in these respects and we conjecture that our findings are most readily
explained by stock-flow matching models - if these were amended by time-consuming screening
technologies.
∗This chapter is joint work with Christian Holzner. This chapter is published, see Ehrenfried and Holzner
(2019) for details.
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3.1. Introduction
Search and matching models have been used extensively throughout in labour economics to
explain worker and firm behaviour, to model macroeconomic trends, and to evaluate labour
market policies. The various types of models - random search, directed search, stock-flow
matching - used in the literature differ substantially in the way they assume that job seek-
ers and firms behave during the recruitment process.1 While many studies investigate the
search behaviour of workers and gives us some guidance to assess which type of model
fits workers’ behaviour best,2 relatively little empirical work has been done in order to un-
derstand the recruitment process of firms and to get an idea which theories are best able to
explain it.
In this paper we identify new patterns about the recruitment behaviour of firms using
the entropy balancing technique to account for observed heterogeneity and the information
on the planned search duration of vacancies to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Using
the German Job Vacancy Survey, we find that the vacancy-filling hazard is increasing during
the planned search duration and decreases thereafter. Most applicants arrive early in the
recruitment process and the willingness to pay higher wages or to hire less qualified or
experienced applicants increases for firms that have been unable to hire until the intended
starting date.
In a seminal paper, van Ours and Ridder (1992) find for the Netherlands that in the
first two weeks after the announcement of a vacancy the majority of applicants apply. Then
the arrival rate of applicants drops. The evidence on the shape of the hazard is mixed.
Coles and Smith (1998), Coles and Petrongolo (2008), Kuo and Smith (2009), or Andrews
et al. (2013) provide support for stock-flow matching by showing that the hazard rate is
highest in the first two weeks after registering the vacancy with the UK Job Centre and drops
1In the classical random sequential search model workers and firms meet at random and only one potential
partner at a time (see Pissarides (2000), and Cahuc et al. (2014) for an overview). In directed search models firms
post wages and workers direct their applications to those jobs offering the highest utility (see Wright et al. (2019)
for an overview). In stock-flow matching models the inflow of vacancies (job seekers) matches with the stock of
job seekers (vacancies) and if a vacancy (job seeker) was unsuccessful initially it (she) becomes part of the stock
(see Coles and Muthoo (1998), Coles and Smith (1998), Ebrahimy and Shimer (2010), and Carrillo-Tudela and
Hawkins (2016)).
2The early literature concentrated on the use and return of different search channels (see Holzer (1988), and
Blau and Robins (1990) for the US, Osberg (1993) for Canada, and Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) for the UK).
More recent evidence on the time spent on searching for a job is provided by Krueger and Mueller (2012) and
on the use of different search channels by Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) and Kuhn and Mansour (2014). Kuo and
Smith (2009), Andrews et al. (2013), and Kettemann et al. (2017) show that the longer a worker is unemployed
the higher the probability that she matches with a newly posted vacancy. This rejects random search in favour of
the stock-flow-matching. Kettemann et al. (2017) also find supportive evidence for directed search by showing
that workers direct their search towards more productive firms.
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sharply thereafter. Using data on vacancies registered with the Austrian Public Employment
Service, Kettemann et al. (2017) find – similar to what we find – that if the hazard is centred
around the intended starting date, it is first increasing up to the intended starting date and
decreasing thereafter.
In the second part, we analyse how firms that have been unlucky during the search
process respond by adjusting their search intensity, their qualification and/or experience
requirements, and the wages they pay. This allows us to say more about which theory is
best able to predict the observed patterns.
We use the entropy balancing technique developed by Hainmueller (2012) to construct
synthetic control groups to identify the effect of being unlucky in the search process on the
recruitment strategy of firms. The use of information on the planned search duration of a
vacancy to control for unobserved differences in firm and vacancy characteristics is equally
important. By comparing vacancies with similar planned search durations we are able to
control for all unobserved characteristics that firms expect to influence their search dura-
tion. We therefore assume that after controlling for the planned search duration and other
observable firm and vacancy characteristics, the need to search longer than the planned
search duration is due to random bad luck shocks in the search process.
Using this strategy, we split our sample into four groups. The group early includes
all vacancies that successfully finished their search process at least four weeks prior to the
intended starting date, the group in time includes all vacancies which successfully finished
their search process around the intended starting date, the group delayed includes all va-
cancies that successfully finished their search process after the first week of the intended
starting date, and the final group failed consists of vacancies which could not be filled at all.
We find that firms which are able to hire an applicant some time ahead of the intended
starting date are contacted by a significantly higher fraction of suitable applicants and report
to have faced significantly fewer recruitment problems due to an insufficient number of
suitable applicants or due to high wage demands by applicants than firms which hire in time,
delayed, or fail to hire. We can also show that those firms that hire in time activate additional
search channels compared to firms which hire relatively early. Firms which hire delayed or
failed to hire activate even more search channels.3 The use of the public employment agency
and the use of newspapers and online ads experience the highest increase. Furthermore,
firms which are only able to hire delayed make significantly more concessions in terms of the
3Russo et al. (2000) find that the use of more search channels is associated with a longer vacancy duration.
Our results suggest that this is due to reverse causality, i.e., that firms activate additional search channels after
having failed to hire a worker within the planned search duration.
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required qualification and experience and the willingness to hire previously unemployed
workers than the firms which hire in time and even more compared to firms which hire some
time before the intended starting date. Firms with a delayed recruitment also increase their
willingness to bargain over pay and pay more often more than initially intended compared
to firms which hire early or in time. This also holds true if we account for match-quality by
dropping firms that make concessions in terms of qualification and experience required.4
The decline in the arrival rate of applicants over time and the decrease in the vacancy-
filling hazard after the intended starting date can be explained by the basic stock-flow
matching model.5 Newly posted vacancies initially receive many applications from the
stock of job seekers. If a vacancy cannot be filled by matching with an applicant from the
stock of job seekers, it has to wait until new workers start to search. Since the inflow of
new job seekers is small compared to the stock of job seekers, the number of new appli-
cants and the vacancy-filling hazard drops after a vacancy was unable to match initially.
This decrease in the matching probability reduces firms’ outside option and is therefore also
able to explain why firms – after the intended starting date – are more willing to bargain
over pay, pay higher wages, or to make concessions by accepting workers with a lower
qualification or experience than initially posted. If the basic stock-flow matching model is
combined with a time-consuming screening technology, it seems likely that it can also ex-
plain why the vacancy-filling hazard is increasing up to the intended starting date. If one
introduces a time-consuming screening technology, firms will screen sequentially and use
a reservation productivity to decide on whether or not to hire. Given the number of appli-
cants a newly opened vacancy receives from the stock of unemployed job seekers, the firm
will decrease the reservation productivity as the number of remaining unscreened appli-
cants decreases. The likelihood that one of the screened applicants passes the reservation
productivity threshold then increases as time passes.
Other theories are also able to explain certain parts of the observed pattern. The use of
planned search durations and the increase in the vacancy-filling hazard during this period
can be explained by advanced notice or the intention of firms to gather applicants because
they want to induce competition among applicants. Burdett and Cunningham (1994) and
4Faberman and Menzio (2018) find for the US that higher wages are positively correlated with vacancy
duration. They build a directed search model, which - under certain parameter constellations - is able to explain
their findings, if they assume that some degree of worker and job heterogeneity is unobserved in their empirical
analysis. In light of the stock-flow matching model and our results their findings can also be explained by
reverse causality, i.e. that firms pay higher wages because they have been unsuccessful in finding a worker
initially.
5See Coles and Muthoo (1998), Coles and Smith (1998), Ebrahimy and Shimer (2010), and Carrillo-Tudela
and Hawkins (2016)
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Burdett and Cunningham (1998) explain the increasing vacancy-filling hazard by showing
that firms lower their reservation productivity as the time of advance notice draws down.
Models with multiple applications like in Albrecht et al. (2006) or Gautier and Holzner (2018)
embedded into a dynamic model with a Poisson arrival rate of applications – as generally as-
sumed in dynamic search models – can explain the increasing vacancy-filling hazard before
the intended starting date since the Poisson arrival rate implies that the number of firms
which have gathered sufficiently many applicants increases over time. A Poisson arrival
rate of applicants is, however, unable to explain that most applicants arrive early and that
the arrival rate of applications and subsequently the vacancy-filling rate decreases after the
intended starting date. Phantom vacancies combined with a dynamic directed search model
can explain this pattern as shown by Albrecht et al. (2017). The idea here is that applicants
anticipate that the likelihood of an application being considered by a firm decreases the
longer the vacancy has been posted. Applicants therefore apply more often to newly posted
vacancies than to older ones. However, this theory is unable to explain why firms should be
more willing to make concessions in terms of qualification or experience or by paying higher
wages if they are not successful initially. Instead of making concessions, it would be optimal
to signal to the market that their vacancies are no phantoms by posting the vacancies again.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the dataset we use,
i.e., the German Job Vacancy Survey. Section 3.3 presents the estimated hazard of finding a
worker in different specifications and explains how we form the four groups of vacancies
depending on when the search process was successful or failed. Our identification strategy
is laid out in section 3.4. Section 3.5 contains our main results and describes the dynamics
and the adjustments made by firms during the recruitment process. In section 3.6 we discuss
which theory is most suitable to explain our empirical findings. Section 3.7 concludes our
findings.
3.2. The data
For our analysis, we use the German Job Vacancy Survey collected by the Institute for Em-
ployment Research.6 The survey has been conducted annually since 1989. The quality of
the data and the depth of questions has increased over the years. We use the years 2005 to
2014 since most of the information we need for our analysis is not available before. This
6The data used in this article is made available to us by the Research Data Centre of the German Federal
Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg. For details see Kettner et al.
(2011) or Brenzel et al. (2016).
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period covers good and bad labour market periods. The German Job Vacancy Survey is a
repeated cross section. The representative samples are drawn from German establishments
which employ at least one person subject to social security contribution. For confidentiality
reasons the data does not contain establishment identifiers.
The yearly cross-sectional survey delivers detailed information on the interviewed
establishment like the number of employees, the industry, the number of vacancies, the
number of hires and quits in the previous year, and the region the establishment is located.
The firm’s current economic condition is measured by binary indicators for “low sales”,
“financial constraints” and “skilled labour shortage”.
In the second part of the survey, the firm is interviewed in detail on the last case of
a successfully filled vacancy and (if applicable) on the last case of a aborted recruitment
attempt in the survey year.7 The questionnaire for vacancies which failed to hire a worker
is limited and the number of observations is relatively low (5.6% of our total sample).8 We
include information on failed vacancies if the respective information is available.
The survey also contains detailed information on the characteristics of a vacancy like
occupation, qualification and experience required for the job, whether the position is full-
or part-time, permanent or temporary and if temporary, whether it is a seasonal job or re-
places another worker temporarily. Moreover, the firm is asked when it started to search for
applicants, when it stopped searching (signed an agreement with the later hired worker),
when the intended starting date was, and when employment actually started. This unique
feature of the German Job Vacancy Survey allows us to estimate the baseline hazard over
the recruitment process and to compare the recruitment strategies of vacancies which found
a suitable applicant some time ahead of the intended starting date with vacancies which
found a suitable applicant in time or some time after the intended starting date, and with
vacancies which failed to hire.
Firms are also asked to provide information on the search and hiring channels used.
Binary variables to indicate which channels were used are available for the following chan-
nels: Advertisement in print media, on company’s website, on online job platforms, on so-
cial media platforms (Facebook, Twitter etc.), public employment agency (online and offline
services), speculative applications to the firm, private employment agencies, internal post-
ings, interns, apprentices, or referrals by employees (network). In our empirical analysis we
group these channels into five main groups as shown in Table 3.1.
7The vacancy could have opened already in the year before the survey year.
8Since the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) does not provided weights, we are unable to calculate
the representative number of failed vacancies.
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Table 3.1: Grouping of search channels
Name of main group Assigned search channels
Classic - Advertisement in print media
- Advertisement on company’s website
- Advertisement on online job platforms
- Advertisement on social media platforms
Internal - Internal postings
- Interns
- Apprentices
Network - Referrals by employees
Speculative appl. - Speculative applications
PEA - Public employment agency (PEA)
All advertisements of the company – on- and offline – are grouped together into the
group classic. We group on- and offline advertisements because of the high overlap in con-
tent and the similarity in how they address applicants. If a company nowadays decides
to publish an advertisement in a newspaper, the same job advertisement will typically be
displayed on the newspaper’s website and on the company’s website as well. The group
internal refers to all search channels which address all groups of employees who are al-
ready known to the firm such as all regular employees (addressed by internal postings),
and interns or apprentices. The group network refers to firms that asked their employees to
approach potential applicants in their personal network. Speculative applications are appli-
cations received by firms without having posted a respective vacancy. Firms which register
their vacancies with the public employment agency (PEA) are counted as using the PEA search
channel. The channel private employment agency is dropped since this search channel is only
used by 7.28% of firms and is hence of minor importance in the German context.
Apart from the information on the timing of the search process and the search channels
used, the survey provides information on problems which can arise during the search pro-
cess. Firms can indicate via binary variables whether they had problems in finding enough
suitable applicants, and whether they had problems in hiring workers because pay claims of
applicants were too high. The survey also includes questions on how many persons applied
overall and how many are regarded as suitable for the job.
Additionally, the survey contains several questions which can be used to evaluate how
firms reacted if they were unable to find a suitable applicant within the intended search
period. The first set of questions concerns the firm’s willingness/need to adjust the wage.
We know whether the firm bargained over pay, the wage it paid to the hired worker, and
whether it paid more than initially intended. The second set of questions concerns the firm’s
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willingness/need to make concessions in terms of qualification and experience required.
The respective information is provided by firms if they answer the question whether the
hired worker’s qualification and experience level was below what was initially expected.
Finally, we can use the information on the number and types of search channels used to
evaluate whether firms which were unable to hire a suitable worker in time increased their
search effort.
Not all variables are available for the years 2005 to 2014. The years on which the
respective analysis is based are shown below the respective tables and figures.
3.3. Planned search duration and the vacancy-filling hazard
3.3.1 Planned search duration
Figure 3.1 shows the frequency of vacancies with different planned search durations. The
planned search duration is measured by the difference between the intended employment
starting date and the starting date of the search process. In our sample 52.1% of firms start
their recruitment process at least eight weeks before the intended starting date and 18.7% of
firms start their recruitment process less than four weeks ahead. The planned search dura-
tion is longer for vacancies offering permanent jobs, full-time jobs, and jobs which require a
high qualification and experience level, and shorter for temporary jobs, especially seasonal
jobs. The respective OLS-estimates are shown in Table C.1 in the Appendix.
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Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014
Figure 3.1: Frequency of vacancies according to planned search duration
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3.3.2 Computed vacancy-filling hazard rates
So far, the literature has paid very little attention to how the planned search duration shapes
the hazard of filling a vacancy. Figure 3.2 shows the weekly recruiting hazard rates of va-
cancies with 17, 13, 8, 4, and 0 weeks of planned search duration. The hazard rates are
calculated as the number of vacancies which stopped searching (signed an agreement with
an applicant) in a given week divided by the number of vacancies at risk (i.e., still search-
ing) at the beginning of the week. In order to emphasise the role of the planned search
duration we centred the hazard rates around the intended starting date. The hazard rates
of vacancies with 17, 13, and 8 weeks of planned search duration are highest around the
5th to 2nd week in advance of the intended starting date. The hazard rates for vacancies
with 4 weeks planned search durations have their highest hazard rates in the two weeks
prior to the intended starting date and the hazard rate of vacancies with no planned search
duration is highest in the first week after the intended starting date (which coincides with
the first week after the search process started). The black solid line shows the hazard rate
of all vacancies. The respective hazard is again calculated by dividing the number of vacan-
cies hiring in the respective week by the number of vacancies at risk at the beginning of the
respective week. Note that the number of firms at risk in a specific week consist of firms
which searched unsuccessfully in the previous week and new firms which started to search
in the respective week. The respective number of firms at risk are shown in Table C.2 in
the Appendix. The overall hazard of filling a vacancy is first increasing until the intended
starting date. It stays high for several weeks around the intended starting date and declines
thereafter.
3.3.3 Estimated vacancy-filling hazard rates
Next, we estimate the effect of searching a certain number of weeks before or after the in-
tended starting date on the vacancy-filling hazard rate. To do so, we use week-indicators in
such a way that the indicator is one if the vacancy is searching in the 16th, 15th, and so on
week before the intended starting date, and 1st, 2nd, 3rd and so on week after the intended
starting date and zero otherwise.
In Figure 3.3a) we estimate an exponential hazard model. The exponential hazard
model assumes a constant underlying baseline hazard that we normalize to zero by omitting
the constant in the regression and by demeaning the rest of the variables (except the week
indicators). In the estimation we control for a host of vacancy characteristics as well as for
year-, industry-, and region-fixed effects. The respective estimates are shown in Table C.3 in
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Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014
Figure 3.2: Vacancy-filling hazard for different planned search durations
the Appendix. The week-indicators estimate the weekly constant hazard rate of filling the
vacancy in the "x"-th week before/after the intended starting date, where week 0 is defined
as the week before the intended starting date. The estimated weekly vacancy-filling hazard
rates start from very low values around 0.02 to 0.06 which indicate that between 2% to 6%
of those firms at risk hire somebody within the respective week. The hazard increases until
the intended starting date up to values beyond 0.3 indicating that around one third of firms
searching in the respective week are able to hire an applicant. Shortly after the intended
starting date the hazard decreases again.
In Figure 3.3 b) we present the estimates of the hazard ratios for our week-indicators
based on a Cox-Proportional Hazard model. The Cox-Proportional Hazard model allows
for a flexible baseline hazard. The underlying baseline hazard varies for each week after a
firm started searching for a worker. Our definition of the week indicators with respect to the
intended starting date ensures that the underlying baseline hazard and our week-indicators
are not collinear. The flexible baseline hazard in the Cox-Proportional Hazard model ab-
sorbs some of the variation of the vacancy-filling hazard and explains why the hazard ratios
shown in Figure 3.3b) fluctuate less than the hazard rates shown in Figure 3.3a) which are
estimated with an exponential hazard model assuming a constant baseline hazard.
The hazard-ratios in Figure 3.3b) start from very low values around 0.2. This implies
for example that a vacancy which is searching 16 weeks prior to the intended starting date
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The grey shaded areas represent the 95% confidence interval. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014
Figure 3.3: Hazard estimates centred around the intended starting date
has a baseline hazard 5-times smaller than the baseline hazard of other vacancies which
searched equally long. The hazard-ratio increases during the planned search duration to
values up to 2.5 around the intended starting date. This implies that vacancies around the
intended starting date have a baseline hazard 2.5-times above the baseline hazard of other
vacancies which searched equally long. After the first week of the intended starting date
the hazard ratios decrease again to values around 1, which implies that the baseline hazard
is comparable to the baseline hazard of other vacancies which searched equally long. The
pattern of the estimated hazard ratios remains almost the same if we treat the exit of unsuc-
cessful vacancies as a competing risk and estimate the Cox-Proportional Hazard accordingly
(see Table C.3 in the Appendix for the respective results).
We are not the first to show that the vacancy-filling hazard is increasing up to the
intended starting date and decreasing thereafter. Kettemann et al. (2017) show a similar
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picture for vacancies registered with the Austrian Public Employment Service. Other studies
like Coles and Smith (1998), Gregg and Petrongolo (2005), and Coles and Petrongolo (2008)
show that the hazard rate of vacancies registered with UK Job Centres is highest in the first
month after the start of the search process. Kuo and Smith (2009) and Andrews et al. (2013)
use weekly data from UK Job Centres and show that the hazard rate of vacancies is highest
in the first two weeks.
When we instead calculated the weekly vacancy-filling hazard using the standard
piecewise-constant (weekly) estimation approach,9 we would obtain a fluctuating hazard
with no clear pattern (see Figure C.1a) in the Appendix). If we follow our approach, we
always find a hazard rate which is increasing up to the intended starting date and decreases
thereafter. The only exception occurs if we take firms with no planned search duration (see
Figure C.1 a) in the Appendix). In this case, our approach and the standard approach coin-
cide and give the same estimates. The differences in the shape of the vacancy-filling hazard
rates between the standard and our approach can therefore be explained by the fact that our
observations are centred around the intended starting date.
3.3.4 Definition of groups early, in time, and delayed
Since the main objective of the paper is to investigate how firms’ recruitment behaviour
changes before, around, and after the intended starting date, we split our sample into four
groups. We label the first group early. This group includes all vacancies which successfully
finished their search process at least 4 weeks prior to the intended starting date. The second
group is labelled in time. It includes all vacancies that successfully finished their search
process at most four weeks prior to the intended starting date and no later than one week
after the intended starting date (weeks -3, -2, -1, 0, and 1). The third group, which we
label delayed, includes all successful vacancies which need longer than one week after the
intended starting date to recruit an applicant. The fourth group includes all vacancies which
failed to hire a worker and cancelled the recruitment process. This fourth group is labelled
failed. 37.6% of all vacancies in our sample (with all covariates available) belong to the group
early hires, 37.0% to the group in time hires, 18.1% to the group delayed hires, and 7.3% to
the group failed to hire. The results shown below are not sensitive to slight changes in the
thresholds defining the different groups.
9The standard approach to estimate a piecewise-constant (weekly) baseline hazard (see e.g. Wooldridge,
2010, ch.20) uses week-indicators, which are equal to one if the vacancy is searching in the respective week and
zero otherwise. The respective week-indicators are defined as searching in 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, ... week after search
started.
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3.4. Identification of firms’ recruitment behaviour
The aim of the paper is to evaluate how firms’ recruitment behaviour changes if they are
unlucky during the recruitment process. We regard those firms that hire early as being lucky
and those which hire in time or delayed, or those which failed to hire as being hit by bad
luck. Ideally, we would have liked to have data on the points in time when firms which are
not successful in the early recruitment phase adjusted their strategy, e.g. the points in time
when they start to use certain search channels or the point in time when they start to make
concessions. Unfortunately, in our dataset - and this holds (to the best of our knowledge) for
all vacancy datasets currently available - only information on whether or not e.g. a search
channel has been used or a concession has been made is available, but not the point in time
when this event took place. We therefore have to compare the recruitment behaviour of
vacancies which hired in time or delayed, or failed to hire, with the recruitment behaviour of
vacancies which hired early. The only exception is the use of the PEA search channel for the
years 2013 and 2014. We use this information to validate our identification approach on the
use of the PEA search channel in section 3.5.
Adverse selection of firms makes it difficult to identify how firms reacted if they had
been unlucky during the recruitment process. For example, one would expect that more
attractive firms are more likely to find a worker early. If attractive firms use a different
recruitment strategy or adjust their recruitment behaviour differently in case they are not
successful initially, then the differences in recruitment behaviour between early hiring firms
and firms hiring in time or delayed are partly driven by the (un)observable characteristics
which determine the attractiveness of a firm. In order to be able to interpret our results as
changes in recruitment behaviour due to bad luck we need to rule out that the observed
differences in recruitment behaviour are driven by selection.
In order to identify the effect of being unlucky in the recruitment process on firms’
recruitment behaviour, we use the entropy balancing re-weighting technique developed by
Hainmueller (2012). Entropy balancing, like e.g. propensity score matching, takes into ac-
count the selection on observables by producing weights which are subsequently used to
reweight the comparison (control) observations in an OLS regression. In the entropy bal-
ancing step, we match on a host of vacancy characteristics, like the required qualification
and experience level, whether the job is permanent, temporary or seasonal, requires week-
end work, and whether it is full- or part-time. On the firm level, we include the number
of employees (log), and the binary indicator variables “low sales", “financial constraints",
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and “skilled labour shortage" to control for the economic condition of the firm. The entropy
balancing is done year by year. This ensures that vacancies are always matched within the
same year. This accounts for possible differences in labour market conditions over time.
We are also able to account for selection along unobservable characteristics by match-
ing on planned search duration. By conditioning on planned search duration, we control for
all factors firms take into account when forming expectations on their likely search duration.
Take for example the case where an unobservable characteristic - like bad reputation - is pos-
itively correlated with the search duration of a vacancy. As long as a firm takes this fact into
account by increasing its planned search duration accordingly, we are able to control for this
effect. Only if the firm is unable to adjust its planned search duration accordingly - maybe
because a worker left without advanced notice and has to be replaced immediately, or if the
firm already has a suitable candidate for the vacancy when starting to search, we are unable
to account for the underlying unobserved characteristic. If in such a case the unobserved
characteristic is correlated with some outcome variables, then the respective estimates are
biased. To avoid such cases, we restrict our sample to vacancies with a planned search dura-
tion of more than four weeks. For our identification, we therefore assume that firms with a
planned search duration of more than four weeks take expected recruitment difficulties into
account when deciding on their planned search duration.
The main advantage of entropy balancing compared to standard matching and weight-
ing techniques like propensity score weighting or nearest neighbour matching is its higher
effectiveness in reducing covariate imbalance. This is accomplished by, generally speaking,
re-weighting the observations of the different comparison groups such that predefined mo-
ments (in our case mean and variance) are similar to the ones of the reference group. While
many weights potentially fulfil such requirements, entropy balancing chooses those which
deviate as little as possible from uniform weights. Thereby, entropy balancing is advanta-
geous since it overcomes the cumbersome rechecking in propensity score methods where
“researchers ‘manually’ iterate between propensity score modelling, matching, and balance
checking until they attain a satisfactory balancing solution” (Hainmueller, 2012, p.25). Un-
like propensity score matching methods, entropy balancing improves the covariate balance
of all conditioning variables10 and is fully non-parametric.11 Entropy balancing fits the co-
variates very well as shown in Table C.4 in the Appendix. For robustness checks, however,
10Using propensity score matching and similar methods can lead to a better balance between some covariates
at the cost of a worse balance between other conditioning variables. See e.g. King and Nielsen (2016).
11We implement entropy balancing by using the program “ebalance” (Hainmueller and Xu, 2013) in Stata
14.2.
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we also employ in subsection C.2 in the Appendix weights obtained from a combination of
propensity score and nearest neighbour matching, the so-called radius matching approach
proposed by Huber et al. (2015), Lechner et al. (2011), and Lechner and Wunsch (2009).
Entropy balancing assigns all observations in the reference group a weight equal to
one. The observations in the comparison groups are assigned the respective entropy balanc-
ing weights. In order to ensure a common support of planned search duration, we choose
to define the vacancy group in time as the reference (treatment) group. The vacancy groups
early, delayed, and failed are the comparison (control) groups. Besides the conditional inde-
pendence assumption, an important condition for propensity score methods has to be valid,
the assumption of common support, meaning that for any conditioning variable there exist
observations for both treatment and control group. Whereas for propensity score methods
this condition is reached by simply selecting only those observations in the treatment group
which have a propensity score not higher than the maximum propensity score of the ob-
servations in the control group (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008), it is unclear how to ensure
this condition for entropy balancing. By choosing the group in time as the reference group,
we ensure common support on planned search duration. For the radius matching approach
used as a robustness check in subsection C.2 in the Appendix, we enforce the common sup-
port assumption. When comparing the number of observations from radius matching with
the number of observations from entropy balancing, we find that the number of observa-
tions in entropy balancing is only 3.2% higher than in radius matching, i.e., 3.2% of our
observations are not on the common support.
Calculating the entropy weights for all covariates including the planned search dura-
tion to match unobservable characteristics is the first step. The second step is the estimation
of the treatment effect, implemented by an OLS regression based on the re-weighted sam-
ple. Given our formal definition of the group in time as the reference (treatment) group and
the groups early, delayed, and failed as comparison (control) groups, we estimate the average
treatment effect on the untreated, which can be obtained from,
β̂ =
(
X′WX
)−1 X′y, (3.1)
where y is the vector of outcomes, W a diagonal matrix with 1 in the diagonal cells for
vacancies in the in time group and entropy balancing weights in the diagonal cells for the
comparison (control) groups. X is a n× (k + 3) matrix. n equals the overall number of ob-
servations. k + 3 equals the total number of control variables, where the first column is a
vector of 1s, the second column a vector indicating the comparison group early and the third
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column a vector indicating the comparison group delayed. The k additional columns in X
contain all remaining control variables. Since for the vacancies in the group failed the infor-
mation on the planned search duration is only available for certain years and since some
covariates are not available at all, our sample would be relatively small if we restricted it to
observations with information on all three comparison groups. Therefore, we estimate the
behaviour of failed vacancies separately (where X is a n× (k + 2) matrix).
The OLS regressions allow us to account for additional explanatory variables. We also
control for occupation-fixed effects (according to 3 digit ISCO-classification) and for time-
varying effects on the regional level (180 labour market regions) by including interaction
terms for years and regions. In regressions where we investigate outcomes related to the
hired person (e.g. wages paid), we include gender and experience (and experience squared)
of the hired worker. We also include all covariates used in the first entropy balancing step.
This allows us to investigate whether balancing is effective by testing whether the estimated
treatment effects change if we exclude the covariates from the first step. The coefficients
are not statistically significantly different if we omit the covariates used for entropy balanc-
ing. If all factors which jointly determine the outcome y and when a vacancy hires (fails to
hire) D ∈ {early, in_time, delayed, f ailed} are observable (either directly or indirectly via the
planned search duration) and controlled for by the weights from entropy balancing, EB (X),
we can interpret our results causally. This is properly formalized in the conditional inde-
pendence assumption,
E [y|EB (X) , D = m] = E [y|EB (X) , D = in_time] , (3.2)
where m ∈ {early, delayed, f ailed}. We assume that this assumption holds.
3.5. Dynamics of the recruitment process
We describe our results by chronologically “following” firms through their search process.
First, we show which problems might occur whilst firms look for suitable applicants. Then
we investigate how many (suitable) candidates apply and how firms adjust their search
behaviour. Finally, we show how firms change their wage policy and make concessions in
order to increase the likelihood of filling the vacancy.
In this section we present results based on entropy balancing and consider only those
vacancies which had more than or 4 weeks of planned search duration. In Appendix C.2 we
show that the results are robust to including also vacancies with a shorter planned search
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duration or if we use instead of entropy balancing radius matching.
3.5.1 Problems during the recruitment process
Firms which were not able to hire up to the intended starting date have been unlucky in the
search process. If firms are unlucky, we would expect that they report having problems in
finding suitable applicants. We can see that this is indeed the case as shown in Table 3.2,
which shows the respective mean for the reference group in time and the estimated differ-
ence for the three comparison groups (early, delayed and failed). While the fraction of firms
reporting problems in finding enough suitable applicants is around 12.4% for the in time
group, this value increases by 17.7 percentage points for the delayed group. For firms that
failed to hire the increase was much larger: 41.0 percentage points. This means that around
53.4% of failed firms report this problem. The opposite holds for the firms which are able to
fill their vacancy early. Here only 6.7% report this problem.
Table 3.2: Problems in the recruitment process
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not enough suitable applicants 0.1239 -0.0572*** 0.1768*** 0.4102***
(Standard Error) (0.0043) (0.0061) (0.0124)
Nr. of Obs. 15,870 15,480 7,920 4,005
Pay claim of applicants too high 0.0522 -0.0236*** 0.0804*** 0.2542***
(Standard Error) (0.0025) (0.0040) (0.0109)
Nr. of Obs. 20,579 20,256 9,878 4,005
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights and a restricted sample, including only vacancies with at least 28 days of planned search duration. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies
(based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01. Data for “Not enough suitable applicants”:
German Job Vacancy Survey 2009-2014. Data for “Pay claim of applicants too high”: German Job Vacancy Survey 2010-2014.
A similar picture arises for the variable which indicates whether firms had problems
in the recruitment process due to higher pay claims of their applicants. For the in time group,
only 5.2% report recruitment problems due to higher wage demands. For vacancies hiring
early, the fraction is only 2.9%. At the same time 13.3% of those firms hiring delayed report
recruitment problems because applicants demand higher wages. This problem is again most
prominent for failed vacancies, where around 30.6% report too high pay claims by applicants.
We interpret the increase in problems reported during the recruitment process as evi-
dence that random matching frictions are driving longer search durations. In other words,
the increase in problems reported during the recruitment process supports our identifica-
tion strategy that longer search durations are driven by random bad luck shocks and not by
unobserved heterogeneity.
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3.5.2 Adjustments during the recruitment process
Table 3.3 shows the average number of applicants, the average number of suitable appli-
cants, and the fraction of suitable applicants for the in time group and the estimated differ-
ence for the three comparison groups (early, delayed and failed). Our estimates suggest that a
vacancy which hires early receives on average 13.9 applicants. This number increases to 16.2
applicants on average for vacancies in the in time group. The increase in the number of ap-
plicants for those vacancies which hire delayed is only minor (only 0.9 applicants more). This
evidence is in line with the results reported by van Ours and Ridder (1992) who show that
the majority of applicants arrive within the first two weeks after the announcement of the
vacancy. Then the arrival rate of applicants drops almost to zero. Our results also suggest
that failed vacancies are unlucky and receive 3.8 fewer applicants than the in time group.
Table 3.3: Applicants and suitable applicants
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of applicants 16.1968 -2.3076*** 0.8971*** -3.8181***
(Standard Error) (0.5321) (0.4107) (0.8043)
Nr. of Obs. 18,375 17,466 9,095 1,732
Number of suitable applicants 4.6472 -0.6383*** -0.2827*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.1131) (0.1300)
Nr. of Obs. 18,237 17,353 8,971
Fraction of suitable applicants 0.5035 0.0745*** -0.0795*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0048) (0.0044)
Nr. of Obs. 17,942 16,963 8,879
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights and a restricted sample, including only vacancies with at least 28 days of planned search duration. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies
(based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
The average number of suitable applicants increases from 4.0 suitable applicants for
vacancies which hire early to 4.6 suitable applicants for vacancies which hire in time and
decreases to 4.4 suitable applicants for vacancies which hire delayed. This suggests that firms
need 4 to 5 suitable applicants to successfully hire somebody. Early vacancies are lucky
because 57.8% of their 13.9 applicants are suitable, which allows them to get the necessary
number of suitable applicants early. Vacancies hiring in time (delayed) are less lucky since
only 50.4% (42.4%) of their applicants are suitable, which forces them to wait longer for
the necessary number of suitable applicants to arrive.12 For failed vacancies we have no
12The average fraction of suitable applicants is substantially higher than the ratio of the average number of
suitable applicants to the average number of applicants. This difference results from the fact that firms with
a large number of applicants receive relatively few suitable applicants while firms with a small number of
applicants receive a relatively high share of suitable applicants.
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information on the number of suitable applicants.
The first adjustment measure used by “unlucky“ firms is to increase the search effort
by activating more search channels. Vacancies which hire early use on average 1.67 search
channels and vacancies which hire in time 1.84 search channels. If a firm is not able to hire
in time, it activates additional search channels. Delayed vacancies use 0.34 search channels
more, failed vacancies 0.54.
Table 3.4: Search channels
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of search channels activated 1.8411 -0.1740*** 0.3403*** 0.5441***
(Standard Error) (0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0587)
Nr. of Obs. 20,579 20,256 9,878 786
Use of search channel: Classic 0.5291 -0.0891*** 0.1064*** -0.1352***
(Standard Error) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0097)
Nr. of Obs. 20,579 20,256 9,878 4,005
Use of search channel: Internal 0.2416 -0.0001*** 0.0553*** 0.0352***
(Standard Error) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0106)
Nr. of Obs. 20,579 20,256 9,878 4,005
Use of search channel: Speculative 0.2660 -0.0212*** 0.0374*** 0.0110***
(Standard Error) (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0268)
Nr. of Obs. 20,579 20,256 9,878 786
Use of search channel: Network 0.4047 0.0602*** 0.0202*** 0.0473***
(Standard Error) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0283)
Nr. of Obs. 20,579 20,256 9,878 786
Use of search channel: PEA 0.4000 -0.1238*** 0.1210*** 0.2166***
(Standard Error) (0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0147)
Nr. of Obs. 20,579 20,256 9,878 2,360
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights and a restricted sample, including only vacancies with at least 28 days of planned search duration. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies
(based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
Firms most commonly use print or online media or internet platforms to advertise
their vacancies. These channels, summarised as classic search channel, are used by 44.0% of
vacancies hiring early and increases by 8.9 and 10.6 percentage points for vacancies hiring in
time or delayed. The internal search channel i.e., the practice to fill the position with another
employee or to hire an intern or apprentice seems to be used relatively rarely by vacancies
(24.2% of those hiring early or in time). Both, delayed and failed vacancies, use this channel
significantly more often (increase of 5.5 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively), which sug-
gests that the internal search channel is only used if hiring via other search channels fails.
The fraction of firms receiving (and using) speculative applications increases slightly from
24.5% for early hiring firms to 26.6% for firms hiring in time to 30.3% for delayed hiring firms.
Since job seekers – not vacancies – decide on whether or not to send a speculative appli-
cation, this increase is most likely due to the increased search duration. Contacts initiated
by own employees (network search channel) are most frequently observed in the group of
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vacancies hiring early (46.5%). The use of the network then decreases for vacancies hiring
in time (40.5%) and increases again for vacancies which hire delayed (42.5%) or failed to hire
(45.2%). The search channel with the highest increase in usage is the intermediation service
provided by the public employment agency (early 27.6%, in time, delayed 40.0%, and failed
61.7%).
Table 3.5: Fraction of vacancies with active PEA search channel
Vacancies hiring ... (groups) weighted
Activating early in time delayed average
PEA search channel ... (1) (2) (3) (4)
lower bound
early 0.231 0.237 0.249 0.238
in time 0.317 0.412 0.354
delayed 0.452 0.452
upper bound
early 0.345 0.310 0.314 0.323
in time 0.415 0.521 0.459
delayed 0.572 0.572
Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2013-2014.
For the years 2013 and 2014, we have additional information on the date when the va-
cancy was registered with the PEA for the public employment agency search channel. This
allows us to calculate when the PEA search channel was actually activated. For the groups
in time and delayed, we observe how they adjusted the use of the PEA search channel in the in
time period if they were not able to hire an applicant in the early period. We provide a lower
and an upper bound. The lower bound is calculated based on the sample vacancies, which
provided the information on the timing of PEA activation. The upper bound is calculated
based on the assumption that those vacancies which reported to have used the PEA but did
not report the timing of PEA activation activated the PEA in the same pattern as those in the
same group (early, in time, and delayed).
The lower bound calculation suggests an increase of 8.0 percentage points for the
group hiring in time and 16.5 percentage points for the group hiring delayed, the upper bound
calculation suggest and increase of 10.5 and 20.7 percentage points for the groups in time and
delayed, respectively. The last column (4) presents the weighted averages over the groups in
time and delayed. The weighted averages suggest an increase in PEA activation of 11.6 and
13.6 percentage points for the lower and upper bound respectively. Our estimated increase
using entropy balancing equals 12.1 percentage points and lies in between the lower and
upper bound. The reaction to not hiring in time can only be observed for the delayed hiring
group. The respective increases in the activation of the PEA search channel are calculated
by considering the difference in the weighted averages. They are 9.8 and 11.3 percentage
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points for the lower and upper bound, respectively. This is slightly lower than the 12.1
increase estimated based on entropy balancing.
The increase in search effort can explain the increase in the number of applicants,
which we observe for vacancies in the groups in time and delayed compared to vacancies
in group early (see Table 3.3). That additional information on open vacancies can increase
the number of applicants is also shown by Skandalis (2018), who shows that media news
spreading the information that an expanding plant needs to hire many workers leads to a
60% increase in job applications in the following month.
The numbers presented in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 suggest that the increase in the av-
erage number of search channels of 0.17 from the group early to the group in time and of
0.34 from the group in time to the group delayed is leading to an increase in the number of
applications by 2.3 and 0.9, respectively. This suggests decreasing returns. It is not surpris-
ing that these additional search channels have a lower return than the ones chosen initially,
since it is rational to choose first the search channels that are most efficient and activate the
less efficient ones later. This suggests that the classic search channels and the PEA are not
the most efficient search channels to start with. This is in line with evidence from the work-
ers’ side. Holzer (1988), and Blau and Robins (1990) for the US, Osberg (1993) for Canada,
and Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) for the UK show that the productivity of the classic search
channels and the PEA (in generating offers and acceptances) is lower than the productivity
of networks and speculative applications.
3.5.3 Willingness to make concessions
Increasing the number of search channels to receive more (suitable) applications is one way
to increase the chances to hire somebody. Another way to increase the probability of hiring
is to adjust the terms of employment by either increasing the wage or by decreasing the
required level of qualification. We refer to these as concessions. The German Job Vacancy
Survey contains a set of questions regarding wage bargaining, wage payments, and qualifi-
cation, experience, and previous labour market status of the hired worker, which allow us
to evaluate whether a firm was willing to make such concessions.
While vacancies in the group early hire only few workers with an experience level
below the initially required level, this fraction is significantly higher (9.6% and 16.0%) for
firms which hired in time or delayed respectively, as shown in Table 3.6. A similar pattern
emerges for the qualification level required. The respective fractions of firms which hired
a worker with a qualification level below the required level is 5.0% for early hires, 7.6% for
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Table 3.6: Concessions related to worker characteristics
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experience lower than required 0.0957 -0.0322*** 0.0640*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0036) (0.0048)
Nr. of Obs. 19,615 19,410 9,236
Qualification lower than required 0.0759 -0.0264*** 0.0561*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0033) (0.0044)
Nr. of Obs. 19,400 19,270 8,988
Hired previously unemployed 0.3571 -0.0773*** 0.0081*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0059) (0.0063)
Nr. of Obs. 20,579 20,256 9,878
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights and a restricted sample, including only vacancies with at least 28 days of planned search duration. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies
(based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
in time hires, and 13.2% for delayed hires. Unemployed individuals are often thought of as
being less productive than employed individuals with the same observable characteristics.
If we take unemployment as a signal for lower productivity, then hiring an unemployed
worker can be regarded as a concession. The fraction of hired workers who have previously
been unemployed increases from 28.0% for vacancies which hire early to 35.7% and 36.5%
for vacancies which hire in time or delayed respectively.
The results in Table 3.6 show that firms are less willing to hire somebody with lower
qualification or experience or a previously unemployed worker if they are lucky and have
enough suitable applicants already before the intended starting date. Once this date is ap-
proaching or even exceeded, firms are more willing to hire a less qualified or experienced
worker or somebody who is unemployed.
Another way to make concessions is to adjust wages. The pattern which we observe
for hourly wages can be explained with a match-quality effect and a bargaining effect. The
match-quality effect predicts that wages paid by vacancies hiring workers with high quali-
fication and experience are higher than wages paid by vacancies hiring workers with low
qualification and experience. The bargaining effect predicts that wages paid by firms hiring
after the intended starting date should be higher since the bargaining power decreases as
the hazard of hiring a worker decreases after the intended starting date.
The first row in Table 3.7 on wage bargaining supports the hypothesis of the bargaining
effect. Firms which hire early or in time bargain over wages in 32.9% and 31.8% of all cases.
For vacancies which hire delayed, the fraction which report that they bargained over pay
increases significantly by 5.7 percentage points. A similar pattern is shown in the second
row which presents the fraction of firms which report that they paid more than initially
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intended. It shows that the fraction of firms which reported to have paid higher wages than
initially expected increases from around 8.1% and 9.2% for vacancies which hire early or in
time to 13.7% for vacancies which hire delayed.
Table 3.7: Concessions related to wages
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage bargaining 0.3177 -0.0110*** 0.0570** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0109) (0.0110)
Nr. of Obs. 6,040 5,964 3,127
Paid more than intended 0.0861 -0.0059*** 0.0508*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0036) (0.0042)
Nr. of Obs. 20,370 20,023 9,777
Hourly wage (Euro) 13.1879 0.3552*** 0.4060*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.1377) (0.1298)
Nr. of Obs. 2,578 2,496 1,508
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights and a restricted sample, including only vacancies with at least 28 days of planned search duration. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies
(based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01. Data for “Wage bargaining took place": German
Job Vacancy Survey 2011-2013. Data for “Average hourly wage": German Job Vacancy Survey 2014. Data for “Paid more than intended": German Job Vacancy
Survey 2005-2014.
The pattern for average hourly wages shown in Table 3.7 can be explained as follows:
The group of vacancies which hire early makes less often concessions and thus hires workers
with on average higher qualification and experience and less often unemployed workers.
This results in a significantly higher wage (13.54 Euros) compared to the group of vacancies
which hire in time (13.19 Euros). Firms that hire delayed pay again significantly higher wages
(13.59 Euros). Given that these firms make concessions as shown in Table 3.6, the higher
wage can be explained by the bargaining effect dominating the match-quality effect.
Table 3.8 controls for the match-quality effect by conditioning on vacancies which made
no concessions in terms of qualification and experience. To account for the wage-difference
due to unemployment, the results are presented separately for vacancies which hired a pre-
viously unemployed worker and for vacancies which hired a previously employed worker.
If a previously employed worker is hired, bargaining over wages and payment above the
initially intended level increases only if the firm is not able to hire until the intended starting
date. This can be explained by the bargaining effect. Wages paid by firms hiring early are still
somewhat higher than wage paid by firms hiring in time, but the effect is not statistically
significant. The wage pattern for previously unemployed workers is the same.
For previously unemployed workers, firms are generally less willing to bargain or in-
crease payment above the initially intended level. This can be explained by the generally
worse outside option that unemployed have compared to employed workers or by selection,
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Table 3.8: Concessions related to wages - controlled for qualification and experience
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
previously employed workers
Wage bargaining 0.3243 -0.0020*** 0.0748*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0135) (0.0148)
Nr. of Obs. 3,623 4,458 1,714
Paid more than intended 0.0810 0.00137*** 0.0519*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0047) (0.0058)
Nr. of Obs. 11,089 13,651 5,014
Hourly wage (Euro) 13.93 0.1741*** 0.3872*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.1964) (0.1897)
Nr. of Obs. 1,558 1,810 826
previously unemployed workers
Wage bargaining 0.2671 -0.0466*** 0.0587*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0249) (0.0251)
Nr. of Obs. 1,460 792 606
Paid more than intended 0.0542 -0.0155*** 0.0322*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0060) (0.0075)
Nr. of Obs. 5,742 3,530 2,103
Hourly wage (Euro) 11.85 0.3485*** 0.7894*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.2712) (0.2438)
Nr. of Obs. 536 356 264
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights and a restricted sample, including only vacancies with at least 28 days of planned search duration. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies
(based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01. Data for “Wage bargaining took place": German
Job Vacancy Survey 2011-2013. Data for “Average hourly wage": German Job Vacancy Survey 2014. Data for “Paid more than intended": German Job Vacancy
Survey 2005-2014.
i.e. that unemployed workers are worse in bargaining or related skills. Most interestingly
however, there is a different trend in wage bargaining over the recruitment process if we
compare previously employed and previously unemployed hires. The fact that bargaining
over wages and payment above the initially intended level is less often observed by vacan-
cies hiring a previously unemployed worker early compared to vacancies which hire a pre-
viously unemployed in time can be explained if we assume that unemployed workers prefer
an earlier employment start over higher wages. If this is the case, then we should not only
see lower levels of wage bargaining in the comparison between the vacancy groups early
and in time as shown in Table 3.8, we should also see that firms which hire early are more
willing to bargain about when employment starts with previously unemployed than with
previously employed workers. We have no information on whether or not firms and work-
ers bargained about the date when employment should start. However, we observe when
employment actually started and can therefore investigate this hypothesis by analysing how
the probability to hire prior to the intended starting date depends on the previous employ-
ment status of the hired worker.
In Table 3.9 we present OLS estimates of the effect that the previous employment sta-
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Table 3.9: Employment start prior or after intended starting date and employment status
Vacancies hiring early
all at least 3 months between
vacancies hiring and intended starting date
(1) (2)
previously unemployed workers 0.0653*** 0.0860***
(0.0060) (0.0337)
Nr. of Obs. 18,779 2,109
R2 0.0895 0.4080
Estimated with OLS. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Covariates on firm and vacancy level are not reported. Interaction dummies between region
and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates
p < 0.01. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
tus has on the probability to hire prior to the intended starting date (the indicator variable
is 1 if employment started prior to the intended starting date and 0 otherwise). The sample
consists only of vacancies which hire early. We control for the same set of firm- and vacancy
characteristics as in Tables 3.7 to 3.8. Column (1) in Table 3.9 shows that the probability to
hire prior to the intended starting date is 6.5 percentage points higher if the hired worker
was previously unemployed. To rule out that this result is due to the legal notice period of
3 months for employed workers in Germany, we restrict the sample in column (2) to early
hiring firms which hired (signed the employment contract) at least 3 months ahead of the
intended starting date. The result is robust. This supports our hypothesis that previously
unemployed worker prefer earlier employment over higher wages and thus bargain less
over wages as the estimates in Table 3.8 show.
3.5.4 Reaction if firms fail to hire
The German Job Vacancy Survey includes some information on how failed firms react if
they fail to hire. The survey asks how firms handle the tasks, which should originally be
done by the newly employed worker. Figure 3.4 summarises the replies to this question.
Multiple answers are allowed. Most firms spread the tasks among incumbent workers either
with or without an extra compensation (24.1% and 24.4% respectively) or delegate the work
entirely to one incumbent worker (8.5%). Other firms try to overcome the labour shortage by
increasing technical or organisational efficiency (19.6%). 16.6% of firms accept fewer orders
and reduce output, because they do not have the labour force needed. Only few firms (6.8%)
indicate that they do not need the vacancy any longer due to changes in the product market
situation.
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Figure 3.4: Reaction of firms towards failure in filling their vacancy
3.6. Theoretical explanations
In the following section we discuss in how far different theories are able to explain the
recruitment pattern, which we observe.
3.6.1 Summary: Empirical findings
Our results show that more than 80% of firms plan to need more than four weeks to recruit a
worker. This suggests that most firms do not intend to hire immediately. They rather screen
and gather applications until they have enough suitable applicants so that the chances of
hiring one of them is sufficiently high. In line with the evidence by van Ours and Ridder
(1992), we also find that the majority of applicants arrive early. Close to and especially after
the intended starting date, the number of additionally arriving applicants is low.
We also show that the vacancy-filling hazard rate increases during the planned search
duration, that most hiring takes place around the initially intended starting date, and that
after the intended starting date the vacancy-filling hazard falls. At the same time the fraction
of suitable applicants decreases.
If firms have not received enough applications from suitable candidates, they activate
additional search channels to increase the number of applications. The additionally acti-
vated search channels have a lower return than the initially activated ones. Firms which
are unable to hire until the intended starting date are more willing to hire workers with a
qualification or experience below the initially required level or a previously unemployed
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workers. In addition, they become more and more willing to bargain over wages and pay
wages above the initially intended level. The shape of the vacancy-filling hazard suggests
that the higher willingness to bargain over wages increases as the likelihood to hire some-
body decreases.
3.6.2 Planned search duration and the increasing hazard until the intended starting date
Burdett and Cunningham (1994) and Burdett and Cunningham (1998) suggest that firms
want to wait with hiring because of advance notice of workers who want to leave the firm
and need to be replaced in a few weeks/months time. Another reason for observing planned
search durations is that firms decide to gather a sufficiently high number of suitable appli-
cants before starting to negotiate over pay. The reason is that firms are able to pay lower
wages if the number of applicants exceeds the number of firms competing for them as Al-
brecht et al. (2006) or Gautier and Holzner (2018) show.
In a random search model with advance notice Burdett and Cunningham (1994) and
Burdett and Cunningham (1998) show – in the spirit of van den Berg (1990) – that the longer
the advance notice the pickier firms are and that firms lower their reservation productivity
as the intended starting date approaches. This explains the increasing hazard rate as the
intended starting date approaches.
If applicants arrive at a Poisson rate – as dynamic search models generally assume
– then gathering applicants can also explain the increasing vacancy-filling hazard during
the planned search duration. The Poisson arrival rate of applicants predicts over time an
increase in the number of firms which have gathered sufficiently many applicants to let
them compete for the job. Thus, an increasing number of firms will hire as time passes.
3.6.3 Number of (suitable) applicants and decreasing hazard after the intended starting
date
Traditional search models which assume that workers randomly search have difficulties in
explaining the decline in applicants over time and the decrease in the vacancy-filling haz-
ard after the intended starting date. Instead, stock-flow matching models as proposed by
Coles and Muthoo (1998) and Coles and Smith (1998) and more recently by Ebrahimy and
Shimer (2010) and Carrillo-Tudela and Hawkins (2016) are build to explain this pattern.
Newly posted vacancies initially receive many applications from the stock of job seekers. If
a vacancy cannot be filled by matching with an applicant from the stock of job seekers, it
has to wait until new workers start to search. Since the inflow of new job seekers is small
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compared to the stock of job seekers, the number of new applicants and the vacancy-filling
hazard drops after a vacancy was unable to match with somebody from the stock of job
seekers. Another explanation for the decreasing number of applicants and the decreasing
vacancy-filling hazard over time is provided by research on phantom vacancies by Cheron
and Decreuse (2016) and Albrecht et al. (2017). Especially the latter paper, which combines
directed search with phantom vacancies, is able to explain this pattern. Phantom vacancies
are vacancies which are still advertised although they are no longer available either because
somebody has already been hired or because the screening process is already at such an
advanced stage that it is unlikely that the firm will consider late arriving applications. Al-
brecht et al. (2017) show that workers anticipate this and are more likely to apply to newly
posted vacancies than to older vacancies. Thus, the number of arriving applicants and the
vacancy-filling hazard decrease over time.
3.6.4 Reservation productivity and wages
The increased willingness to make concessions after the intended starting date can be ex-
plained with stock-flow matching. The decline in potential matching partners after a firm
failed to hire somebody from the stock of job seekers decreases its outside option. Thus,
firms that remain unlucky and cannot find a suitable worker until the intended starting date
are willing to make concessions by accepting workers with a lower qualification or experi-
ence or by increasing their willingness to bargain over pay and to pay higher wages than
initially intended.
The increased willingness to make concessions or pay higher wages is difficult to ex-
plain with other models. Take for example the directed search model with phantom va-
cancies as in Albrecht et al. (2017). If firms fail to find a suitable worker until the intended
starting date, it would be optimal for them to post this information and signal to job seek-
ers that they are no phantoms. They would then receive equally many applications as new
vacancies and there would be no need to make concessions.
3.6.5 Missing element I: Screening applicants
One reason for not hiring immediately is the need to screen applicants. The models we are
aware of are not explicitly modelling the time needed to screen applicants. Directed search
models or stock-flow matching models, in which sorting and screening of workers is as-
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sumed to take place instantaneously,13 could be amended to account for a planned search
duration. And heterogeneity in planned search durations could be explained with hetero-
geneity in the time needed to screen applicants.
A directed search model with screening might be able to explain the increasing vacancy-
filling hazard. If directed search is embedded in a dynamic model, where workers randomly
(at a Poisson rate) receive notice about an available vacancy, workers will apply at a Poisson
rate. If one further assumes economies of scale in screening, firms will wait until they have
enough applications collected. The increasing hazard during the planned search duration
can then again be explained by the Poisson arrival rate, which predicts that the number of
firms which have gathered sufficiently many applicants increases over time.
If one introduces a screening period into a stock-flow matching model, then one might
be able to explain the increase in the vacancy-filling hazard during the planned search du-
ration. If firms follow a sequential screen policy, because screening is time-consuming and
time is costly, then it seems plausible that firms will use a reservation productivity rule in
order to decide when to stop screening. Given the number of applicants a firm received
(from the stock of job seekers) and the expected low inflow of new job seekers, the reser-
vation productivity should be decreasing over time as less and less unscreened applicants
are left. Thus, as time progresses, it becomes more and more likely that one of the screened
applicants passes the reservation productivity threshold and hiring takes place.
3.6.6 Missing element II: Increasing the workload if firms do not hire
Vacancies which fail to hire report having received not enough applications from suitable
candidates although they searched more intensely. They also report that applicants were
not willing to accept their low wage offers. These firms were apparently not willing to meet
the higher wage demands to secure a hire. The fact that most of them spread the tasks of the
vacant position among incumbent workers (with or without extra pay) suggests that this is
the cheaper option for them. We are not aware of any theory which considers this inside
option when deciding on which wage to offer.
13See Guerrieri et al. (2010), Shao (2014), Chang (2018), Guerrieri and Shimer (2014), Chen et al. (2016),
Williams (2016), Davoodalhosseini (2019), Holzner and Watanabe (2018) for directed search models with screen-
ing and Coles and Muthoo (1998), Coles and Smith (1998), Ebrahimy and Shimer (2010), and Carrillo-Tudela
and Hawkins (2016) for stock-flow matching models with screening.
107
EDUCATION AND THE LABOUR MARKET
3.7. Conclusion
In this paper we identify new patterns about the recruitment behaviour of firms. We use en-
tropy balancing on observable vacancy characteristics to generate synthetic control groups
for firms which have been unlucky in the search process. In addition, we are able to control
for unobserved vacancy characteristics by controlling for planned search durations. Us-
ing this method, we show that the vacancy-filling hazard is increasing during the planned
search period and decreases thereafter, that most applicants arrive early in the recruitment
process, and that the willingness to pay higher wages or to hire less qualified or experienced
applicants increases for firms which have been unlucky and unable to hire until the intended
starting date.
We compare our findings with the predictions of different theories and argue that
stock-flow matching models – if suitably amended by a time-consuming screening technol-
ogy – are able to explain the whole recruitment pattern which we observe. Other theories
are only partly able to explain our findings. For example, a dynamic directed search model
with phantom vacancies and screening is able to explain the initially increasing and later
decreasing vacancy-filling hazard, it is, however, unable to explain why firms should be
willing to make concessions once they fail to hire initially.
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Appendix C
C.1 Planned duration and hazard rates
Table C.1: Determinants of planned search duration (OLS-regression)
Dependent Variable: Log of planned search duration
Low qualification required -0.2794***
(0.0207)
High qualification required 0.1331***
(0.0159)
Experience required 0.0481***
(0.0101)
Permanent position 0.0628***
(0.0115)
Full-time employment 0.0419***
(0.0128)
Seasonal employment -0.0735***
(0.0247)
Temporary employment -0.2207***
(0.0168)
Log of firm size (employees) -0.0086**
(0.0037)
Financial constraints -0.0240
(0.0202)
Low sales -0.0309**
(0.0147)
Skilled labour shortage -0.0785***
(0.0190)
Nr. of Obs. 52,336
R2 0.1392
Results represent OLS-results with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables for year, industry, region, month of search start and day within month
of search start are not reported. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01.
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Table C.2: Hazard rates for different planned search duration
Weeks Weeks of planned search duration
relative to 0 4 8 13 17 all
the intended nr. at risk
starting date (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-18 0.3196 7,620
-17 0.0177 0.0469 8,918
-16 0.0033 0.0161 8,779
-15 0.0194 0.0273 9,282
-14 0.0070 0.0237 9,329
-13 0.0232 0.0983 0.0771 15,314
-12 0.0063 0.0162 0.0165 15,727
-11 0.0224 0.0386 0.0341 16,651
-10 0.0122 0.0244 0.0226 16,932
-9 0.1571 0.2050 0.1323 17,230
-8 0.0318 0.0365 0.0310 0.0511 26,791
-7 0.0115 0.0929 0.0964 0.0553 26,501
-6 0.0560 0.0572 0.0485 0.0649 28,452
-5 0.0341 0.3636 0.1377 0.1169 27,656
-4 0.1181 0.3037 0.0778 0.3377 0.1921 37,888
-3 0.0690 0.1008 0.2995 0.1214 0.1212 32,424
-2 0.3006 0.3021 0.1644 0.2510 0.2763 32,760
-1 0.2040 0.2020 0.1369 0.1194 0.2567 25,446
0 0.4729 0.3142 0.2937 0.2446 0.2388 0.3537 23,480
1 0.1472 0.1714 0.1042 0.0961 0.0770 0.1630 15,175
2 0.1615 0.2389 0.2357 0.1919 0.1667 0.2266 12,701
3 0.0824 0.1456 0.1114 0.0499 0.0605 0.1331 9,823
4 0.2396 0.2935 0.1408 0.2850 0.3249 0.2340 8,516
5 0.0765 0.0858 0.2308 0.0668 0.0332 0.1282 6,523
6 0.0918 0.1776 0.0899 0.1575 0.1717 0.1426 5,687
7 0.0555 0.1034 0.1547 0.0652 0.0777 0.1112 4,876
8 0.2109 0.1328 0.0686 0.2939 0.1854 0.1530 4,334
9 0.0492 0.2128 0.2810 0.0644 0.2759 0.1885 3,671
10 0.0853 0.0946 0.0721 0.1697 0.1048 0.0967 2,979
11 0.0612 0.1597 0.1452 0.0718 0.1596 0.1249 2,691
12 0.0782 0.0604 0.1029 0.0893 0.0886 0.0828 2,355
13 0.1837 0.2401 0.3013 0.3072 0.3056 0.2347 2,160
14 0.0736 0.0547 0.0534 0.0755 0.1600 0.0823 1,653
15 0.1005 0.1079 0.1452 0.1020 0.2857 0.1239 1,517
16 0.0442 0.0767 0.0708 0.1250 0.1000 0.0745 1,329
17 0.2092 0.2875 0.2284 0.4026 0.9259 0.2504 1,230
18 0.0275 0.0493 0.3026 0.1087 1.0000 0.1182 922
19 0.0636 0.1887 0.1226 0.2195 0.1353 813
20 0.0415 0.0640 0.1183 0.1563 0.0953 703
21 0.2165 0.1118 0.0976 0.9259 0.1965 636
22 0.0452 0.2448 0.4459 1.0000 0.2172 511
23 0.0474 0.0833 0.0976 0.0725 400
24 0.0552 0.1515 0.2432 0.1267 371
Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
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Table C.3: Hazard-Ratios of Filling a Vacancy
Weeks Exponential Cox-Proportion Competing Risk
relative to Hazard-Model Hazard-Model Model
the intended Hazard-Rates S.E. Hazard-Ratio S.E. Hazard-Ratio S.E.
starting date (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-18 or more 0.0282 (0.0008) 0.2093 (0.0082) 0.1654 (0.0062)
-17 0.0669 (0.0038) 0.4329 (0.0260) 0.3687 (0.0216)
-16 0.0247 (0.0017) 0.1698 (0.0128) 0.1364 (0.0103)
-15 0.0284 (0.0019) 0.2154 (0.0152) 0.1761 (0.0124)
-14 0.0257 (0.0018) 0.2644 (0.0188) 0.2294 (0.0162)
-13 0.1135 (0.0037) 0.6323 (0.0263) 0.5368 (0.0219)
-12 0.0262 (0.0014) 0.1957 (0.0116) 0.1603 (0.0094)
-11 0.0367 (0.0016) 0.2653 (0.0133) 0.2161 (0.0108)
-10 0.0237 (0.0013) 0.2425 (0.0141) 0.2079 (0.0120)
-9 0.1372 (0.0030) 0.8139 (0.0283) 0.6941 (0.0236)
-8 0.0669 (0.0022) 0.5756 (0.0241) 0.4911 (0.0203)
-7 0.0697 (0.0017) 0.4483 (0.0164) 0.3667 (0.0135)
-6 0.0693 (0.0017) 0.5957 (0.0220) 0.5052 (0.0185)
-5 0.1221 (0.0022) 0.9717 (0.0319) 0.8147 (0.0263)
-4 0.2318 (0.0031) 1.4820 (0.0457) 1.2302 (0.0374)
-3 0.1698 (0.0024) 1.2179 (0.0380) 0.9903 (0.0309)
-2 0.2911 (0.0032) 2.1810 (0.0655) 1.7837 (0.0534)
-1 0.2788 (0.0035) 2.5579 (0.0781) 2.0416 (0.0628)
0 0.3598 (0.0045) 2.0535 (0.0620) 1.4553 (0.0451)
1 0.3111 (0.0047) 2.4931 (0.0787) 1.6870 (0.0571)
2 0.2384 (0.0045) 1.6286 (0.0549) 1.2189 (0.0420)
3 0.1419 (0.0040) 1.4993 (0.0595) 1.1897 (0.0478)
4 0.2490 (0.0057) 1.4062 (0.0503) 0.9384 (0.0351)
5 0.1380 (0.0049) 1.1300 (0.0507) 0.8260 (0.0381)
6 0.1529 (0.0055) 1.0857 (0.0492) 0.8964 (0.0410)
7 0.1239 (0.0054) 1.1113 (0.0578) 0.9368 (0.0497)
8 0.1682 (0.0067) 1.1374 (0.0549) 0.8054 (0.0413)
9 0.2076 (0.0081) 1.2413 (0.0594) 0.8321 (0.0427)
10 0.1050 (0.0064) 0.8826 (0.0584) 0.8366 (0.0569)
11 0.1383 (0.0077) 1.0782 (0.0674) 1.1162 (0.0714)
12 0.0898 (0.0066) 0.9253 (0.0723) 0.9493 (0.0764)
13 0.2649 (0.0119) 1.1788 (0.0628) 0.9754 (0.0554)
14 0.0913 (0.0080) 0.9401 (0.0864) 1.1557 (0.1101)
15 0.1403 (0.0104) 0.8954 (0.0714) 1.2167 (0.0984)
16 0.0864 (0.0087) 0.9697 (0.1036) 1.4527 (0.1592)
17 0.2840 (0.0165) 1.1432 (0.0739) 1.2510 (0.0866)
18 0.1330 (0.0131) 1.0114 (0.1031) 1.5258 (0.1625)
19 0.1506 (0.0148) 0.9416 (0.0958) 1.6744 (0.1723)
20 0.1113 (0.0137) 0.9344 (0.1198) 2.0282 (0.2665)
21 0.2310 (0.0208) 0.9185 (0.0879) 1.3928 (0.1421)
22 0.2528 (0.0243) 1.2021 (0.1220) 2.3795 (0.2558)
23 0.0874 (0.0162) 0.5344 (0.1021) 1.2468 (0.2420)
24 0.1370 (0.0211) 0.9871 (0.1508) 2.7707 (0.4253)
25 0.1885 (0.0264) 1.0691 (0.1579) 2.1814 (0.3388)
Low qualification required 1.1184 (0.0148) 1.1081 (0.0141) 1.1074 (0.0147)
High qualification required 0.8348 (0.0089) 0.8285 (0.0086) 0.8675 (0.0085)
Full-time employment 0.9335 (0.0101) 0.9838 (0.0027) 0.9865 (0.0027)
Financial constraints 0.9722 (0.0158) 0.9751 (0.0155) 0.9377 (0.0147)
Low sales 1.0173 (0.0119) 1.0144 (0.0116) 0.9884 (0.0113)
Skilled labour shortage 0.6484 (0.0089) 0.6447 (0.0087) 0.5450 (0.0074)
Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
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Figure C.1: Hazard rates since search start
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C.2 Robustness checks
This section investigates whether the results are robust to including also vacancies with a
shorter planned search duration or if we use instead of entropy balancing radius matching.
Sample including vacancies with shorter planned search duration
In the previous section, we restricted the sample to vacancies with more than 28 days of
planned search duration to account for unobservable characteristics of a vacancy. E.g. a
firm indicating a shorter planned search period might be exposed to a certain limitation
(e.g. a short term order which has to be fulfilled) and simply needs a new employee as fast
as possible. Therefore, such firms might differ in their way of searching for a worker or in
their willingness to accept less qualified candidates in contrast to other firms which do not
suffer such restrictions.
Table C.5 in the Appendix displays the results for problems during the recruitment
process for the unrestricted sample with entropy balancing weights. As in our benchmark
specification in section 3.5 early hires report significantly fewer problems because of not
having enough suitable applicants or higher wage demands by applicant in contrast to the
in time group and even more so in contrast to the delayed and failed groups. The results are
also similar for the number of (suitable) applicants and the fraction of suitable applicants
as shown in Table C.6 in the Appendix, i.e., the number of applicants increases from the
groups early to the groups in time and delayed and decreases again for the group failed. The
fraction of suitable applicants among all applicants decreases from the highest value for
the early group down to the lowest value for the delayed group (suitable applicants are not
available for failed vacancies). The picture remains also unchanged for the increase in search
intensity, which we observed in the restricted sample (see Table C.7 in the Appendix). Also
the pattern of how firms adjust the single search channels remains the same. Table C.8 in the
Appendix shows that vacancies, which are not able to hire early, are like in the benchmark
case more and more willing to hire applicants, who are unemployed or have an experience
or a qualification lower than initially required. Also wage bargaining, payment above the
initially intended level, and the hourly wage of all hired workers follows a similar pattern
as in the benchmark case (see Table C.9 in the Appendix). The difference in hourly wages
between the groups early and in-time is no longer statistically significant, but the sign is the
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same.14 The results for the sub-sample of matches, in which no concessions were made,
are also generally in line with the benchmark case. That the results are robust to including
vacancies with a planned search duration shorter than 28 days is comforting and shows that
the documented dynamics of the recruitment pattern holds in general.
Table C.4: Raw and weighted covariate means with entropy balancing weights
Means Means Means Means1 Means
Variable In Time Early Delayed In Time Failed
Raw EB Raw EB Raw EB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Planned search duration 60.633 112.454 60.640 67.474 60.651 62.094 125.563 62.010
(0.014) (0.031) (0.007)
Low qualification required 0.114 0.064 0.114 0.086 0.114 0.119 0.091 0.119
(-0.001) (0.008) (-0.015)
High qualification required 0.189 0.256 0.189 0.265 0.189 0.182 0.238 0.182
(0.001) (0.005) (-0.011)
Experience required 0.444 0.468 0.444 0.493 0.444 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(0.000) (0.011)
Permanent position 0.444 0.510 0.444 0.529 0.444 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(0.000) (0.016)
Full time position 0.782 0.789 0.782 0.852 0.782 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(0.001) (0.026)
Seasonal work 0.068 0.041 0.068 0.042 0.068 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(-0.001) (-0.007)
Temporary employment 0.171 0.128 0.171 0.101 0.171 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(-0.001) (-0.011)
Log of firm size (employees) 3.848 3.813 3.848 3.922 3.848 3.837 3.710 3.837
(0.000) (0.020) (0.008)
Financial distress 0.071 0.063 0.071 0.070 0.071 0.059 0.080 0.059
(0.000) (-0.001) (-0.007)
Low sales 0.153 0.130 0.153 0.168 0.153 0.140 0.177 0.140
(0.000) (0.000) (-0.014)
Skilled labour shortage 0.085 0.061 0.085 0.193 0.085 0.086 0.331 0.086
(0.000) (0.066) (-0.008)
No. of Obs. 20,579 20,256 9,878 13,817 4,005
t-statistics are reported in parentheses below respective values and refer to a two sided t-test against the unweighted mean of the In Time Group. Thereby, the
t-statistics in row (3) and (5) refer to a t-test against the means of row (1), while the t-statistics in row (8) refer to the means in row (6). Raw means are unweighted
means while the rows, marked with “EB” represent weighted means by an entropy balancing procedure. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
1 The difference between Means In Time in this row and the respective means from row (1) is due to a lack of data for failed vacancies for several years in contrast
to vacancies, which were filled. This also explains the difference in the number of observations for row (1) and row (6).
14For hourly wages of previously unemployed workers hired early, we are unable to present results, because
the entropy balancing weights obtained for this small sample (wages are only available in 2014) are due to
the lack of common support (the planned search duration in the early group has to be longer than 28 days by
definition, while the planned search duration in the in time group includes a majority of vacancies with less then
28 days of planned search duration) are equal to zero.
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Table C.5: Problems in the recruitment process - OLS with Entropy Balancing (full sample)
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not enough suitable applicants 0.1126 -0.0553*** 0.1689*** 0.4287***
(Standard Error) (0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0109)
Nr. of Obs. 21,646 15,534 11,645 4,928
Pay claim of applicants too high 0.0475 -0.0230*** 0.0753*** 0.2503***
(Standard Error) (0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0096)
Nr. of Obs. 28,524 20,326 14,589 4,928
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region
and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates
p < 0.01. Data for “Not enough suitable applicants”: German Job Vacancy Survey 2009-2014. Data for “Pay claim of applicants too high”: German Job Vacancy
Survey 2010-2014.
Table C.6: Applicants and suitable applicants - OLS with Entropy Balancing (full sample)
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of applicants 14.4071 -2.8221*** 1.7537*** -2.2941***
(Standard Error) (0.5520) (0.3331) (0.7168)
Nr. of Obs. 24,911 17,516 13,270 2,104
Number of suitable applicants 4.3431 -0.8496*** -0.1587*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.1145) (0.1060) ()
Nr. of Obs. 24,801 17,403 13,097
Fraction of suitable applicants 0.5343 0.0795*** -0.0922*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0061) (0.0038) ()
Nr. of Obs. 24,253 17,012 12,919
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region
and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates
p < 0.01. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
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Table C.7: Search channels - OLS with Entropy Balancing (full sample)
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of search channels activated 1.7683 -0.1836*** 0.3405*** 0.5547***
(Standard Error) (0.0139) (0.0113) (0.0522)
Nr. of Obs. 28,524 20,326 14,589 920
Use of search channel: Classic 0.4691 -0.0921*** 0.1169*** -0.1013***
(Standard Error) (0.0073) (0.0053) (0.0081)
Nr. of Obs. 28,524 20,326 14,589 4,928
Use of search channel: Internal 0.2163 0.0036*** 0.0543*** 0.0445***
(Standard Error (0.0065) (0.0047) (0.0089)
Nr. of Obs. 28,524 20,326 14,589 4,928
Use of search channel: Speculative 0.2664 -0.0319*** 0.0332*** 0.0116***
(Standard Error) (0.0068) (0.0051) (0.0236)
Nr. of Obs. 28,524 20,326 14,589 920
Use of search channel: Network 0.4354 0.0661*** 0.0003*** 0.0291***
(Standard Error) (0.0081) (0.0056) (0.0263)
Nr. of Obs. 28,524 20,326 14,589 920
Use of search channel: PEA 0.3811 -0.1292*** 0.1358*** 0.2293***
(Standard Error) (0.0072) (0.0056) (0.0133)
Nr. of Obs. 28,524 20,326 14,589 2,860
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region
and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates
p < 0.01. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
Table C.8: Concessions related to worker characteristics - OLS with Entropy Balancing (full
sample)
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experience lower than required 0.0905 -0.0277*** 0.0634*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0044) (0.0039)
Nr. of Obs. 27,197 19,480 13,627
Qualification lower than required 0.0722 -0.0194*** 0.0565*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0041) (0.0037)
Nr. of Obs. 26,932 19,339 13,312
Hired previously unemployed 0.3984 -0.0899*** 0.0037*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0075) (0.0054)
Nr. of Obs. 28,524 20,326 14,589
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region
and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates
p < 0.01. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
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Table C.9: Concessions related to wages - OLS with Entropy Balancing (full sample)
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage bargaining 0.3020 -0.0127*** 0.0614*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0124) (0.0094)
Nr. of Obs. 7,854 5,978 4,406
Paid more than intended 0.0802 -0.0072*** 0.0449*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0042) (0.0034)
Nr. of Obs. 28,227 20,092 14,444
Hourly wage (Euro) 13.0253 0.1416*** 0.2223*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.1280) (0.1008)
Nr. of Obs. 3,842 2,514 2,330
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region
and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates
p < 0.01. Data for “Wage bargaining took place": German Job Vacancy Survey 2011-2013. Data for “Average hourly wage": German Job Vacancy Survey 2014.
Data for “Paid more than intended": German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
Table C.10: Concessions related to wages - controlled for qualification and experience - OLS
with Entropy Balancing (full sample)
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
previously employed workers
Wage bargaining 0.3142 -0.0014*** 0.0762*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0147) (0.0130)
Nr. of Obs. 4,535 4,467 2,333
Paid more than intended 0.0767 0.0029*** 0.0516*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0054) (0.0050)
Nr. of Obs. 14,441 13,680 7,106
Hourly wage (Euro) 13.86 -0.0802*** 0.1791*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.1696) (0.1440)
Nr. of Obs. 2,260 1,814 1,250
previously unemployed workers
Wage bargaining 0.243 -0.0427*** 0.0672*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0249) (0.0196)
Nr. of Obs. 2,139 796 963
Paid more than intended 0.0610 -0.0112*** 0.0224*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0073) (0.0056)
Nr. of Obs. 11,466 2,855 4,807
Hourly wage (Euro) 13.22 N.A. *** 0.1672*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.1732)
Nr. of Obs. 3,176 1,710
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with entropy balancing
weights. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region
and year are not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates
p < 0.01. Data for “Wage bargaining took place": German Job Vacancy Survey 2011-2013. Data for “Average hourly wage": German Job Vacancy Survey 2014.
Data for “Paid more than intended": German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
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Radius matching with the baseline sample
As an alternative to the entropy balancing approach, we use a radius matching approach to
match the in time group with the early, delayed and failed hires. The literature on propensity
score matching suggests to use radius matching proposed by Huber et al. (2015), Lechner
et al. (2011), and Lechner and Wunsch (2009), because it allows for a relatively high pre-
cision especially in settings when many good comparison observations are available. The
approach is a combination of propensity score matching and nearest neighbour matching.
After calculating the propensity score of belonging to the groups early, delayed or failed hires
respectively, a radius is formed around each observation in group in time. Every observation
in this radius is then used to form a synthetic control observation in the group early, delayed
or failed hires respectively, where all control observations are weighted by inverse probabil-
ity weighting, based on their distance towards the observations in the in time group. This
approach is applied onto the restricted sample with vacancies, which have more than 28
days of planned search duration to control also unobservable dimensions.15
The radius matching approach is unlike the entropy balancing approach not always
able to match the mean of the covariates. The reported t-statistics in Table C.11 in the Ap-
pendix suggest that the means of the planned search duration, the low and high qualifica-
tion requirement, full-time job, temporary job, firm size, low sales, financial constraints, and
skilled labour shortage between the in time group and at least for one of the comparison
groups early, delayed or failed are statistically significantly different. In the respective OLS-
regressions we control again for the set of covariates used in the matching. Not surprisingly,
we find that in some cases the coefficients with and without the control of the matching
covariates differ significantly. However, the differences are small in size.
Despite the insufficient balancing of covariates due to radius matching, the results
are qualitatively the same as with entropy balancing. This can be seen by comparing the
respective Tables C.12 to C.17 in the Appendix with the respective Tables in section 3.5.
15We also used the standard propensity score and nearest neighbour matching estimator. The results are very
similar.
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Table C.11: Raw and weighted covariate means with radius matching weights
Means Means Means Means1 Means
Variable In Time Early Delayed In Time Failed
Raw RM Raw RM Raw RM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Planned search duration (log) 3.967 4.566 3.967 4.034 3.934 3.971 4.548 4.230
(0.035) (-5.196) (27.244)
Low qualification required 0.113 0.064 0.125 0.086 0.108 0.114 0.090 0.088
(3.746) (-1.236) (-5.427)
High qualification required 0.189 0.256 0.172 0.265 0.178 0.186 0.244 0.189
(-4.206) (-2.108) (0.542)
Experience required 0.445 0.468 0.441 0.493 0.451 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(-0.890) (1.028)
Permanent position 0.444 0.510 0.448 0.529 0.445 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(0.679) (0.186)
Full time position 0.782 0.789 0.785 0.852 0.798 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(0.620) (3.183)
Seasonal work 0.068 0.041 0.071 0.042 0.063 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(1.121) (-1.873)
Temporary employment 0.171 0.128 0.176 0.100 0.151 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(1.414) (-4.188)
Log of firm size (employees) 3.848 3.813 3.848 3.922 3.848 3.823 3.704 3.746
(-0.010) (-0.048) (-3.344)
Financial distress 0.071 0.063 0.065 0.070 0.068 0.070 0.091 0.057
(-2.382) (-1.008) (-3.544)
Low sales 0.153 0.130 0.148 0.168 0.145 0.153 0.191 0.141
(-1.300) (-1.644) (-2.115)
Skilled labour shortage 0.085 0.061 0.075 0.193 0.083 0.084 0.321 0.162
(-3.477) (-0.450) (16.848)
N 20,568 19,206 9,522 22,485 5,067
t-statistics are reported in parentheses below respective values and refer to a two sided t-test against the unweighted mean of the In Time Group. Thereby, the
t-statistics in row (3) and (5) refer to a t-test against the means of row (1), while the t-statistics in row (8) refer to the means in row (6). Raw means are unweighted
means while the rows, marked with “RM” represent means calculated by using the means of a radius matching approach. Data: German Job Vacancy Survey
2005-2014.
1 The difference between Means In Time in this row and the respective means from row (1) is due to a lack of data for failed vacancies for several years in contrast
to vacancies, which were filled. However, fewer matching variables might also lead to a greater common support between treatment and control group. These
two factors explain the difference in the number of observations for row (1) and row (6).
Table C.12: Problems in the recruitment process - Radius matching
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not enough suitable applicants 0.1239 -0.0563*** 0.1740*** 0.4296***
(Standard Error) (0.0052) (0.0071) (0.0109)
Nr. of Obs. 15,863 14,729 7,653 5,067
Pay claim of applicants too high 0.0522 -0.0258*** 0.0833*** 0.2464***
(Standard Error) (0.0028) (0.0050) (0.0087)
Nr. of Obs. 20,568 19,206 9,522 5,067
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with with weights,
generated with the radius matching approach. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are
not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01.
Data for “Not enough suitable applicants”: German Job Vacancy Survey 2009-2014. Data for “Pay claim of applicants too high”: German Job Vacancy Survey
2010-2014.
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Table C.13: Applicants and suitable applicants - Radius matching
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of applicants 16.1985 -2.9223*** 1.5266*** -4.1774***
(Standard Error) (0.5368) (0.5393) (0.7306)
Nr. of Obs. 18,366 16,553 8,770 1,767
Number of suitable applicants 4.6477 -0.8781*** -0.0570*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.1290) (0.1946) ()
Nr. of Obs. 18,230 16,437 8,652
Fraction of suitable applicants 0.5035 0.0819*** -0.0812*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0059) (0.0050) ()
Nr. of Obs. 17,935 16,075 8,564
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with with weights,
generated with the radius matching approach. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are
not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01.
Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
Table C.14: Search channels - Radius matching
Group In Time Difference to
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of search channels activated 1.8412 -0.1984*** 0.3458*** 0.5438***
(Standard Error) (0.0148) (0.0156) (0.0533)
Nr. of Obs. 20,568 19,206 9,522 794
Use of search channel: Classic 0.5292 -0.1033*** 0.1133*** -0.1538***
(Standard Error) (0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0074)
Nr. of Obs. 20,568 19,206 9,522 5,067
Use of search channel: Internal 0.2416 -0.0039*** 0.0612*** 0.0443***
(Standard Error) (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0092)
Nr. of Obs. 20,568 19,206 9,522 4,082
Use of search channel: Speculative 0.2660 -0.0282*** 0.0377*** 0.0180***
(Standard Error) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0243)
Nr. of Obs. 20,568 19,206 9,522 794
Use of search channel: Network 0.4044 0.0738*** 0.0135*** 0.0409***
(Standard Error) (0.0081) (0.0076) (0.0253)
Nr. of Obs. 20,568 19,206 9,522 794
Use of search channel: PEA 0.3998 -0.1367*** 0.1201*** 0.2040***
(Standard Error) (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0132)
Nr. of Obs. 20,568 19,206 9,522 2,406
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with with weights,
generated with the radius matching approach. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are
not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01.
Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
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Table C.15: Concessions related to worker characteristics - Radius matching
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experience lower than required 0.0956 -0.0312*** 0.0566*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0044) (0.0053)
Nr. of Obs. 19,604 18,411 8,907
Qualification lower than required 0.0758 -0.0262*** 0.0526*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0041) (0.0051)
Nr. of Obs. 19,389 18,278 8,674
Hired previously unemployed 0.3570 -0.0839*** 0.0257*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0072) (0.0073)
Nr. of Obs. 20,568 19,206 9,522
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with with weights,
generated with the radius matching approach. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are
not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01.
Data: German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
Table C.16: Concessions related to wages - Radius matching
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage bargaining 0.3177 -0.0100*** 0.0648*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0129) (0.0125)
Nr. of Obs. 6,037 5,710 3,025
Paid more than intended 0.0860 -0.0016*** 0.0508*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0045) (0.0049)
Nr. of Obs. 20,359 18,990 9,421
Hourly wage (Euro) 13.1913 0.4166*** 0.4865*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.1406) (0.1423)
Nr. of Obs. 2,576 2,328 1,462
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with with weights,
generated with the radius matching approach. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are
not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01.
Data for “Wage bargaining took place": German Job Vacancy Survey 2011-2013. Data for “Average hourly wage": German Job Vacancy Survey 2014. Data for
“Paid more than intended": German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
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Table C.17: Concessions related to wages - controlled for qualification and experience -
Radius matching
Group In Time Difference between In Time and
(Mean) Early Delayed Failed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
previously employed workers
Wage bargaining 0.3242 0.0199*** 0.0660*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0159) (0.0167)
Nr. of Obs. 3,621 4,303 1,660
Paid more than intended 0.0810 0.0007*** 0.0545*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0054) (0.0068)
Nr. of Obs. 11,085 13,079 4,840
Hourly wage (Euro) 13.93 0.4139*** 0.3188*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.2053) (0.2092)
Nr. of Obs. 1,558 1,724 792
previously unemployed workers
Wage bargaining 0.2674 -0.0542*** 0.0553*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0253) (0.0271)
Nr. of Obs. 1,440 733 588
Paid more than intended 0.0542 -0.0081*** 0.0438*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.0071) (0.0088)
Nr. of Obs. 5,660 3,243 1,995
Hourly wage (Euro) 11.88 0.3047*** 0.7651*** N.A. ***
(Standard Error) (0.2488) (0.2738)
Nr. of Obs. 530 300 232
Differences are the coefficients of the respective indicator variables for belonging to the group Early, Delayed or Failed in an OLS regression with with weights,
generated with the radius matching approach. Covariates of firm and vacancy characteristics are not reported. Interaction dummies between region and year are
not reported. 3 digit occupational dummies (based on ISCO-88 classification) are not reported. * indicates p < 0.1,** indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.01.
Data for “Wage bargaining took place": German Job Vacancy Survey 2011-2013. Data for “Average hourly wage": German Job Vacancy Survey 2014. Data for
“Paid more than intended": German Job Vacancy Survey 2005-2014.
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